United States v. Robert Boyd , 537 F. App'x 234 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6231
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT PAUL BOYD,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:08-hc-02061-D-JG)
Submitted: July 30, 2013 Decided: August 7, 2013
Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jennifer Haynes Rose, LAW OFFICE OF JENNIFER HAYNES ROSE,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Seth M. Wood,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Paul Boyd appeals from the district court’s
order civilly committing him pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006)
to the custody and care of the Attorney General. The United
States sought to commit Boyd as a sexually dangerous person
under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18
U.S.C. §§ 4247-48 (2006) (the “Act”). On appeal, Boyd contends
that the Act violates his equal protection and due process
rights and is criminal — and not civil — in nature. He also
challenges the district court’s determination that he suffers
from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder, given
that his diagnosis of paraphilia, not otherwise specified,
hebephilia, is not specifically listed in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”). Boyd also
contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that
the Government proved by clear and convincing evidence that he
would be unable to refrain from future acts of child
molestation. Finally, he contends that the district court erred
in denying his motions to dismiss and staying the action for two
years. Finding no error, we affirm.
Pursuant to the Act, if, after a hearing, the district
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a person is a
“sexually dangerous person,” the court must commit the person to
the custody of the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d). A
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“sexually dangerous person” is one “who has engaged or attempted
to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and
who is sexually dangerous to others.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5).
A person is considered “sexually dangerous to others” if “the
person suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty
in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation
if released.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6).
Regarding his constitutional claims, Boyd argues that
18 U.S.C. § 4248 violates equal protection because it applies
only to federal prisoners, those committed to the Attorney
General under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2006), and those against whom
all criminal charges have been dismissed based solely on their
mental condition. In addition, he argues that his detention
between certification and his hearing violated due process. He
further claims that the Act is a criminal statute and is not
civil in nature.
This Court’s precedent in United States v. Timms, 664
F.3d 436, 448-49 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 189(2012), forecloses these three arguments. In Timms, we applied
rational basis review and held that “Congress rationally limited
§ 4248’s scope to sexually dangerous persons within BOP
custody.” Id. at 449. As to the due process claim, if the
Government’s lawful authority under § 4248 is not to blame for
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the delay between a certification being filed and the hearing,
the delay in the proceedings does not violate due process. Id.
at 454. Here, the district court appropriately denied Boyd’s
first motion to dismiss and placed the case in abeyance pending
the outcome of the appellate proceedings in United States v.
Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d 560 U.S. 126(2010). The case proceeded without significant delay following
the issuance of the Supreme Court’s decision. Therefore, there
was no due process violation. * Finally, in Timms, we held that
“§ 4248 creates civil — not criminal — proceedings.” 664 F.3d
at 456. Thus, these claims are without merit.
Next, Boyd contends that the district court clearly
erred in finding that clear and convincing evidence supported
its finding that he suffered from a serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder. Boyd relies in part on the absence of
his particular type of paraphilia (hebephilia) from the DSM. We
recently confirmed that “one will search § 4247(a)(6) in vain
for any language purporting to confine the universe of
qualifying mental impairments within clinical or pedagogical
*
To the extent Boyd argues that the delay from
certification to hearing was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, the Eighth Amendment does not provide him with a
cause of action. See, e.g., Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978,
994 (9th Cir. 2007) (vacated on other grounds) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment is not the proper vehicle to challenge the conditions
of civil commitment.”).
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parameters” and, consequently, that “it has been left to the
courts to develop the meaning of ‘serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder’ as a legal term of art.” United
States v. Caporale, 701 F.3d 128, 136 (4th Cir. 2012).
Therefore, it was within the court’s discretion to find that
Boyd has a qualifying impairment even though his exact condition
may not be specified in the DSM.
As to Boyd’s other claims that it was error to find
that his condition qualified under the Act and that he would
have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent
behavior or molestation of a child, as required by 18 U.S.C.
§ 4247(a)(5)-(6), we have reviewed the record, the hearing
transcript, and the district court’s order incorporating its
ruling from the bench and find no error. See United States v.
Boyd, 5:08-hc-02061-D-JG (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2012).
We therefore affirm the district court’s order
committing Boyd to the custody and care of the Attorney General
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4248. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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