Brown Ex Rel. Estate of Bell v. Middleton , 362 F. App'x 340 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1937
ANGELIC BROWN, Individually and as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Travone L. Bell, decedent; TROJAN BELL,
Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Travone L. Bell, decedent,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
OFFICER MIDDLETON, Individually; OFFICER HOLT, Individually;
OFFICER KRAMITZ, Individually; E. BERNARDI, Officer,
Individually; DETENTION OFFICER BROWN, Individually; AL
CANNON, Sheriff of Charleston County in his official and
individual capacities,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
OFFICER VALENTINE, Individually; CHARLESTON COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER; CITY OF NORTH CHARLESTON POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (2:06-cv-02454-MBS)
Argued: October 27, 2009 Decided: January 15, 2010
Before KING, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and
Anthony J. TRENGA, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Michele Patrao Forsythe, Michael W. Sautter, QUERY,
SAUTTER, GLISERMAN & PRICE, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellants. Robin Lilley Jackson, SENN, MCDONALD & LEINBACK,
LLC, Charleston, South Carolina; Gordon Wade Cooper, BUYCK LAW
FIRM, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
Stephanie P. McDonald, SENN, MCDONALD & LEINBACK, LLC,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees Officer Middleton,
Individually, Officer Holt, Individually, Officer Kramitz,
Individually, E. Bernardi, Officer, Individually; Darren K.
Sanders, BUYCK & SANDERS, LLC, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina,
for Appellees Detention Officer Brown, Individually, Al Cannon,
Sheriff of Charleston County, in his official and individual
capacities.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
On February 18, 2005, approximately four and a half hours
after being arrested and while still in custody, Travone Bell
(“Bell”), age 16, suddenly collapsed into unconsciousness while
taking a shower at the Charleston County Detention Center (the
“Detention Center”). He received immediate medical attention and
was taken to a nearby hospital. He died approximately ten days
later without ever regaining consciousness. The underlying cause
of his collapse was attributed to acute cocaine intoxication.
Following their son’s death, Appellants Angelic Brown and
Trojan Bell (“Appellants”), acting individually and as personal
representatives of the Estate of Travone Bell, filed a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of North Charleston
Police Department (the “Department”), Al Cannon, the Sheriff of
Charleston County, Officers Tony Middleton, Justin Holt, Alan
Kramitz, Ethan Bernardi, George Valentine, 1 who were involved in
their son’s arrest, and Officer Hans Brown, who processed their
son at the Detention Center (collectively referred to as the
“Appellees”). Appellants allege that Appellees violated their
son’s federal constitutional rights when his urgent medical
1
Although Officer Valentine was named as a defendant in the
District Court and is included among the Appellees, the
Appellants have not pressed their claim against Officer
Valentine on appeal.
3
needs were not attended to following his arrest on February 18,
2005. The District Court entered summary judgment against the
Appellants. Because the evidence does not support a reasonable
inference that Appellees had actual knowledge that Bell was in
need of medical attention before his sudden collapse, we must
affirm.
I. Background
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on February 18, 2005, Officer
Holt stopped a vehicle driven by Bell for speeding. Bell was
arrested at the scene, handcuffed, and placed in the back of
Officer Holt’s police vehicle. Officers Middleton, Kramitz,
Bernardi, and Schmidt arrived to provide back up and assistance.
During a search of Bell’s vehicle, the officers found
several empty plastic baggies in the driver’s side door. There
was no evidence that these baggies previously contained any
material. Each officer asked Bell whether he was in possession
of anything illegal, including drugs or guns, and Bell responded
in the negative each time. Officers Bernardi and Middleton
noticed that Bell appeared to have an object in his mouth and
removed from Bell’s mouth a baggie containing an off white
substance, which field tested positive for crack-cocaine. The
Appellants contend this baggie had holes in it and that the
crack-cocaine in the baggie was moist from Bell’s saliva at the
4
time it was taken from his mouth, 2 while the Appellees maintain
that Officer Middleton made the holes in the baggie himself in
order to field test the substance inside, and the substance
inside the baggie became moist from the saliva on the baggie’s
exterior during that procedure.
