New West Materials LLC v. Interior Board of Land Appeals , 216 F. App'x 385 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-2362
NEW WEST MATERIALS LLC; JWR, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
and
CALMAT COMPANY, d/b/a Vulcan Materials
Company,
Plaintiff,
versus
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS; BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT,
Defendants - Appellees.
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NATIONAL STONE, SAND & GRAVEL ASSOCIATION,
Amicus Supporting Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District
Judge. (CA-05-403-TSE-BRP)
Argued: November 29, 2006 Decided: February 8, 2007
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Joseph R. GOODWIN,
United States District Judge for the Southern District of West
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: R. Timothy McCrum, CROWELL & MORING, L.L.P., Washington,
D.C., for Appellants. Elizabeth Ann Peterson, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Environment & Natural Resources Division,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Clifton S. Elgarten,
Daniel W. Wolff, CROWELL & MORING, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for
Appellant New West Materials, L.L.C.; Thomas P. Mains, Jr., Great
Falls, Virginia, Jerry L. Haggard, Phoenix, Arizona, for Appellant
JWR, Incorporated. Barbara B. Fugate, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, D.C.; Richard R.
Greenfield, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Office of the
Solicitor, Phoenix, Arizona; Sue Ellen Wooldridge, Assistant
Attorney General, William B. Lazarus, Gregory D. Page, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Environment & Natural Resources
Division, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Christopher G. Hayes,
Kathleen S. Corr, BJORK, LINDLEY & LITTLE, P.C., Denver, Colorado,
for National Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, Amicus Supporting
Appellants.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
The central issue in this appeal is the meaning and scope of
a mineral reservation in a patent granted under the Small Tract Act
("STA"). 43 U.S.C. § 682a (1970).* Specifically, the question
before us is whether sand and gravel are included in the
reservation of "the oil, gas and all other mineral deposits"
contained in a land patent issued pursuant to the STA. The Bureau
of Land Management ("BLM") concluded that sand and gravel fall
within this mineral reservation and issued appellants, New West
Materials ("New West"), a notice of trespass. Appellants appealed
the BLM’s notice to the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA"),
which affirmed the BLM’s trespass determination. New West and JWR
Inc. then initiated this suit in federal court, seeking review of
the IBLA’s final administrative decision. After considering cross-
motions for summary judgment, the district court affirmed the IBLA.
New West Materials, LLC v. IBLA, 398 F. Supp. 2d 438 (E.D. Va.
2005). For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
The district court opinion provides a detailed recitation of
the facts and background in this case. A short summary of the facts
will, therefore, suffice here. The Small Tract Act of 1938
*
Small Tract Act of 1938, Ch. 317, 52 Stat. 609, amended by
Ch. 270, 68 Stat. 239 (1954), repealed by Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2789.
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authorized the Secretary of the Interior to sell or to lease small,
isolated five acre tracts of public lands to be used for "home,
cabin, camp, health, convalescent, recreational, or business site"
purposes. 52 Stat. 609 (1938). In addition, the STA required the
patents under which land was sold to contain a reservation to the
United States of the "oil, gas, and other mineral deposits,
together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same
under such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe." Id.This case involves an eighty-two acre tract of land located
approximately twenty miles outside of downtown Phoenix, Arizona. In
1959, the BLM, an agency of the United States Department of the
Interior ("DOI"), conveyed the land via patent deeds pursuant to
the STA to several private owners in separate parcels approximately
five acres in size.
Shortly after acquiring the subject-land in August of 2000,
appellant JWR, Inc. ("JWR") leased the land to co-appellant New
West for the express purpose of New West’s extraction of sand and
gravel from the land. In 2001, the BLM discovered that New West was
actively mining sand and gravel on the land.
On November 1, 2001, the BLM claimed ownership of the sand and
gravel found on the land. The BLM asserted that New West was not
authorized to remove the sand and gravel without the approval of
the DOI. On January 3, 2002, the BLM served New West with a notice
of trespass stating that New West had "committed an act of
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nonwillful trespass by removing and selling mineral material
without a valid contract" in violation of 43 C.F.R. § 9239.0-7.
New West and JWR appealed the notice of trespass to the IBLA
pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 4.411. On December 2, 2004, the IBLA upheld
the BLM’s trespass determination in a written decision in New West
Materials, 164 IBLA 126 (2004). After the IBLA denied New West’s
motion for reconsideration, appellants sought judicial review of
the Board’s decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 701, in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia.
