Mullins v. AT&T Corporation , 424 F. App'x 217 ( 2011 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-2135
    MARGARET MULLINS,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    AT&T CORPORATION,
    Defendant – Appellant,
    and
    CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; AT&T LONG TERM
    DISABILITY PLAN FOR OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYEES; AT&T MEDICAL
    EXPENSE PLAN FOR OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYEES,
    Defendants.
    No. 04-2136
    MARGARET MULLINS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; AT&T LONG TERM
    DISABILITY   PLAN   FOR   OCCUPATIONAL    EMPLOYEES;  AT&T
    CORPORATION; AT&T MEDICAL EXPENSE PLAN FOR OCCUPATIONAL
    EMPLOYEES,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    No. 07-1717
    MARGARET MULLINS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; AT&T LONG TERM
    DISABILITY   PLAN   FOR   OCCUPATIONAL    EMPLOYEES;  AT&T
    CORPORATION; AT&T MEDICAL EXPENSE PLAN FOR OCCUPATIONAL
    EMPLOYEES,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    No. 10-2010
    MARGARET MULLINS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    AT&T CORPORATION,
    Defendant – Appellee,
    and
    CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; AT&T LONG TERM
    DISABILITY PLAN FOR OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYEES; AT&T MEDICAL
    EXPENSE PLAN FOR OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYEES,
    Defendants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
    Judge. (CA-03-69; 1:03-cv-00069-GBL-TCB)
    2
    Argued:   January 26, 2011                   Decided:     April 20, 2011
    Before TRAXLER,   Chief   Judge,   and   NIEMEYER   and   AGEE,   Circuit
    Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: Robert Barnes Delano, Jr., SANDS ANDERSON, PC, Richmond,
    Virginia,   for  AT&T   Corporation,   Connecticut   General  Life
    Insurance   Company,  AT&T    Long   Term   Disability   Plan  for
    Occupational Employees, and AT&T Medical Expense Plan for
    Occupational Employees.     Patricia Ann Smith, LAW OFFICES OF
    PATRICIA A. SMITH, Alexandria, Virginia, for Margaret Mullins.
    ON BRIEF: Jeffrey H. Geiger, SANDS ANDERSON, PC, Richmond,
    Virginia,   for  AT&T   Corporation,   Connecticut   General  Life
    Insurance   Company,  AT&T    Long   Term   Disability   Plan  for
    Occupational Employees, and AT&T Medical Expense Plan for
    Occupational Employees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    3
    PER CURIAM:
    Margaret       Mullins     appeals        the    district     court’s       decision
    granting        summary    judgment       against       her   on    her     claim    for
    disability benefits under a long-term disability plan (the “LTD
    Plan” or “Plan”) self-funded by her employer, AT&T Corporation
    (“AT&T”),       administered      by    Connecticut      General     Life     Insurance
    Company    (“CGLIC”),       and     governed      by    the   Employee      Retirement
    Income     Security       Act     of    1974     (“ERISA”).         See     29     U.S.C.
    § 1132(a)(1)(B).            AT&T       cross-appeals      the      district       court’s
    decision imposing a penalty under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) for
    AT&T’s failure to produce a copy of the Summary Plan Description
    (“SPD”) upon Mullins’ request.             We affirm.
    I.
    Mullins was employed by AT&T as a communications assistant.
    In this capacity, she handled “relay” calls for disabled persons
    that required her to type telephone conversations as quickly as
    possible.        While at AT&T, Mullins was covered by the LTD Plan.
    Under     the     Plan,    an     employee       is    considered     disabled,      and
    therefore entitled to LTD benefits, when:
    in the sole opinion of [CGLIC], [the employee] is
    determined   to   be  incapable   of  performing   the
    requirements of any job for any employer (including
    non-AT&T employment), (as a management or occupational
    employee), for which the individual is qualified or
    may reasonably become qualified by training, education
    4
    or experience, other than a job that pays less than 50
    percent of [the employee’s] annual Base Pay.
    J.A. 365.
