United States v. Simpson , 138 F. App'x 519 ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4068
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHAD ERIC SIMPSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Chief
District Judge. (CR-01-189)
Submitted: May 25, 2005 Decided: July 6, 2005
Before LUTTIG and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, LAW OFFICE OF CHIEGE O. KALU OKWARA,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert,
United States Attorney, Jennifer Marie Hoefling, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Chad Eric Simpson pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute and distribute cocaine, methamphetamine,
and Ecstasy, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000) (Count One); aiding and
abetting kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 2 (2000) (Count Five); and
brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, aiding and
abetting, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 2 (2000) (Count Six). He was
sentenced to a term of 294 months imprisonment. Simpson appeals
his sentence, contending for the first time that the district court
erred under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 231 (2004), when it
applied the cross reference from kidnapping to attempted murder,
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2A4.1(b)(7), 2A2.1 (2003),
although he did not admit participating in attempted murder.
Simpson also contests the enhancements made under § 2A2.1 for
kidnapping and permanent or life-threatening bodily injury and
under § 3A1.3 for physical restraint. He further claims that the
court erred by failing to depart downward based on his claim of
coercion and duress and other grounds. Last, he challenges the
court’s calculation of his criminal history. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm the court’s determination of Simpson’s
criminal history, but we vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.
In United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the
Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines, under
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which courts were required to impose sentencing enhancements based
on facts found by the court by a preponderance of the evidence,
violated the Sixth Amendment because of their mandatory nature.
Id. at 746, 750 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). The Court
remedied the constitutional violation by making the guidelines
advisory through the removal of two statutory provisions that had
rendered them mandatory. Id. at 746 (Stevens, J., opinion of the
Court); id. at 756-57 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). Although
Simpson did not raise a Sixth Amendment challenge at sentencing,
this court has held that a mandatory enhancement based on judicial
factfinding supported by a preponderance of the evidence
constitutes plain error warranting correction when the sentence
“exceeded the maximum allowed based on the facts found by the jury
alone” and the record does not disclose what discretionary sentence
the district court would have imposed under an advisory guideline
scheme. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547-48 (4th Cir.
2005) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993)).
In light of Booker and Hughes, we find that the district
court plainly erred in sentencing Simpson and that the error was
prejudicial. We thus exercise our discretion to notice the error
and remand for resentencing.
Simpson claims that the court erred in refusing to depart
downward. However, the district court’s discretionary decision not
to depart below the guideline range is not reviewable unless the
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court’s decision was based on a mistaken belief that it lacked
authority to depart. United States v. Wood, 378 F.3d 342, 351 n.8
(4th Cir. 2004). Our review of the district court’s ruling on
Simpson’s departure motion leaves us convinced that the district
court understood its authority to depart and exercised its
discretion not to depart.
We find no merit in Simpson’s contention that the
district court erred in awarding one criminal history point for
each of the Kentucky sentences listed in ¶¶ 38 and 39 of the
presentence report (a fine and two days imprisonment) and for the
North Carolina probationary sentence listed in ¶ 40 because he was
not represented by counsel in any of these proceedings. He claims
that the district court did not address his contention that he was
denied counsel because the state court judge did not intend to
impose a sentence of imprisonment (¶ 38) or any additional jail
time (¶¶ 39, 40).
We note first that the presentence report contained
information that Simpson waived counsel in the North Carolina
proceeding described in ¶ 40. Although Simpson asserted in the
district court that any waiver was not knowing and voluntary, he
offered no evidence in support of his claim. With respect to the
other sentences, Simpson’s Kentucky driving-while-impaired offenses
were both misdemeanors, punishable as first and second offenses by
a maximum of thirty days and six months imprisonment, respectively.
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Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189A.010 (Baldwin 2004).1 The background
commentary to USSG § 4A1.2 states that all “[p]rior sentences, not
otherwise excluded, are to be counted in the criminal history
score, including uncounseled misdemeanor sentences where
imprisonment was not imposed.” However, in Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be used to enhance the
sentence for a subsequent offense only if no prison term was
imposed. Simpson did not receive any prison sentence for the
conviction described in ¶ 38, but he served two days in prison for
the conviction in ¶ 39.
A defendant may challenge at sentencing the validity of
a prior conviction on the ground that he was denied counsel,
Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 495 (1994). However, he
bears the burden of showing that the prior conviction is invalid.
United States v. Jones, 977 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir. 1992). Simpson
had to overcome the presumption that the state court informed him
of his right to counsel as it was required by statute to do and
that, if he was not represented, it was because he waived his right
to counsel. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-34 (1992) (holding
1
For guideline purposes, a “felony offense” means any offense
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, even an
offense classified as a misdemeanor under state law, United
States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1991), and even
though, after the defendant’s conviction, the maximum sentence may
have been reduced to less than a year. United States v. Johnson,
114 F.3d 435, 445 (4th Cir. 1997).
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that presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments
makes it appropriate for defendant to have burden of showing
irregularity of prior plea). He did not meet this burden because
he did not present either evidence or testimony to establish that
he had not waived counsel. We conclude that the court did not err
in finding that Simpson had not been denied his right to counsel.
In conclusion, we affirm the district court’s
determination of Simpson’s criminal history score, but we vacate
his sentence and remand for proceedings consistent with Hughes.2
Id. at 546 (citing Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65, 767 (Breyer, J.,
opinion of the Court)). Just as we noted in Hughes, “[we of course
offer no criticism of the district court judge, who followed the
law and procedure in effect at the time” of Simpson’s sentencing.
Hughes, 401 F.3d at 545 n.4. See generally Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (stating that an error is “plain”
if “the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary
to the law at the time of appeal”). We dispense with oral argument
2
Although the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory,
Booker makes clear that a sentencing court must still “consult
[the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” 125
S. Ct. at 767. On remand, the district court should first
determine the appropriate sentencing range under the guidelines,
making all factual findings appropriate for that determination.
Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The court should consider this sentencing
range along with the other factors described in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and then impose a sentence.
Id. If that sentence falls outside the guidelines range, the court
should explain its reasons for the departure as required by 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2). Id. The sentence must be “within the
statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.” Id. at 547.
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
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