United States v. Fernando , 291 F. App'x 494 ( 2008 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-4896
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    WARSHAHENNEDIGE ANTON RAJ NISHANTHA FERNANDO,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
    District Judge. (1:07-cr-00038-NCT)
    Submitted:   August 14, 2008             Decided:   September 5, 2008
    Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Donald K. Tisdale, Sr., Christopher R. Clifton, GRACE TISDALE &
    CLIFTON, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna
    Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Warshahennedige Anton Raj Nishantha Fernando (“Fernando”)
    appeals his convictions following a jury trial and his sentence for
    using interstate commerce to coerce or entice a minor to engage in
    illegal sexual activity,1 in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 2422
    (b)
    (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), and attempting to transfer obscene
    material to a minor under the age of 16, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1470
     (2000).      He claims the district court erred in denying his
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for acquittal.                   He also challenges
    certain instructions and contends that his 120-month statutorily
    mandated sentence is unreasonable.             We affirm.
    The evidence at trial established that in August 2006,
    Fernando, who was forty-two and identified himself using the screen
    name       “thicktoolngso,”   began     chatting    on   the    internet   with
    “kimmie14fun”      (“Kimmie"),    an    undercover    officer    posing    as   a
    fourteen-year-old girl.       During the span of approximately a week,
    Fernando       initiated   four   on-line      conversations     with   Kimmie.
    Fernando brought up sexually explicit topics and electronically
    sent Kimmie a picture of himself holding his erect penis. Fernando
    told Kimmie he wanted to meet her in person, and Kimmie agreed to
    meet him in front of a Borders Bookstore.
    1
    Specifically, the indictment alleged that the sexual activity
    would violate 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1
     (2007), prohibiting taking
    indecent liberties with a minor.
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    Fernando was arrested at the arranged meeting place and
    admitted what he had done to police. At trial, Fernando maintained
    that he thought Kimmie was at least twenty-five and that, although
    he pursued sexual conversations with her, he came to meet her
    merely because he was “curious” to see who she was.
    Fernando argues that the district court erred in denying
    his Rule 29 motion for acquittal.      He contends that he could not be
    convicted of violating § 2422(b) because he interacted with an
    adult, not a minor.     This court reviews de novo the denial of a
    Rule 29 motion for acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the Government.        United States v. Alerre, 
    430 F.3d 681
    , 693 (4th Cir. 2005).
    Under § 2422(b), it is unlawful for a person, “using
    . . . any facility or means of interstate . . . commerce . . . [to]
    knowingly    persuade[],   induce[],     entice[],   or    coerce[]   any
    individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in
    . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with
    a criminal offense, or attempt[] to do so . . . .”        See 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 2422
    (b).     To obtain a conviction under § 2422(b), then, the
    Government also had to establish that the sexual activity Fernando
    sought to engage in would violate 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1
    - 3 -
    (2007), which makes it unlawful for an individual to take indecent
    liberties with a child under the age of sixteen.2
    In State v. Ellis, 
    657 S.E.2d 51
     (N.C. App. 2008), the
    North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that, under state law,
    indecent   interaction   with   an   adult   undercover   officer   may
    constitute the crime of attempted indecent liberties with a child,
    where the defendant believed the victim to be the requisite age.
    Ellis, 
    657 S.E.2d at 54-55
    .3     This court also recently upheld a
    conviction under 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 2423
    (b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)
    (prohibiting traveling in interstate commerce “for the purpose of
    engaging in illicit sexual conduct” with a minor) where, although
    the defendant believed he was arranging to meet a twelve-year-old
    girl through an intermediary, no actual minor was placed at risk.
    United States v. Kelly, 
    510 F.3d 433
    , 441 (4th Cir. 2007), cert.
    2
    To obtain a conviction for indecent liberties under 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1
    , the State is required to prove the following
    elements: “(1) the defendant was at least 16 years of age; (2) he
    was five years older than his victim; (3) he willfully took or
    attempted to take an indecent liberty with the victim; (4) the
    victim was under 16 years of age at the time the alleged act or
    attempted act occurred; and (5) the action by the defendant was for
    the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.” State v.
    Thaggard, 
    608 S.E.2d 774
    , 786-87 (N.C. App. 2005).