In the district court, appellants sought 1) a declaration that
the United States, acting through the BLM, had no ownership
interest in the sand and gravel of the subject lands, and 2) an
injunction enjoining the BLM from asserting a claim of trespass and
resulting damages against New West and JWR. Because the material
facts in the case were essentially undisputed, the parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the
government’s motion for summary judgment and denied New West’s
motion. See New West Materials, LLC v. Interior Bd. of Land
Appeals, 398 F. Supp. 2d 438 (E.D. Va. 2005).
The district court determined that because Congress had
conferred upon the DOI the authority to implement the STA, the
IBLA’s interpretation of the STA was entitled to deference and must
be upheld if it was reasonable. Ultimately, the court found that
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the IBLA’s interpretation was "based on a permissible construction
of the statute." Id. at 453 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). The court
concluded that sand and gravel are minerals pursuant to the STA
reservation. This appeal followed.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, 452 F.3d 299, 302 (4th
Cir. 2006). Although we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, we review any conclusions of law
de novo. Blaustein & Reich, Inc. v. Buckles, 365 F.3d 281, 286 (4th
Cir. 2004). In particular, we review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. United States v. Abuagla, 336 F.3d 277, 278
(4th Cir. 2003).
New West contends that the district court erred in affording
deference to the IBLA’s decision. Because we base our decision on
our own interpretation of the statute, there is "no occasion to
defer and no point in asking what kind of deference, or how much"
we should grant in this case. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S.
106, 114 (2002). Therefore, we do not reach the question of whether
the IBLA’s decision is owed deference.
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III.
In interpreting a federal statute, we begin by examining its
plain language. Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 367 (4th Cir.
2004). We must give the relevant terms their "common and ordinary
meaning." Id. If the language is unambiguous, that is the beginning
and end of our inquiry. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S.
176, 183 (2004) (citing Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534
(2004)). Here, we agree with the district court that the word
mineral is ambiguous, as it is "used in so many senses, dependent
upon the context." New West, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (quoting Watt
v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 42 (1983)). The term is so
broad that it could encompass virtually all of any conveyance of
land. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 43.
The Supreme Court has twice considered whether materials such
as sand and gravel are reserved minerals under other federal
statutes administered by the DOI. See BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 184-86;
Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 43. In Western Nuclear, the Court
interpreted a reservation of "all the coal and other minerals"
contained in the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 ("SRHA").
Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 60. The Court held that gravel was a
reserved mineral pursuant to the SRHA. Id.In BedRoc, the Court distinguished Western Nuclear without
overruling it. The statute at issue in BedRoc, the Pittman
Underground Water Act of 1919 ("Pittman Act"), reserved "all the
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coal and other valuable minerals" to the United States. BedRoc, 541
U.S. at 185. The Court refused to extend the rationale of Western
Nuclear to the Pittman Act because the Court found that the Act’s
plain meaning would not support it. Id. at 186. The Court relied on
Congress’s addition of the modifier "valuable," which was absent in
the SRHA, in holding that sand and gravel were not "valuable
minerals" reserved by the Pittman Act. Id.In these cases, the Supreme Court considered 1) the plain
meaning of the reservation at issue, 2) the contemporary legal
sources’ understanding of the meaning of the word mineral, and 3)
the purpose of the mineral reservation in question. Using the
analysis applied by the Supreme Court in both BedRoc and Western
Nuclear and the analysis that the district court correctly applied
in this case, we find that the term mineral, as used in the STA,
encompasses sand and gravel.
A.
We look first to the plain language of the STA. The plain
language of the STA is instructive as to the intended reach of its
mineral reservation. In the 1954 STA amendments, Congress clarified
the scope of the Act’s mineral reservation by including the
modifier "all." As amended, the relevant portion of section 2 of
the STA reserved to the United States "the oil, gas, and all other
mineral deposits." 43 U.S.C. § 682a, 68 Stat. 239 (1954) (emphasis
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added). In rewriting the language of the STA, Congress reduced any
ambiguity on the question of what mineral deposits might be
included under the reservation. We follow the "canon of statutory
interpretation [which] requires us to presume that the legislature
says in a statute what it means and means what it says." BedRoc,
541 U.S. at 183 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
253-54 (1992)). Applying this canon, we agree with the district
court that the plain meaning of the amendment is clear: "Congress
intended the STA’s mineral reservation to be given the broadest
interpretation possible." New West, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
Previous Supreme Court opinions provide guidance in our
interpretation of the term mineral. In Western Nuclear, the Court
held that gravel was a reserved mineral pursuant to the SRHA, while
in BedRoc, the Court held that sand and gravel were not "valuable
minerals" reserved to the United States pursuant to the Pittman
Act. BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 186; Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 60.
