United States v. Hill , 174 F. App'x 805 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 3, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-40502
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM EARL HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:04-CR-99-ALL
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Before JOLLY, DAVIS and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
William Earl Hill appeals, pro se, from his conviction and
sentence for one count of mailing a threatening communication with
intent to extort money, 12 counts of threat in retaliation against
a federal official, and 11 counts of mailing a threatening
communication. Hill argues that the district court abused its
discretion by requiring him to wear a stun belt during trial, the
district court judge was biased against him, and he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-40502
-2-
Prior to trial, the district court heard testimony regarding
Hill’s conduct, the threatening content of the letters he was
accused of writing, and the various methods that could be used to
restrain him. The district court determined that Hill presented an
imminent danger to others in the courtroom and that the restraint
belt provided the least restrictive means of obviating this danger.
Given the specific threat in the letters to attack one of the
witnesses when she appeared in court, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by requiring Hill to wear a stun belt during
the trial proceedings. See United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587,
591 (5th Cir. 2003); Chavez v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 805, 809 (5th
Cir. 2002).
Hill’s contention that the district court judge was biased
against him is based on an isolated remark made by the judge
outside the presence of the jury. The judge stated that the remark
was a joke and apologized for making it. There is no evidence to
support Hill’s contention that he was deprived of due process due
to bias against him by the court. See Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Because Hill’s assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel
were not developed before the district court, we decline to address
these contentions without prejudice to Hill’s ability to raise them
in a collateral proceeding. See United States v. Scott, 159 F.3d
916, 924-25 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1998).
AFFIRMED.