United States v. Conrad , 177 F. App'x 296 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4103
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    TERRELL ANTOINE CONRAD,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
    District Judge. (CR-04-255)
    Submitted:   February 28, 2006            Decided:   April 21, 2006
    Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, Robert Albert Jamison Lang, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Terrell Antoine Conrad pled guilty to one count of
    possession with intent to distribute seventeen grams of cocaine
    base       (“crack”),   in   violation    of     
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (a)(1)   and
    (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) (Count One), and one count of
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) (2000).            The government filed an information
    pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
     (2000), seeking enhanced penalties
    based on Conrad’s prior drug felony convictions.                      The district
    court sentenced Conrad to 120 months in prison.                      Conrad timely
    appealed. Conrad’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), stating that in his opinion there
    are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether
    Conrad’s sentence violates the Sixth Amendment because it was
    enhanced based on facts that were neither admitted by Conrad nor
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Conrad was informed of his right
    to file a pro se supplemental brief, but failed to file one.1                     We
    affirm Conrad’s conviction and sentence.
    The district court sentenced Conrad under the mandatory
    federal sentencing guidelines and established a base offense level
    of twenty-eight.        U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(6)
    (2004).        The court reached this offense level by finding that
    Conrad was responsible for 31.77 grams of crack. The court applied
    1
    Conrad was granted two extensions of time to file a
    supplemental pro se brief but he failed to file one.       We deny
    Conrad’s pending motion for an additional extension of time to file
    a pro se supplemental brief.
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    a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility
    under USSG § 3E1.1(a) and (b), yielding a total offense level of
    twenty-five.       Conrad’s criminal history score category was V,
    resulting in a guideline range of 100 to 125 months in prison.
    USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table). The district court sentenced
    Conrad to 120 months in prison, the statutory minimum sentence
    based on Conrad’s prior felony drug offense convictions.                        
    18 U.S.C.A. §§ 841
    (b)(1)(B), 851.
    Conrad   argues   that    his    sentence     violates    the   Sixth
    Amendment because it was based in part on drug quantities that were
    neither admitted by Conrad nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Because Conrad preserved this issue by objecting at sentencing
    based upon Blakely v. Washington, 
    542 U.S. 296
     (2004), our review
    is de novo.     United States v. Mackins, 
    315 F.3d 399
    , 405 (4th Cir.
    2003).   When a defendant preserves a Sixth Amendment error, “we
    must reverse unless we find this constitutional error harmless
    beyond a reasonable doubt, with the Government bearing the burden
    of proving harmlessness.”          
    Id.
     (citations omitted); see United
    States   v.    White,   
    405 F.3d 208
    ,    223   (4th    Cir.)     (discussing
    difference in burden of proving that error affected substantial
    rights under harmless error standard in Fed. R. App. P. 52(a), and
    plain error standard in Fed. R. App. P. 52(b)), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 668
     (2005).
    In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that
    the mandatory manner in which the federal sentencing guidelines
    required courts to impose sentencing enhancements based on facts
    - 3 -
    found by the court by a preponderance of the evidence violated the
    Sixth Amendment.       
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005).        Post-Booker, courts must
    calculate the appropriate guideline range, consider the range in
    conjunction with other relevant factors under the guidelines and 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and impose a sentence.
    If a court imposes a sentence outside the guideline range, it must
    state its reasons for doing so.        United States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546 (4th Cir. 2005).
    Excluding the drug quantities that Conrad did not admit
    and   without   the    reduction    Conrad   received      for   acceptance   of
    responsibility,2 his offense level would have been twenty-six and,
    thus, his guideline range would have been 110 to 137 months of
    imprisonment.    USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).             Because the
    120-month sentence Conrad received is within that guideline range,
    we find no Sixth Amendment error.           Evans, 416 F.3d at 300-01.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.    We therefore affirm Conrad’s conviction and sentence.
    This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
    his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.       If the client requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
    counsel   may   move    in   this   court    for   leave   to    withdraw   from
    2
    See United States v. Evans, 
    416 F.3d 298
    , 300 n.4 (4th Cir.
    2005).
    - 4 -
    representation.   Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on the client.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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