The BedRoc plurality distinguished the Pittman Act from the
SRHA by emphasizing the addition of the modifier "valuable" in the
Pittman Act’s reservation. Id. at 184-86. The Pittman Act reserved
"all the coal and other valuable minerals." Id. at 179. The Court
reasoned that the Pittman Act’s reservation of "valuable minerals"
required a narrower interpretation than the reservation of "all the
coal and other minerals" found in the SRHA. BedRoc, 541 U.S. at
183-84.
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The mineral reservation in the amended STA of "oil, gas, and
all other mineral deposits" and the reservation in section 9 of the
SRHA of "all the coal and other minerals" are strikingly similar.
The Supreme Court interpreted the SRHA’s reservation to include
gravel. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 60. Accordingly, the district
court in this case reasoned that because the modifier "valuable"
was necessary to distinguish the Pittman Act’s reservation from
that of the SRHA, "the absence of the term valuable in the STA’s
mineral reservation compels the conclusion that the Western Nuclear
holding is persuasive, if not, controlling." New West, 398 F. Supp.
2d at 446. We agree. In employing the Court’s same plain language
approach to this case, we find that the plain meaning of the STA’s
reservation commands the most expansive interpretation available
under existing law.
B.
The excellent and thorough opinion of the district court also
considered the contemporary legal sources’ understanding of the
term mineral at the time of the STA’s passage. New West, 398 F.
Supp. 2d at 447-48; see also BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 184 ("[T]he proper
inquiry focuses on the ordinary meaning of the reservation at the
time Congress enacted it."). The district court noted that
contemporaneous judicial decisions, opinions of the Secretary of
the Interior, and IBLA decisions bolstered the idea that the STA’s
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mineral reservation included sand and gravel. We agree with the
district court’s determination that those decisions further support
the conclusion that minerals under the STA were intended to include
sand and gravel. See Dredge Corp. v. Penny, Civ. No. 475 (D. Nev.
1964) (holding that minerals including sand and gravel found on STA
lands were not subject to prospecting until the DOI issued
appropriate rules and regulations), affirmed by Dredge Corp. v.
Penny, 362 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1966); Layman v. Ellis, 52 L.D. 714,
718 (1929) (citing publications "wherein sand and gravel [had]
uniformly been classed as a mineral resource").
The district court found further support for its conclusion in
the Materials Act of 1947. New West, 398 F. Supp 2d at 448-49. The
Materials Act gave the DOI the authority to dispose of minerals,
specifically including sand and gravel, and Congress passed this
act eight years after the STA was originally passed and seven years
before the STA was amended to expand the mineral reservation to
"all other mineral deposits." See Materials Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C.
§ 601. Because the Materials Act passed contemporaneously with the
STA and its amendments expressly granted the DOI authority to
dispose of "mineral materials" such as sand and gravel, we believe
that this Act adds further support to the holding that the mineral
reservation in the STA includes sand and gravel.
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C.
In considering the purpose of the STA’s mineral reservation,
we find the Supreme Court’s analysis of the SRHA helpful. The Court
found that the primary congressional purpose in reserving the
mineral estate under the SRHA was to promote "concurrent
development of both surface and subsurface resources." Western
Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 50. The Western Nuclear Court concluded that
"the determination of whether a particular substance is included in
the surface estate or the mineral estate should be made in light of
the use of the surface estate that Congress contemplated." Id. at
52. In the Court’s view, inclusion of gravel in the surface estate
in SRHA lands would lead to the illogical result of making
subsurface development of gravel resources dependent on “the
initiative of persons whose interests were known to lie elsewhere.”
Id. at 56.
We find Western Nuclear’s reasoning applicable to STA lands.
As the district court explained: "Just as Congress should not have
expected the ranchers and farmers who received grants pursuant to
the SRHA to exploit the subsurface estate, Congress likewise could
not have expected the homeowners or small business owners of five
acre plots to exploit the subsurface estate." New West, 398 F.
Supp. 2d at 449. Congress specified the types of small surface
estates permitted by the STA. These estates included residential
homes, small businesses, recreational sites, and health centers. 43
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U.S.C. § 682a. We cannot infer from any of these intended uses the
possibility that individual owners were permitted to exploit the
minerals underlying their land. This is not to say that some
incidental disruption to the sand and gravel of an estate in order
to build a home, for example, would justify a trespass claim. It is
wholly another matter, however, to sell or lease a group of small
limited purpose parcels of land for full-scale commercial mining.
IV.
The Supreme Court’s prior decisions guide our interpretation
of the STA. After following the Court’s analysis by considering the
language of the statute, the contemporaneous legal sources, and the
congressional purpose of the STA’s mineral reservation, we hold
that the STA’s reservation of the “oil, gas and all other mineral
deposits” encompasses sand and gravel deposits.
AFFIRMED
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