    In April 1998, Mullins was diagnosed with bilateral carpal
    tunnel      syndrome        (“CTS”)       which        caused      her     to     experience
    sensitivity and pain in her hands.                       Mullins also had diabetes,
    which was thought to aggravate her CTS condition.                               In late 1998
    and early 1999, Dr. Stephen Schroering, an orthopedic surgeon,
    performed carpal tunnel surgery on both of her hands.                                  Mullins
    returned to work at AT&T on April 8, 1999, but her physician
    determined that she was unable to perform the continuous and
    repetitive keyboarding duties required by her position.                                      She
    stopped working at AT&T effective April 16, 1999.
    On   April     23,    1999,       Dr.    Schroering        stated    that      Mullins’
    condition       prohibited      her      from       “work    requiring      repetitive        or
    forceful       grasping      with   either       hand,      greater      than   50%    of    her
    maximum     grip    strength,”        and      other    “work     requiring       repetitive
    work    with    either      hand,    including         keyboard     work.”         J.A.     548.
    However, Dr. Schroering noted that Mullins “does well as long as
    she is not doing” such repetitive work throughout the day.                                  J.A.
    548.     He felt that Mullins was unable “to return to her usual
    and    customary      work    as    an    AT&T      operator,      and    w[ould]     require
    vocational rehabilitation.”                 J.A. 548.         Dr. Schroering assigned
    Mullins     a   10%   permanent          disability         for   mild    residual     carpal
    5
    tunnel symptoms in the right hand and a 10% permanent disability
    for mild residual carpal tunnel symptoms in the left hand, which
    equated     to      a    12%    whole        person    permanent     disability.           Dr.
    Schroering left his practice in mid-1999.
    In September 1999, Mullins applied for benefits under the
    LTD   Plan,       claiming      that    the     pain    and   weakness    in    her      hands
    rendered her “incapable of performing the requirements of any
    job for any employer” under the terms of the Plan.                              J.A. 365.
    Mullins,      a    high       school    graduate       with    two   years     of   college
    education,        was    35    years    old     at    the   time.      CGLIC    began      its
    evaluation        of    Mullins’       LTD    claim    by   obtaining    copies       of   the
    medical       records          from     the     physicians       identified         in     her
    application.            In addition to Dr. Schroering, Mullins listed Dr.
    Leopoldo Bendigo, Dr. Robert Strang, Dr. Douglas Williams, and
    Dr. N.C. Ratliffe as her treating physicians.
    Dr.         Bendigo,       an      orthopedic         surgeon,     performed          an
    independent medical examination of Mullins on May 14, 1999.                                 He
    stated that Mullins was unable to return to her duties at AT&T
    “at this point in time.”                 J.A. 545.          However, he felt that she
    had not reached maximum medical improvement and prescribed three
    to six months of physical therapy.
    Dr. Strang, an orthopedic surgeon, began seeing Mullins in
    early August 1999, after Dr. Schroering left his practice.                                 Dr.
    Strang suggested physical therapy and referred Mullins to Dr.
    6
    Williams,     a   neurologist,     for   his   opinion     and    recommendations
    regarding the continued pain and sensitivity in her hands.                        Dr.
    Williams had previously performed nerve conduction studies on
    Mullins in May 1998, prior to her CTS surgeries, but felt that
    she did not have CTS at that time.                On September 23, 1999, Dr.
    Williams noted that Mullins had “pretty good grip strength,” but
    was continuing to experience bilateral hand pain.                     J.A. 488.   It
    was his impression that she had a “small fiber neuropathy . . .
    related to her diabetes.”           J.A. 553.          He continued to believe
    that    her   problems     were    unrelated      to    CTS.       He    prescribed
    medication and asked Mullins to follow-up with him in two weeks.
    On   September     28,   1999,    Dr.    Strang   advised      that     Mullins   had
    “neuropathy of both hands due to the carpal tunnel syndrome and
    the diabetic neuropathy,” and was unable to return to work “[a]t
    this time.”       J.A. 443.
    Dr. Ratliff was Mullins’ family doctor.                   In October 1999,
    he completed a statement of disability, stating that Mullins had
    a    “[s]evere      limitation     of     functional      capacity”        and    was
    “incapable of minimal (sedentary) activity.”                   J.A. 492.     It was
    his opinion that Mullins was totally disabled from her position
    at AT&T and from “any other work.”             J.A. 492.       However, he noted
    that Mullins’ prognosis was “[g]uarded,” and offered no opinion
    as to whether a fundamental or marked change was expected.
