United States v. Kittrell , 269 F. App'x 338 ( 2008 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-5265
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    KENNETH LEROY KITTRELL,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior
    District Judge. (5:05-cr-00261-H)
    Submitted:   February 13, 2008            Decided:   March 17, 2008
    Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    David W. Long, POYNER & SPRUILL LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
    Hayes, Banumathi Rangarajan, Assistant United States Attorneys,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Following a jury trial, Kenneth Leroy Kittrell was found
    guilty of one count of bank robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
    (a)     (2000).       Kittrell    was     sentenced   to   216    months’
    imprisonment, and ordered to pay $2520 in restitution and a $5000
    fine.    On appeal, Kittrell asserts the admission of a photograph
    violated Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and challenges the sufficiency of the
    Government’s evidence. We have reviewed the record and, finding no
    error, we affirm.
    Taken in the light most favorable to the Government,
    Evans v. United States, 
    504 U.S. 255
    , 257 (1992), the evidence
    presented at trial established the following facts.                On July 20,
    2004, a robber entered a Wachovia Bank branch in Raleigh, North
    Carolina, and handed teller Lisa Roycroft a deposit slip, on the
    back of which was written, “This is a stick up.               Put all the 100's
    and 20's on the top.”          According to Roycroft, the robber was an
    older black man, with gray hair, a receding hairline, and facial
    hair.    Roycroft also noted the robber appeared unclean and was
    wearing a dirty white T-shirt.                At trial, Roycroft identified
    Kittrell as the robber.
    In responding to the crime scene, the police secured the
    demand   note     and     dusted   it   for     fingerprints.      Five   latent
    fingerprints of value were found on the two-sided demand note.
    Latent footwear impressions found near Roycroft’s teller station
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    were photographed and documented.    Submission of the fingerprints
    to North Carolina’s automated fingerprint identification system
    yielded twelve potential matches. Because one of these matches was
    “very consistent” with the recovered print, the print examiner
    retrieved the corresponding fingerprint card, which belonged to
    Kittrell.    The examiner concluded the recovered print was that of
    the middle finger on Kittrell’s right hand.         Further analysis
    revealed that three of the five latent fingerprints of value left
    on the demand note matched Kittrell.
    Having identified a possible suspect, Detective Timothy
    Fanney of the Raleigh Police Department examined Kittrell’s police
    record.     Fanney compared a photograph of Kittrell the department
    had on file, which was taken in April 2004 — approximately three
    months before the robbery — with still photographs from the bank’s
    video     surveillance.     Fanney   immediately   noticed   physical
    similarities between the April 2004 photo of Kittrell and the
    surveillance photos.      Fanney sought and obtained a warrant for
    Kittrell’s arrest.
    The warrant was executed and Kittrell detained at a local
    Motel Six.    Upon seeing Kittrell, Fanney observed that Kittrell’s
    appearance was different from that of his April 2004 photograph.
    Fanney obtained consent from Angela Lane, the motel manager, to
    search the motel’s dumpster.    In the dumpster, Fanney found a pair
    of sneakers, a white T-shirt, and a pair of gray sweat pants.
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    Fanney recognized this clothing from the surveillance video as that
    which the robber wore. In comparing the latent footwear impression
    discovered on the floor in front of Roycroft’s teller station to
    the sneakers, the print examiner concluded the impression was made
    by the recovered right sneaker.
    Angela Lane testified that she spoke to Kittrell on July
    20, the day of the robbery.    Lane described Kittrell as an older
    black man, with a receding hairline, a beard, and a mustache.   Lane
    stated that though Kittrell appeared scruffy and dirty when she
    spoke with him prior to the occurrence of the robbery, Kittrell had
    shaved his beard and his head and was wearing clean clothes when
    she saw him later that day.   Lane identified the white T-shirt and
    sweat pants recovered from the dumpster as the clothes Kittrell
    wore on July 20.
    DNA testing was ordered on the clothing seized from the
    dumpster.    Kristin Meyer, a DNA analyst with the North Carolina
    State Bureau of Investigation, concluded Kittrell could not be
    eliminated as a contributor to the DNA found in almost all of the
    samples taken from the clothing.    In addition to linking Kittrell
    to the robbery via photographic, testimonial, and DNA evidence, the
    Government also presented the testimony of a questioned documents
    examiner who opined there was “strong evidence” that Kittrell wrote
    the demand note.
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    Prior to trial, the Government provided notice of its
    intent   to    introduce    the   April    2004   photograph    of   Kittrell.
    Kittrell opposed this, arguing the photograph should be precluded
    pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Finding the photograph relevant,
    reliable, and necessary for purposes of establishing Kittrell’s
    identity, the district court denied Kittrell’s motion.
    At the close of the Government’s evidence, Kittrell moved
    the court for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court
    denied. The jury found Kittrell guilty of the charged offense, and
    Kittrell was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment.               This appeal
    followed.
    Kittrell raises two issues on appeal.           First, Kittrell
    maintains the district court violated Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) in
    admitting the photograph of Kittrell taken in April 2004.                  Next,
    Kittrell maintains the Government’s evidence of his guilt was
    legally insufficient to support the conviction.               We address each
    contention in turn.
    I.   Admission of April 2004 Photograph
    In this first assignment of error, Kittrell asserts the
    admission of the April 2004 photograph violated Fed. R. Evid.
    404(b)   because    the    photograph     was   taken   in   conjunction   with
    Kittrell’s prior arrest.       According to Kittrell, admission of this
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    photograph, “constituted an improper comment on Kittrell’s earlier
    involvement with the police.”
