United States v. Goode , 178 F. App'x 219 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4918
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DONTRELL A. GOODE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (CR-04-369)
Submitted: March 31, 2006 Decided: April 27, 2006
Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Robert J. Wagner,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Matthew C.
Ackley, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Dontrell A. Goode was convicted by a jury of possession
and possession with intent to distribute marijuana and
methylenedioxymethamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841,
844 (2000), as well as possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000).
The district court sentenced Goode to a total of sixty-eight
months’ imprisonment. Although Goode does not contest his
sentence, he does challenge his convictions.
Goode argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress. We review the factual findings underlying a
motion to suppress for clear error, and the district court’s legal
determinations de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
699 (1996). When a suppression motion has been denied, we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United
States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
With these standards in mind, we conclude that the police
officers had reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct to make a
traffic stop of the vehicle Goode was operating. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); United States v. Wilson, 205 F.3d
720, 722-23 (4th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Hassan El,
5 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting a traffic violation, no
matter how minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop the
driver). We further conclude that, based on the totality of the
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circumstances, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot in order to ask Goode further questions
in the execution of the traffic stop. See United States v. Brugal,
209 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 2000).
Goode’s pre-custodial admission that a firearm was
located in his vehicle created a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that he presented a danger to the officers, which justified their
decisions to place him in handcuffs, see United States v. Moore,
817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding a brief but complete
restriction of liberty is valid under Terry), and to conduct their
search of the areas of the passenger compartment of the automobile
where “a weapon may be placed or hidden.” Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). Finding the firearm and narcotics, the
officers possessed probable cause to arrest Goode. Finding no
violation of the Fourth Amendment, we therefore conclude that the
district court correctly denied Goode’s suppression motion.
Further, Goode challenges the district court’s jury
instruction regarding the § 924(c) count. We review a district
court’s decision to give a jury instruction and the content of the
instruction for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Abbas,
74 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 1996). A district court abuses its
discretion when it fails or refuses to exercise its discretion or
when its exercise of discretion is flawed by an erroneous legal or
factual premise. James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir.
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1993). When jury instructions are challenged on appeal, the issue
is whether, taken as a whole, the instructions fairly stated the
controlling law. United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788-89 (4th
Cir. 1990). We find the district court’s jury instruction, which
in part listed examples of how a firearm might be used in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, was proper. United
States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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