United States v. Boggs , 100 F. App'x 188 ( 2004 )


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  •               Vacated by Supreme Court, January 24, 2005
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                              No. 03-4574
    ROBERT WAYNE BOGGS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
    William L. Osteen, District Judge.
    (CR-02-29)
    Argued: May 7, 2004
    Decided: June 9, 2004
    Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and
    Pasco M. BOWMAN, Senior Circuit Judge of the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
    sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Eric David Placke, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
    OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant
    United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON
    2                      UNITED STATES v. BOGGS
    BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
    Attorney, L. Patrick Auld, Assistant United States Attorney, Greens-
    boro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Robert Wayne Boggs appeals his conviction and 284-month sen-
    tence for kidnapping, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1201
    (a)(1) (2000);
    transmitting a ransom demand in interstate commerce, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 875
    (a) (2000); and carrying and using firearms during a
    crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
    Boggs’s only contention is that the district court abused its discretion
    by denying his request for a third evaluation to determine his compe-
    tence to stand trial. We find no abuse of discretion and therefore
    affirm.
    "The conviction of a defendant when he is legally incompetent is
    a violation of due process." United States v. Mason, 
    52 F.3d 1286
    ,
    1289 (4th Cir. 1995). The district court must order a competency
    hearing under 
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    (a) (2000) if there is reasonable cause
    to believe the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental
    defect rendering him incompetent to stand trial. "The test for mental
    competence is whether the defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to
    consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
    standing and whether he has a rational as well as factual understand-
    ing of the proceedings against him.’" Mason, 
    52 F.3d at 1289
    (quoting Dusky v. United States, 
    362 U.S. 402
    , 402 (1960) (per
    curiam)); see also 
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    (a). Indicia of competence can
    include a defendant’s behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any medical
    opinion on competence. Mason, 
    52 F.3d at 1290
     (citations omitted).
    UNITED STATES v. BOGGS                        3
    This court’s review of a district court’s refusal to order a competency
    determination is for abuse of discretion. United States v. West, 
    877 F.2d 281
    , 285 n.1 (4th Cir. 1989).
    Two previous psychological examinations had concluded that
    Boggs was competent to stand trial. At a hearing on the motion for
    a third evaluation of Boggs’s competency, which the district court
    conducted with great care and thoughtfulness, Boggs demonstrated an
    understanding of the legal system and of the nature of the charges
    against him. Boggs argues, as he did to the district court, that his
    rejection of the government’s offer of a favorable plea agreement was
    influenced by the delusions already explored fully in the two previous
    psychological examinations. The district court conducted an extended
    colloquy with Boggs and gave thorough consideration to this argu-
    ment, concluding that Boggs’s rejection of the plea agreement was
    supported by a rational thought process and that Boggs was able to
    assess his options with a "‘reasonable degree of rational understand-
    ing.’" Mason, 
    52 F.3d at 1289
     (quoting Dusky, 
    362 U.S. at 402
    ). In
    the circumstances presented here, we cannot say the district court
    erred in determining there was no reasonable cause to believe Boggs
    was incompetent to stand trial.
    Accordingly, we affirm Boggs’s conviction and sentence.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-4574

Citation Numbers: 100 F. App'x 188

Judges: Bowman, King, Motz, Pasco, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/9/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023