United States v. Ruhbayan , 294 F. App'x 23 ( 2008 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-5166
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    RAJUL RUHBAYAN, a/k/a James Vernette Johnson, a/k/a James
    Vernon Wood, a/k/a Jibrael Ruhalamin, a/k/a Jibra’el Ruh-
    alamin, a/k/a Amir Ruhbayan, a/k/a Deja, a/k/a Day-Ja, a/k/a
    Kreem, a/k/a Creme,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
    (S. Ct. No. 07-7811)
    Submitted:   February 29, 2008          Decided:   September 22, 2008
    Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Joseph Barry McCracken, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck
    Rosenberg, United States Attorney, James Ashford Metcalfe,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Jonathan Tate Mlinarcik, Third-
    Year Law Student, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    In 2003, Rajul Ruhbayan was convicted by a jury in the Eastern
    District of Virginia on four offenses arising from a perjury and
    obstruction of justice scheme.        Thereafter, in 2004, the district
    court sentenced Ruhbayan to life in prison on one offense and to
    three concurrent sixty-month sentences on the other three offenses.
    We affirmed his convictions but vacated his sentence, remanding for
    resentencing pursuant to United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005).     See United States v. Ruhbayan, 
    406 F.3d 292
     (4th Cir.
    2005).
    On remand, in 2005, the district court reimposed the initial
    sentence. Ruhbayan appealed, challenging, inter alia, the district
    court’s failure to “take into account factors [under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)] which should have mitigated against the harsh sentence
    imposed,”    Br.   of   Appellant   43,   including   “the   need   to   avoid
    inappropriate sentencing disparities” resulting from “the 100-to-1
    ratio between powder and crack cocaine,” id. at 47.*                Ruhbayan
    nevertheless acknowledged our then-controlling decision in United
    States v. Eura, 
    440 F.3d 625
     (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that 100:1
    *
    The district court found that Ruhbayan committed and suborned
    perjury in connection with his 2000 trial on a prior federal charge
    of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Under the Sentencing
    Guidelines, Ruhbayan’s base offense level for perjury and suborning
    perjury was six levels below the offense level for the underlying
    drug conspiracy offense (up to a maximum level of 30), with the
    offense level for the underlying drug conspiracy offense being
    premised on the amount of crack cocaine attributed to him. See
    U.S.S.G. §§ 2J1.3, 2X3.1, 2D1.1(c).
    2
    ratio cannot be the basis of a variance), vacated 
    128 S. Ct. 853
    (2008).   We rejected Ruhbayan’s appellate contentions and affirmed
    his sentence.     See United States v. Ruhbayan, 
    527 F.3d 107
     (4th
    Cir. 2007).
    Ruhbayan filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the
    Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to this court for
    further consideration in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 558
    , 564 (2007) (holding that a sentencing judge is free to
    consider the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment of crack
    and   powder   cocaine   offenses   in   determining   whether,   “in   the
    particular case, a within-Guidelines sentence is ‘greater than
    necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing” (quoting 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a))).      Upon review of the record, we conclude that
    resentencing is warranted.          Accordingly, we vacate Ruhbayan’s
    sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing in light
    of Kimbrough. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    3