    3
    In addition, several circuits that have considered the
    impossibility defense to charges of unlawful sexual acts involving
    a minor have uniformly rejected the argument that an actual child
    must be placed at risk to secure a conviction under § 2422(b).
    See, e.g., United States v. Helder, 
    452 F.3d 751
    , 753-56 (8th Cir.
    2006); United States v. Sims, 
    428 F.3d 945
    , 959-60 (10th Cir.
    2005); United States v. Meek, 
    366 F.3d 705
    , 717-20 (9th Cir. 2004);
    United States v. Root, 
    296 F.3d 1222
    , 1227 (11th Cir. 2002); United
    States v. Farner, 
    251 F.3d 510
    , 512-13 (5th Cir. 2001).
    - 4 -
    denied, 
    128 S. Ct. 1917
     (2008).          This court rejected the argument
    that an actual minor must be involved to secure a conviction under
    § 2423(b), concluding, “[t]his sensible result follows from the
    clear language of the statute, under which a conviction ‘turns
    simply on the illegal purpose for which [the defendant] traveled.’”
    Kelly,   
    510 F.3d at 441
       (quoting   Root,      
    296 F.3d at 1231
    ).
    Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in
    denying Fernando’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on
    impossibility.
    Fernando      challenges    the    jury       instructions        in   two
    respects.      He first argues that the district court failed to
    “adequately explain” N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-201.1 (taking indecent
    liberties   with       children).     Fernando      did    not   object      to    this
    instruction below, and identifies no specific error on appeal. The
    instruction included the elements of § 14-202.1 as described in the
    statute and in North Carolina caselaw.              We conclude there was no
    error,   plain    or    otherwise.      Fed.   R.    Crim.      P.   52(b);    United
    States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731-32 (1993).4
    Fernando further suggests that it was error for the
    district court to omit an instruction on entrapment.                      However,
    4
    To the extent Fernando claims that violation of the North
    Carolina statute requires that the defendant must be in the
    presence (actual or constructive) of a minor, his argument is
    unavailing. Fernando was convicted of violating § 2422(b), which
    requires the Government to establish that he persuaded or enticed
    a minor to commit illegal sexual activity, or attempted to do so.
    - 5 -
    Fernando expressly declined to seek such an instruction below.
    Even if this claim had been properly preserved for appellate review
    and presented on appeal, the evidence did not support an entrapment
    instruction.      See United States v. Harrison, 
    37 F.3d 133
    , 136 (4th
    Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen government agents merely offer an opportunity
    to commit the crime and the defendant promptly avails himself of
    that opportunity, an entrapment instruction is not warranted.”).
    Finally, while recognizing the “mandatory nature” of his
    sentence, Fernando argues that his 120-month statutorily mandated
    minimum sentence is unreasonable.              This court reviews a district
    court’s sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion
    standard.      Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597 (2007); see
    also United States v. Pauley, 
    511 F.3d 468
    , 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
    When sentencing a defendant, a district court must: (1) properly
    calculate the Guidelines range; (2) determine whether a sentence
    within that range serves the factors set out in 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a)    (West   2000   &   Supp.    2008);   (3)    implement   mandatory
    statutory limitations; and (4) explain its reasons for selecting a
    sentence.      Pauley, 
    511 F.3d at 473
    .          In the Fourth Circuit, “[a]
    sentence      within   the    proper      Sentencing      Guidelines   range   is
    presumptively reasonable.”         United States v. Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    ,
    193 (4th Cir. 2007); see Rita v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    ,
    2462-69 (2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness for a
    within-Guidelines sentence).              Absent a motion for substantial
    - 6 -
    assistance, a district court lacks authority to impose a sentence
    below the statutory mandatory minimum. See United States v. Allen,
    
    450 F.3d 565
    , 568-69 (4th Cir. 2006).           Here, the district court
    followed the necessary procedural steps in sentencing Fernando. It
    properly    calculated   the    Guidelines    range   and    considered   the
    § 3553(a) factors before sentencing Fernando to the statutory
    mandatory minimum.       The district court thus did not abuse its
    discretion in imposing the 120-month sentence.
    Accordingly,   we    affirm      Fernando’s     convictions   and
    sentence.    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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