    This court reviews the admission of evidence for an abuse
    of discretion.   United States v. Midgett, 
    488 F.3d 288
    , 297 (4th
    Cir. 2007).   Evidentiary rulings are also subject to review for
    harmless error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52, and
    will be found harmless if the reviewing court can conclude “without
    stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment
    was not substantially swayed by the error.” United States v.
    Brooks, 
    111 F.3d 365
    , 371 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and
    citation omitted).
    Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits
    the admission of evidence of “other crimes” solely to prove a
    defendant’s bad character, but such evidence may be admissible for
    other purposes, such as “‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
    preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
    accident.’” United States v. Hodge, 
    354 F.3d 305
    , 311-12 (4th Cir.
    2004) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)).   Rule 404(b) is considered a
    rule of inclusion; thus, evidence of prior acts is admissible under
    Rules 404(b) and 403 if the evidence is:   (1) relevant to an issue
    other than the general character of the defendant, (2) necessary,
    (3) reliable, and (4) if the probative value of the evidence is not
    substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value.   United States
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    v. Weaver, 
    282 F.3d 302
    , 313 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.
    Queen, 
    132 F.3d 991
    , 997 (4th Cir. 1997).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in
    admitting the April 2004 photograph.        The photograph was relevant
    to the issue of identity, not Kittrell’s general character, and
    necessary to the Government’s case.        Moreover, the photograph was
    reliable   and   its   probative   value   was   not   outweighed   by   the
    prejudicial effect.*    United States v. Hill, 
    322 F.3d 301
    , 309 (4th
    Cir. 2003).
    II.   Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Kittrell next asserts the jury’s guilty verdict was not
    supported by legally sufficient evidence.              In support of this
    argument, Kittrell emphasizes several purported deficiencies in the
    Government’s evidence, namely, Roycroft’s in-court identification,
    the lack of any other eyewitness testimony identifying Kittrell as
    the robber, and the “inconclusive” nature of the DNA evidence.
    This court reviews the district court’s decision to deny
    a Rule 29 motion de novo.      United States v. Smith, 
    451 F.3d 209
    ,
    *
    Even if the district court did abuse its discretion in
    admitting the April 2004 photograph, the error was harmless. The
    evidence against Kittrell was significant. As this was not a close
    case factually, we conclude with fair assurance that any error
    regarding the admission of this photograph taken in the course of
    Kittrell’s prior arrest did not affect the verdict. See Weaver,
    
    282 F.3d at 313-14
    ; United States v. Heater, 
    63 F.3d 311
    , 325 (4th
    Cir. 1995).
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    216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 197
     (2006).           This court
    reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges by determining
    whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    Government, any rational trier of fact could find the essential
    elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United
    States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942); United States v. Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d 1018
    , 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).         The court reviews both direct and
    circumstantial evidence, and permits the “[G]overnment the benefit
    of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought
    to be established.”        Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d at 1021
    .
    In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court
    does not “weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the
    witnesses.”     United States v. Wilson, 
    118 F.3d 228
    , 234 (4th Cir.
    1997).       Where   the     evidence   supports   differing   reasonable
    interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to credit.
    
    Id.
     (quotations omitted).          This court will uphold the jury’s
    verdict if there is substantial evidence to support it, and will
    reverse only in those rare cases “where the prosecution’s failure
    is clear.”    United States v. Beidler, 
    110 F.3d 1064
    , 1067 (4th Cir.
    1997) (internal quotations omitted).
    We reject Kittrell’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence.    Roycroft’s identification of Kittrell as the robber was
    sufficient, and the jury was well within its province to credit her
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    testimony.     Moreover, the Government was under no obligation to
    present any other eyewitness testimony.
    Kittrell   strenuously   maintains    the   Government’s   DNA
    evidence was insufficient.    Kittrell is correct in stating the DNA
    did not link Kittrell to the clothing found in the motel dumpster
    to the exclusion of all others.     However, the DNA found on two of
    the cuttings taken from the recovered clothing contained a mixture
    of no more than two contributors, and Kittrell could not be
    excluded as a contributor to that mixture.       Further, the DNA found
    on six of the cuttings contained a mixture of three or four
    contributors, and Kittrell similarly could not be excluded as a
    contributor from those mixtures.    Contrary to Kittrell’s position,
    the inconclusive nature of the DNA evidence obtained from the
    recovered right sneaker is not fatal to the Government’s case.
    The Government’s evidence of Kittrell’s guilt was ample.
    In addition to the DNA evidence linking Kittrell to the recovered
    clothing and Roycroft’s in-court identification, the Government’s
    expert handwriting analyst testified the demand note was “probably”
    written   by   Kittrell.     Moreover,   three   of    the   five   latent
    fingerprints recovered from the demand note were identified as
    Kittrell’s.    Examination of the right sneaker recovered from the
    motel’s dumpster revealed that particular sneaker left the latent
    footwear impression lifted from Roycroft’s teller station.            This
    shoe was found with clothing containing a mixture of DNA, of which
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    Kittrell could not be excluded as one of the no more than four
    contributors.     This evidence, although circumstantial, was more
    than enough to support the jury’s guilty verdict, “even though it
    [did] not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with
    innocence.”    United States v. Osborne, __ F.3d __, 
    2008 WL 222739
    ,
    *7 (4th Cir. Jan. 29, 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    Further, we deny Kittrell’s motion for leave to file a pro se
    supplemental    brief   challenging   the   constitutionality   of   his
    sentence.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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