United States v. Huggins , 176 F. App'x 420 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4229
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHARLES JAMAL HUGGINS, a/k/a Mal,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(CR-02-208)
Submitted: March 29, 2006 Decided: April 20, 2006
Before TRAXLER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
D. Craig Brown, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred
William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Charles Jamal Huggins pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute and to distribute fifty grams or
more of cocaine base crack. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), alleging
that there are no meritorious issues on appeal but raising as
potential issues whether the magistrate judge conducted Huggins’s
guilty plea hearing in compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and
challenging some of Huggins’s sentencing enhancements in light of
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm Huggins’s conviction, but vacate and remand for
resentencing.
We agree with counsel that Huggins’s guilty plea was
conducted in compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and that his
conviction is otherwise proper. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Blakely, however, has now been extended to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In
Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory manner in which
the Sentencing Guidelines required courts to impose sentencing
enhancements based on facts found by the court by a preponderance
of the evidence violated the Sixth Amendment. 543 U.S. at 244-45
(Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). The Court remedied the
constitutional violation by making the Guidelines advisory through
the removal of two statutory provisions that had rendered them
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mandatory. Id. at 233 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court), 245-46
(Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
Because Huggins did not raise a Sixth Amendment issue in
the district court, we review for plain error. United States v.
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005). To demonstrate plain
error, Huggins must establish that error occurred, that it was
plain, and that it affected his substantial rights. Id. at 547-48.
If a defendant satisfies these requirements, our “discretion is
appropriately exercised only when failure to do so would result in
a miscarriage of justice, such as when the defendant is actually
innocent or the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 555 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the district court sentenced Huggins under the then
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines by determining that he was
responsible for three kilograms of crack, under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2002), giving him a base offense
level of 38. Without the additional drug weight finding, Huggins’s
base offense level for the fifty grams to which he pled guilty
would have been 32, under USSG § 2D1.1(c)(4), giving him a
sentencing range of 121 to 151 months. The court also increased
Huggins’s base offense level by two for obstruction of justice,
under USSG § 3C1.1, but lowered his offense level by two under the
safety valve provision, USSG §§ 2D1.1(b)(5), 5C1.2. This gave
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Huggins a total offense level of 38, which, with his criminal
history category of I, yielded a sentencing range of 235 to 293
months. The court sentenced Huggins within this range to a
240-month term of imprisonment. This term exceeds the sentencing
range of 121 to 151 months within which Huggins could have been
sentenced based solely on his admitted conduct. USSG
§ 2D1.1(c)(4). In light of Booker and Hughes, we find that the
district court’s plain error in sentencing Huggins based on facts
found by the court affects his substantial rights and warrants
correction.1
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case for any other meritorious issues on appeal,
including the issues raised in Huggins’s pro se supplemental brief,
and have found none. Accordingly, although we affirm the
conviction, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.2
1
Just as we noted in Hughes, “[w]e of course offer no
criticism of the district court judge, who followed the law and
procedure in effect at the time” of Huggins’s sentencing. Hughes,
401 F.3d at 545 n.4. See generally Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (stating that an error is “plain” if “the law
at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at
the time of appeal”).
2
Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, Booker makes
clear that a sentencing court must still “consult [the] Guidelines
and take them into account when sentencing.” 543 U.S. at 264
(Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). On remand, the district court
should first determine the appropriate sentencing range under the
Guidelines, making all factual findings appropriate for that
determination. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The court should consider
this sentencing range along with the other factors described in 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and then impose a
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
sentence. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. If that sentence falls outside
the Guidelines range, the court should explain its reasons for the
departure as required by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2005). Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The sentence must be
“within the statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.”
Id. at 547.
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