After removing the baggie from Bell’s mouth, Officers Holt,
Middleton, and Kramitz each asked Bell several times whether he
had swallowed any drugs. Bell denied doing so each time, even
after Officer Kramitz cautioned Bell that if he had swallowed
any drugs, he needed to be treated and that he would not face
any additional charges for narcotics that he had consumed. Bell
was also offered immediate medical attention as well as the
services of an ambulance, but Bell continued to deny swallowing
any drugs or any need for medical attention. Bell did admit to
smoking earlier in the day several marijuana cigars laced with
cocaine, known as “blunts,” but Bell appeared calm, acted in a
normal manner, and carried on friendly conversation with the
officers.
2
The evidence offered to support this contention is a
statement in Officer Holt’s supplemental arrest report that
describes the cocaine in the baggie as moist. Officer Holt later
testified, however, that it was the baggie that was moist, and
the contents of the baggie became moist when exposed to the
saliva on the outside after the baggie was removed from Bell’s
mouth.
5
Because Bell was being charged as an adult, he was
transported to the South Precinct of the North Charleston Police
Department to complete paper work and then to the Detention
Center, where he arrived at 2:48 a.m. At the Detention Center,
Bell was taken to the Juvenile Unit, where Officer Brown
performed a strip search on Bell. Brown was provided with a copy
of the incident report that referenced the drugs taken from
Bell’s mouth. 3 During his processing of Bell, Officer Brown asked
Bell if he had swallowed any drugs. Bell again denied swallowing
drugs, but again admitted having smoked up to five cocaine laced
marijuana cigars earlier in the day. Officer Brown checked
Bell’s mouth for any additional hidden drugs, without finding
any. He also observed that Bell was acting calm and compliant,
without the abnormal behavior that is normally associated with
cocaine use.
After Officer Brown’s search, Bell was taken to the shower
room, where he began taking a shower. At approximately 3:53
a.m., a little over an hour after his arrival at the Detention
Center, Bell fell out of the shower stall and suffered a series
3
Officer Holt contends that he told Officer Brown, the
processing officer, that a plastic baggie of crack-cocaine had
been removed from Bell’s mouth, and that Bell could be hiding
additional drugs in his mouth, behind his gold teeth. Officer
Brown, however, denies receiving this information from Officer
Holt.
6
of seizures that rendered him unconscious. The officers and
medical staff immediately responded and summoned emergency
medical services that transported Bell to nearby St. Francis
Xavier Hospital emergency room. In the emergency room, Bell’s
urine tested positive for marijuana and cocaine, although no
blood tests were conducted to determine the exact amount of
drugs in his system. Bell never regained consciousness and died
on March 1, 2005. The cause of death was listed as cerebral
hypoxia due to subacute myocardial infarction secondary to acute
cocaine intoxication.
II. Procedural History/Standard of Review
On August 3, 2006, Appellants filed a complaint against
Appellees in the Court of Common Pleas for Charleston County,
South Carolina, alleging both federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and state law claims pursuant to the South Carolina Torts
Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-78-10, et seq. On September 1,
2006, the Appellees removed the case to federal court. On July
22, 2008, the District Court granted the Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment and remanded the remaining state law claims
after refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The
Appellants have appealed the District Court’s summary judgment
ruling as to their Section 1983 claims. We review a grant of
summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most
7
favorable to the non-prevailing party, here, the Appellants. See
Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir.
2007).
III. Analysis
Section 1983, by its own terms, prohibits constitutional
violations under color of state law. In this case, Appellants
claim that the Appellees violated their son’s constitutional
rights under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments when they
failed to properly attend to his urgent medical needs following
his arrest.
