United States v. Michael Hopson ( 2018 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4724
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL HOPSON, a/k/a O.G., a/k/a Hop, a/k/a Big Homie,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Newport News. Arenda L. Wright-Allen, District Judge. (4:13-cr-00096-AWA-DEM-2)
Submitted: October 18, 2018 Decided: November 5, 2018
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jamison P. Rasberry, RASBERRY LAW, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia; Andrew A.
Protogyrou, PROTOGYROU & RIGNEY, PLC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Tracy
Doherty-McCormick, Acting United States Attorney, Michael J. Frank, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a five-day trial, a jury convicted Michael Hopson of several crimes
related to an extensive racketeering conspiracy. As relevant to this appeal, Hopson was
convicted of racketeering (RICO) conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2012)
(Count 1); murder in aid of racketeering (and aiding and abetting), in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1), (2) (2012) (Count 2); and conspiracy to commit murder in aid of
racketeering, and attempted murder in aid of racketeering (and aiding and abetting), in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(5), 2 (2012) (Counts 6 & 7). The district court
sentenced Hopson to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on Counts 1 and 2, and
concurrent 120-month sentences on Counts 6 and 7. * Hopson appeals, challenging the
sufficiency of the Government’s evidence on these counts of conviction. We affirm.
An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence “must overcome a heavy
burden.” United States v. Robinson, 855 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted). After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, we must decide whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted). It is the jury’s responsibility, “not ours, to resolve conflicts in
the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
*
Hopson was also convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D) (2012) and 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2012), but does not challenge that conviction or the related 60-month concurrent
sentence.
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to ultimate facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding this question, this
court “defer[s] to the jury’s determinations of credibility and resolutions of conflicts in
the evidence, as they are within the sole province of the jury and are not susceptible to
judicial review.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2014). We will
not “overturn a substantially supported verdict” simply because we believe “the verdict
unpalatable” or conclude that “another, reasonable verdict would be preferable.”
Robinson, 855 F.3d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hopson’s primary appellate argument pertains to Count 1. Specifically, Hopson
contends that the Government failed to establish a “sufficient relationship” between the
crimes described by the Government’s witnesses, most of whom were members of the
Black P-Stones (“BPS”), the criminal gang led by Hopson, and an agreement toward a
common purpose. Hopson concedes the instances of criminality these witnesses
described, but posits that the witnesses were engaged in these crimes for their own gain
rather than that of the BPS.
But when the trial evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
Government, with all of the attendant reasonable inferences drawn in the Government’s
favor, see United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219-20 (4th Cir.) (observing that, upon
review of the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion, this Court allows “the government
the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
established”), cert. denied, No. 18-5225, 2018 WL 3417529 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2018), it
supports the jury’s finding that this set of the BPS was a qualifying enterprise and that the
witnesses, led by Hopson, agreed to commit the predicate acts of murder, attempted
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murder, robbery, burglary, and distribution of marijuana, see United States v. Cornell,
780 F.3d 616, 624 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that to sustain a RICO conspiracy
conviction, “[t]he partners in the criminal plan need only agree to pursue the same
criminal objective, regardless of whether that criminal objective is ever started or carried
out” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we have explained, “a RICO enterprise need
not have a rigid structure,” so long as it “at least consist[s] of an ongoing organization
that functions as a continuing unit.” United States v. Pinson, 860 F.3d 152, 162 (4th Cir.
2017) (per curiam) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). This is precisely
what the Government demonstrated vis-à-vis the testimonial evidence regarding BPS
meetings, the ritualized initiation process, the tiered disciplinary regime, and the unified
efforts of BPS members to commit predicate acts. Accord United States v. Olson, 450
F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2006) (observing that, “in informal organizations such as criminal
groups, there must be some structure, to distinguish an enterprise from a mere conspiracy,
but there need not be much” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The record
establishes—at a minimum—that members of the BPS benefited from these individuals’
shared efforts in trafficking illegal drugs, protecting the gang’s territories from outsiders,
and violently discouraging disloyalty within its ranks. We thus conclude the Government
proffered sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the elements of
“relationship” and “purpose,” as required by Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946
(2009).
Hopson next contests the sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt on Count 2, in
which he was charged with murder in aid of racketeering (and aiding and abetting), in
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violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1), (2). This count is related to indicted codefendant
Darius Crenshaw’s murder of fellow BPS member, Enrique Shaw. Hopson contends that
the Government failed to adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he shared
Crenshaw’s criminal intent and, further, that the weight of the trial evidence established
that Crenshaw was acting outside the scope of the BPS when he murdered Shaw.
Under federal law, one who “aids, abets, counsels, commands; induces or
procures” the commission of a crime is punishable as a principal. 18 U.S.C. § 2. To
prove aiding and abetting, the Government must establish the defendant (1) took “an
affirmative act in furtherance of [an] offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the
offense’s commission.” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014).
Fatal to Hopson’s argument is the testimony of Desmond Finnell, another indicted
codefendant and BPS member. Specifically, Finnell testified that Hopson directed
Crenshaw to murder Shaw in retaliation for Shaw’s perceived disloyalty. Accepting
Finnell’s testimony on this point, see Robinson, 855 F.3d at 268, it cannot be disputed
that Hopson acted in furtherance of the murder by ordering Crenshaw to murder Shaw—
even though Hopson was not present for the murder or otherwise involved in its
execution. See United States v. Argueta, 470 F. App’x 176, 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished after argument) (affirming convictions for murder in aid of racketeering and
conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering based on witness testimony that
defendant “‘greenlight[ed]’” the murder). We thus conclude the Government’s evidence
was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict on Count 2 under a theory of aiding and
abetting.
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Finally, we consider Hopson’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the
Government’s evidence of his guilt on Counts 6 and 7. These counts relate to the March
9, 2009, shooting by two other BPS members, Marcellus Williams and Anthony Steward.
Specifically, Williams testified that Arnold Tucker, a rival gang member, had been
searching for, and threatening to kill, Williams. When Williams and Steward happened
upon Tucker’s mother’s home, where they believed Tucker lived, they shot at it
repeatedly. Hopson contends that the Government’s evidence was legally insufficient to
demonstrate his shared criminal intent because (1) Hopson was not present for the
shooting; and (2) the men acted without Hopson’s prior authorization.
This argument, like the prior two, fails to account for the facts viewed in the light
most favorable to the Government. Williams explained that seeking Hopson’s approval
for this shooting was not necessary because Hopson previously directed members of the
BPS to shoot all rival gang members. Other members of the BPS corroborated this
directive. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Hopson—
the identified leader of the BPS who specifically directed BPS members to kill rival gang
members in retaliation for the rival gangs’ attacks on the BPS—was guilty of both
conspiracy to commit murder, and aiding and abetting attempted murder, in aid of
racketeering. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1278 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A
conviction under § 1959(a) will stand even when the underlying crime was sanctioned by
a high-ranking leader of the RICO enterprise, if the high-ranking leader was expected to
act and any failure to do so would have undermined his position in the enterprise.”),
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overruled on other grounds, United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1020-22 (10th
Cir. 2009).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s criminal judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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