Lewete v. Holder , 429 F. App'x 320 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-2380
    MAMITU KEBEDE LEWETE,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals.
    Submitted:   April 28, 2011                 Decided:   May 19, 2011
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jason A. Dzubow, DZUBOW, SARAPU & PILCHER, PLLC, Washington,
    D.C., for Petitioner.    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General,
    Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel, Franklin M. Johnson,
    Jr., Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
    OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Mamitu     Kebede       Lewete,        a        native      and     citizen        of
    Ethiopia,     petitions       for    review     of       an    order      of    the    Board     of
    Immigration     Appeals       (“Board”)       dismissing           her    appeal       from     the
    immigration judge’s order denying her applications for asylum,
    withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention
    Against Torture.        We deny the petition for review.
    The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes
    the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee.                                      
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)    (2006).        The     INA   defines           a    refugee       as    a     person
    unwilling or unable to return to her native country “because of
    persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion.”               
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A) (2006).
    “Persecution        involves        the   infliction              or    threat        of     death,
    torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
    of the enumerated grounds. . . .”                    Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 
    405 F.3d 171
    ,    177     (4th   Cir.    2005)     (internal              quotation      marks     and
    citations omitted).
    An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
    for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 
    455 F.3d 484
    , 486 (4th Cir.
    2006);   see    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a)          (2010),        and     can    establish
    refugee status based on past persecution in her native country
    on account of a protected ground.                         
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)
    2
    (2010).     “An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject
    of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
    persecution.”      Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 
    371 F.3d 182
    , 187 (4th Cir.
    2004).        Without   regard     to    past       persecution,          an       alien    can
    establish     a   well-founded     fear      of     persecution          on    a    protected
    ground.       
    Id. at 187
    .       The well-founded fear standard contains
    both a subjective and an objective component.                             The objective
    element   requires      a    showing    of       specific,     concrete         facts      that
    would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear
    persecution.       Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 351
    , 353
    (4th Cir. 2006).         “The subjective component can be met through
    the    presentation     of    candid,     credible,          and    sincere         testimony
    demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . . [It] must
    have   some    basis    in   the   reality        of   the    circumstances           and    be
    validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it cannot be
    mere irrational apprehension.”                   Qiao Hua Li, 
    405 F.3d at 176
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony
    on credibility grounds, as in this case, must offer “specific,
    cogent reason[s]” for doing so.                  Figeroa v. INS, 
    886 F.2d 76
    , 78
    (4th   Cir.    1989).        “Examples    of       specific        and   cogent      reasons
    include    inconsistent       statements,          contradictory          evidence,         and
    inherently improbable testimony . . . .”                       Tewabe v. Gonzales,
    
    446 F.3d 533
    , 538 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
    3
    citations       omitted).        This    court          accords    broad,       though    not
    unlimited,       deference       to    credibility          findings      supported        by
    substantial evidence.             Camara v. Ashcroft, 
    378 F.3d 361
    , 367
    (4th Cir. 2004).
    The     REAL    ID   Act    of    2005       amended   the   law      regarding
    credibility        determinations        for      applications       for       asylum     and
    withholding of removal filed after May 11, 2005, as is the case
    here.     Such determinations are to be made based on the totality
    of the circumstances and all relevant factors, including “the
    demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness,
    the     inherent       plausibility      of       the    applicant’s       or     witness’s
    account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s
    written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not
    under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the
    statements were made), the internal consistency of each such
    statement,       the     consistency         of    such     statements         with     other
    evidence of record . . . . and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in
    such    statements,       without      regard      to    whether    an   inconsistency,
    inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s
    claim.”    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
    A    determination         regarding        eligibility      for     asylum    or
    withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
    evidence on the record considered as a whole.                            INS v. Elias-
    Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992).                      Administrative findings of
    4
    fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
    any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
    contrary.       
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B) (2006).                         Legal issues are
    reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s
    interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.”                                       Li
    Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 
    517 F.3d 685
    , 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008).                                  This
    court    will       reverse    the     Board        only    if   “the    evidence      .    .   .
    presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
    fail    to     find     the    requisite        fear       of    persecution.”         Elias-
    Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. at 483-84
    ; see Rusu v. INS, 
    296 F.3d 316
    , 325
    n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).               Furthermore, “[t]he agency decision that
    an    alien    is     not     eligible    for        asylum      is    ‘conclusive     unless
    manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.’”
    Marynenka v. Holder, 
    592 F.3d 594
    , 600 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(D) (2006)).
    Lewete       claims       the        immigration          judge’s     adverse
    credibility finding was erroneous.                         We have reviewed the record
    and     note    that     the     immigration             judge’s      adverse   credibility
    finding       was     based    on     Lewete’s       testimony         regarding    how     her
    passport acquired an exit stamp.                      Her testimony on this subject
    was     clearly        inconsistent.                “Inconsistent         statements         and
    contradictory         evidence        qualify       as     cogent     reasons   that       could
    support an adverse credibility finding.”                              Dankam v. Gonzales,
    
    495 F.3d 113
    ,     121    (4th    Cir.     2007)       (internal     quotation        marks
    5
    omitted).    The immigration judge was entitled to reject Lewete’s
    explanations for the discrepancies.                
    Id. at 122
    .         We further
    conclude    that   the   immigration    judge’s      findings      regarding     the
    lack of credible independent evidence in support of Lewete’s
    claim are supported by substantial evidence.
    Accordingly,    we   deny       the   petition   for     review.      We
    dispense    with    oral   argument     because       the    facts     and     legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
    6