Jesus Jehovah v. Harold Clarke , 620 F. App'x 202 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-7881
JESUS EMMANUEL JEHOVAH, a/k/a Robert Gabriel Love, a/k/a
Gabriel Alexander Antonio,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director; A. DAVID ROBINSON, Deputy
Director,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; LORETTA K. KELLY, Warden, Sussex I
State Prison; ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, in their official, individual, and private
capacities, jointly and severally; EDDIE L. PEARSON, Warden;
KEISHA FOWLKES, Unit Manager; MS. EVANS, Records Officer;
MS. ANSAH, Corporal; ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES,
INC.; ANTHONY KING, Dr.; MESELE GEBREYES, Dr.; BENJAMIN J.
ULEP, Dr.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:12-cv-00087-JCC-IDD)
Submitted: July 28, 2015 Decided: October 22, 2015
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jesus Emmanuel Jehovah, Appellant Pro Se. Trevor Stephen Cox,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Jesus Emmanuel Jehovah seeks to appeal the district court’s
March 26, 2014 order denying his first Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
motion for relief from judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)
action and the court’s November 20, 2014 order denying a second
Rule 60(b) motion. We dismiss Jehovah’s appeal.
First, we conclude that Jehovah failed to timely appeal
from the denial of his first Rule 60(b) motion. Parties are
accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final
judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A),
unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(6). If a party files a Rule 60 motion within 28
days of the judgment appealed from, “the time to file an appeal
runs . . . from the entry of the order disposing of the [Rule
60] motion.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). “[T]he timely filing
of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court’s order denying Jehovah’s first Rule
60(b) motion was entered on the docket on March 26, 2014. The
notice of appeal was filed on December 10, 2014. * Furthermore,
*
For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date
appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could
have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to
(Continued)
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Jehovah’s second Rule 60(b) motion did not extend the time for
noting an appeal because it was filed on August 16, 2014, more
than 28 days after the district court’s March 26, 2014 order.
Because Jehovah failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to
obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we
dismiss his appeal from the denial of his first Rule 60(b)
motion for lack of jurisdiction.
With respect to Jehovah’s appeal from the denial of his
second Rule 60(b) motion, we may address sua sponte whether an
appeal is moot because “[t]he doctrine of mootness originates in
Article III’s case or controversy language.” Incumma v. Ozmint,
507 F.3d 281, 285-86 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal alterations and
quotation marks omitted). “[A] case is moot when the issues
presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the out-come.” Id. at 286 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Litigation may become moot even on
appeal, and “[i]f an event occurs while a case is pending on
appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any
effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal must
be dismissed.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted).
the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
276 (1988).
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On July 9, 2015, while this appeal was pending, we
reversed, in its entirety, the district court’s judgment denying
relief on Jehovah’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, remanding for
further proceedings. See Jehovah v. Clarke, ___ F.3d ___, No.
13-7529, 2015 WL 4126391, at *1 (4th Cir. July 9, 2015). In
reversing the district court’s order, we concluded that the
district court erred by not permitting Jehovah an opportunity to
present evidence and arguments regarding his Religious Land Use
and Incarcerated Persons Act claim and his First Amendment free
exercise claim, both stemming from a prison regulation
prohibiting inmates from consuming communion wine. Id. at *4-6.
Jehovah has thus secured the opportunity, on remand, to present
the evidence and arguments raised in his second Rule 60(b)
motion. Jehovah is unable to gain any further meaningful relief
through the resolution of this appeal, and therefore no longer
has a legally cognizable interest in its outcome.
Accordingly, we dismiss Jehovah’s appeal from the denial of
his first Rule 60(b) motion as untimely and dismiss his appeal
from the denial of his second Rule 60(b) motion as moot. We
deny Jehovah’s motion for judicial notice of his health
problems. See United States v. Hawkins, 76 F.3d 545, 551-52
(4th Cir. 1996) (observing that under Fed. R. Evid. 201, court
may not take judicial notice of fact subject to reasonable
dispute). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED
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