United States v. Williams , 126 F. App'x 617 ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4475
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
THOMAS WILLIAMS, a/k/a Paul Ralph Scott, a/k/a
Q, a/k/a Warren Brown, a/k/a Professor,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District
Judge. (CR-02-387)
Submitted: February 28, 2005 Decided: March 24, 2005
Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Lassiter, Jr., JEFFERSON & LASSITER, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J.
Elston, Laura C. Marshall, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Williams appeals his convictions and ninety-six
month sentence for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000), and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (2000). We affirm.
Williams first asserts that there was insufficient
evidence to support his convictions. A verdict must be sustained
if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it. Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d
753, 760-61 (4th Cir.) (applying standard to bench trial), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 991 (2003). This court “ha[s] defined
‘substantial evidence,’ in the context of a criminal action, as
that evidence which ‘a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Newsome, 322
F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94
F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). This court does not
weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses.
United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2002). Moreover,
the uncorroborated testimony of one witness or an accomplice may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction. United States v. Wilson, 115
F.3d 1185, 1190 (4th Cir. 1997).
In order to sustain a conviction for conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. § 371, the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable
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doubt: (1) an agreement to commit an offense against the United
States; (2) willing participation in the conspiracy by the
defendant; and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.
See United States v. Edwards, 188 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 1999).
To sustain a conviction for bank fraud, the Government had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams
knowingly execute[d], or attempt[ed] to execute, a scheme
or artifice to (1) defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets,
securities, or other property owned by, or under the
custody or control of, a financial institution, by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises.
18 U.S.C. § 1344. A review of the evidence presented at trial
convinces us that the Government established these elements.
Williams next contends that the district court clearly
erred in giving him a four-level enhancement for playing an
organizing role in the conspiracy, pursuant to United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3B1.1(a) (2001).
Information obtained from co-conspirators supported the role
adjustment. Williams’ partner described him as the mastermind
behind the bank fraud scheme, the person who knew all the details
and who told him to recruit others. Another co-conspirator
described how Williams recruited him, told him how to make a bank
deposit, instructed him regarding the sum of money to withdraw, and
then collected the withdrawn money. A third co-conspirator, a bank
employee, testified that Williams approached her to join the
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conspiracy and specifically asked her to report confidential
account balances and make fraudulent account transfers. On these
facts, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in
finding that Williams was a leader or organizer in the conspiracy.
Finally, Williams argues that the district court abused
its discretion in imposing a two-level upward departure for
uncharged conduct pursuant to USSG § 52K.21. In its explanation
for the departure, the district court emphasized testimony from co-
conspirators and statements made by Williams himself, that Williams
knowingly and willfully avoided arrest and avoided bringing himself
into custody for a substantial period of time after he was
indicted. The court found that Williams’ conduct led to two trials
and the need for appropriation of additional funds to handle the
case. The court also considered an admission by a co-conspirator
who stated that Williams visited her prior to her trial and
discussed her testimony. We note that because Williams was not
charged for the aforementioned conduct, it was not accounted for in
the calculation of his criminal history category. Therefore, we
conclude that the district court’s decision to depart on this
ground was justified by the facts of the case. We further conclude
that the extent of the departure was not unreasonable.
We therefore affirm Williams’ convictions and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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