Loretta Luke v. Alexander Brown, Jr. , 253 F. App'x 916 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    NOV 15, 2007
    No. 07-13068
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 05-00264-CV-CAP-1
    LORETTA LUKE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ALEXANDER BROWN, JR.,
    J. CLAY, #1662, et al.,
    Defendants,
    DEKALB COUNTY, GA,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    (November 15, 2007)
    Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    This is an appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
    favor of DeKalb County, Georgia, in an action brought under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     by
    Loretta Luke, the mother of Stanley Bates, who was shot and killed by Officer
    Alexander Brown during a confrontation between Bates, Luke, and Officers
    Brown and Clay. Officer Brown shot Bates three times. The first two shots fired
    by Brown were fired in rapid succession using a technique known as “double-
    tapping” or shooting in control pairs. Luke contended in the district court that
    DeKalb County trains its officers to use the double-tap method and that, as a
    matter of policy, the double-tap method is unconstitutional.
    After an investigation, an internal review board determined that Brown was
    not justified in firing the third shot. The board, therefore, found that there was a
    violation of the DeKalb County Police Department policy and permitted Officer
    Brown to resign from the police department in lieu of being terminated.
    The DeKalb County Police Department’s policy under attack in this case is
    that deadly force can only be used when an officer or another person is being
    threatened with deadly force, and that the threat is imminent.
    Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary
    judgment when all “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
    2
    admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
    genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving parties are entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    After reviewing the record, and reading the parties’ briefs, we agree with the
    district court’s finding that the policy in question is not unconstitutional regarding
    the use of force in dealing with suspects armed with weapons at close range. See
    Tennessee v. Garner, 
    471 U.S. 1
    ,
    105 S. Ct. 1694
     (1985). Although it is
    unfortunate that Officer Brown departed from the county’s policy, that departure
    does not mean that the policy itself was unconstitutional or that it was the moving
    force behind the alleged constitutional violation. Accordingly, we affirm the
    district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the county.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-13068

Citation Numbers: 253 F. App'x 916

Judges: Black, Dubina, Per Curiam, Tjoflat

Filed Date: 11/15/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023