Persons within state police custody enjoy the protections
afforded by the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, which include
the right to obtain adequate medical care. Martin v. Gentile,
849 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the denial of
medical care by state officials can give rise to claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); see also City of
Revene v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 266 (1983)
(holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment as post-trial
detainees have under the Eighth Amendment); Belcher v. Oliver,
898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of
convicted prisoners, requires that government officials not be
8
deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the
detainee."); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.
1989) (“A violation of the Eighth Amendment standard . . . may
be used, however, to determine a due process violation.”)
(citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n.4 (4th Cir.
1984)).
“[O]nly the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
implicates the Eighth Amendment" and a prison official must
therefore have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302-303 (1991). Failure to provide
adequate medical care to a detained individual rises to the
level of a constitutional violation when there is “deliberate
indifference” to an individual’s serious medical needs. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (“[D]eliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment.”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976)). In order to establish “deliberate indifference,”
the Appellants must show that the arresting or processing
officers were “aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and also
that the officers “must also [have drawn] the inference.” Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (defining “deliberate
indifference”).
9
In summary, in order to establish liability under Section
1983 based on a claim of inadequate medical care, Appellants
must show the officers had actual knowledge that Bell had an
urgent medical need because of a known risk. Conduct that is
merely negligent, or even reckless, is insufficient. Farmer, 511
U.S. at 537 (rejecting the notion that that the common law
definition of “reckless” in civil cases meets the deliberate
indifference standard). 4 For these reasons, “[i]f an officer
fails to act in the face of an obvious risk of which he should
have known, but did not, the officer has not violated the Eighth
or Fourteenth Amendments.” Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273
F.3d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-
838).
In assessing whether these officers had the required level
of awareness necessary to establish “deliberate indifference” to
Bell’s urgent medical needs, the Court must consider, based on
the summary judgment record, whether Bell’s need for medical
attention was both “apparent and serious.” Grayson v. Reed, 195
F.2d. 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). A medical need is “serious” if
4
The District Court remanded Appellants’ claims under the
South Carolina Torts Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10, et
seq. The Act waives the state’s immunity for losses “proximately
caused by a tort of the State,” id. at 15-78-50, and is not
subject to the “deliberate indifference” standard applied to
claims under Section 1983.
10
it is one that has been “diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Iko v.
Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Henderon v.
Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)).
A.
Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the
Appellants, the evidence offered to support Appellants’ claim
does not support the inference that the arresting officers knew
that Bell was in need of urgent medical attention as a result of
cocaine consumption. It is undisputed that the Officers did not
see Bell ingest any cocaine and Bell did not have any tell-tale
signs in or around his mouth of cocaine ingestion when the
baggie was removed. Even if the substance inside the baggie were
moist following its extraction from Bell’s mouth, there was no
indication, from residue on the outside of the baggie or
otherwise, that the baggie had lost any of its contents.
Importantly, Bell repeatedly and consistently denied swallowing
any drugs, while admitting to drug use earlier in the day. 5
During the several hours that he was under police observation
after his arrest, but before his collapse, Bell acted normally
5
Appellants do not contend that the officers were
“deliberately indifferent” based on their knowledge of his
smoking the cocaine laced marijuana.
11
throughout his interactions with the officers without showing
any of the behavioral symptoms associated with cocaine
ingestion. While the arresting officers were rightfully
concerned that Bell may have swallowed drugs, there is no
evidence from which a fact finder could infer that they in fact
knew that Bell had consumed cocaine or that Bell evidenced the
need for medical attention.
The Appellants claim that the evidence is sufficient to
make the required showing for the purposes of surviving summary
judgment when one considers Bell’s age and the special
protections that South Carolina law provides to juvenile
detainees, but which Bell allegedly did not receive. 6 Whether
Bell was properly treated as a juvenile under South Carolina law
does not affect the constitutional standard by which the
Appellees’ conduct is to be judged; and Appellants still must
show, even if Bell is considered a juvenile for the purposes of
6
Specifically, Appellants allege that the Detention
Center’s own procedures prohibit juveniles from being admitted
to the Detention Center if there is any doubt about their
medical condition. Appellants also contend that under S.C. Code
§ 63-19-810(B), Officer Holt was required to inform an
authorized representative of the State Department of Juvenile
Justice of Bell’s arrest and location, and that Bell’s parents
were required to be notified that he was in custody under S.C.
Code § 63-19-810(A), which also places any child under the age
of seventeen within the jurisdiction of the South Carolina
Family Court.
12
their constitutional claims, that the officers were deliberately
indifferent to a known need for urgent medical attention.
The facts presented to the District Court, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the Appellants, do not create a
triable issue of fact concerning whether the arresting officers
in fact knew that Bell was in need of urgent medical attention.
For these reasons, the evidence did not sufficiently support the
claim that the arresting officers violated Bell’s constitutional
rights. 7
B.
With respect to Officer Brown, who processed and
searched Bell at the Detention Center several hours after his
vehicle was initially stopped, it is uncontested that Officer
Brown searched Bell’s mouth for drugs without finding anything
and asked Bell if he had swallowed any drugs, which Bell again
denied. He also observed that Bell was acting normally, without
showing the signs or symptoms of cocaine ingestion. When Bell
collapsed while taking a shower, Officer Brown acted immediately
to provide him with medical attention.
7
As Appellants did not raise the issue on appeal, we will
not address the District Court’s finding that the level of force
used by the arresting officers to retrieve the baggie from
Bell’s mouth did not violate Bell’s Fourth Amendment rights.
13
Even assuming for purposes of summary judgment that Officer
Brown knew that a baggie of crack-cocaine had been retrieved
from Bell’s mouth and that Officer Holt had specifically told
him to search Bell’s mouth, the evidence remains insufficient to
support the inference that Officer Brown knew that Bell was in
need of urgent medical attention. Accordingly, the evidence is
insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether
Officer Brown was “deliberatively indifferent.”
C.
Appellants base their claim against Al Cannon, the Sheriff
of Charleston County, not on his actual involvement in the
arrest or processing of Bell, but rather on his supervisory
responsibilities. Under Section 1983, a supervisory official may
be held liable in his personal capacity in certain circumstances
for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates if
those actions were premised on a recognition that supervisory
indifference or tacit approval of the misconduct could cause the
constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th
Cir. 1994). In this case, however, since we have found that none
of the officers violated Bell’s constitutional rights, there is
no basis for Sheriff Cannon’s liability under any theory. 8
8
The District Court also correctly concluded that Sheriff
Cannon cannot be held liable under Section 1983 in his official
capacity. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S.
(Continued)
14
Likewise, because we have found that none of the officers
violated Bell’s constitutional rights, there is no basis for the
Appellants’ claim against the Department itself.
D.
The District Court was also correct in concluding that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity for any
constitutional violation they may have committed. When
government officers are performing a discretionary function,
they are entitled to a defense of qualified immunity unless
their conduct clearly violates an established constitutional
right that the officer reasonably would have known to exist.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1983) (granting qualified
immunity in the Section 1983 context). Whether or not a police
officer is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law
for the court, and when there are no relevant disputed material
facts, a court should rule on the qualified immunity issue at
the summary judgment stage. Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553,
558 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, the question of qualified
58, 71 (1989) (“We hold that neither a state nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under §
1983.”); see also Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C.
1988) aff’d 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that, in South
Carolina, sheriffs and deputies are state officials).
15
immunity should be decided at the summary judgment stage.”)
(citing Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003)).
In this case, as discussed above, none of the officers
violated any of Bell’s constitutional rights. Without any
evidence demonstrating the officers had knowledge that Bell was
in urgent need of medical care, the officers cannot have
violated a clearly established constitutional right and are
entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
AFFIRMED
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