    7
    In October 1999, Dr. Strang and Dr. Williams each completed
    a physical assessment at the request of CGLIC, based on their
    evaluation of Mullins.               Dr. Strang stated that Mullins could
    sit, stand and walk for eight hours a day, and occasionally
    reach above and below her shoulders, but was unable to lift,
    carry, push or pull, perform simple or firm grasping, or perform
    fingering/keyboarding           or     other       fine    manipulation.            J.A.   444.
    Dr. Williams stated that Mullins could sit for 8 hours a day,
    stand and walk for 7 hours a day, lift and carry up to 20 pounds
    frequently, lift and carry up to 50 pounds occasionally, push
    and   pull   occasionally,           reach     above       and    below      her    shoulders
    frequently,          and     perform     simple           grasping     frequently,          and
    occasionally         perform     fingering/keyboarding                 and     other       fine
    manipulation.           On January 17, 2000, Dr. Williams reevaluated
    Mullins.        He    stated    that     Mullins’         predominant        deficits      were
    sensory and assigned Mullins a 4% functional impairment in each
    upper extremity, which equated to a 4% overall impairment.
    Due    to    the     conflicting       medical        evidence      as   to    Mullins’
    physical     abilities,         particularly          from       her   specialists,         Dr.
    Strang    and     Dr.      Williams,    CIGNA       referred      Mullins’         case    to   a
    physician advisor, Dr. Thomas Franz, for his review.                                Dr. Franz
    advised     that     the     current    information          failed    to      allow      for   a
    definitive diagnosis and failed to support a finding of physical
    inability to work at a light or sedentary level.
    8
    On    January      27,    2000,     CGLIC      denied       Mullins’     claim   for
    benefits as submitted, advising her that there was insufficient
    evidence     to    support     her     claim       that    she    was   “incapable     of
    performing the requirements of any job for any employer” under
    the terms of the Plan.            J.A. 365.             In support of the decision,
    CGLIC noted the differing views of Dr. Strang and Dr. Williams,
    as well as the review by Dr. Franz.
    Upon Mullins’ request for review of CGLIC’s denial, CGLIC
    obtained updated medical records from her treating physicians.
    In addition, CGLIC consulted a physician advisor, Dr. Edward
    Kern, for an opinion as to whether Mullins had a psychological
    condition that would impact her ability to work.                              Dr. Pierce
    Nelson had previously diagnosed Mullins with major depression in
    November 1999, and raised questions as to Mullins’ ability to
    function    as    a    result.       However,       Dr.    Nelson   also    noted     that
    Mullins was able to drive to her examination and manage her
    financial     affairs.           Dr.    Kern,       who     is   board-certified       in
    psychiatry and neurology, reviewed Mullins’ records, including
    those of Dr. Nelson, and reported that the information did not
    address functionality and that malingering was a concern.
    The     updated         medical     records          from    Mullins’      treating
    physicians       for   her    hand     pain       and    sensitivity     continued     to
    demonstrate       conflicting     opinions        regarding      both   her    diagnosis
    and her ability to work.               On April 18, 2000, Dr. Strang advised
    9
    that Mullins “has a confusing case of neuropathy of the hands.”
    J.A. 528.         He also noted that there was an additional dispute
    between two neurologists, Dr. Williams and Dr. Dew, as to the
    cause of her pain.              Dr. Strang concluded that “[a]t any rate, it
    would appear that [Mullins] does have significant pain in her
    hands, and it would appear that she is still unable to do her
    work.”      J.A. 528.
    On June 13, 2000, Dr. Erdogan Atasoy, a specialist in hand
    surgery, evaluated Mullins.                 Dr. Atasoy diagnosed Mullins with
    “thoracic outlet compression and associating myofascitis.”                               J.A.
    581.     Dr. Atasoy stated that Mullins could perform “[l]ight work
    lifting      20    lbs        maximum    with        frequent    lifting       or     carrying
    restricted to 10 lbs or less.”                       J.A. 582-83.     She was to avoid
    work requiring “constant repetitive/static use of both hands –
    pushing/pulling,               pinching/gripping,               flexion/extension           of
    wrist/elbow, pronation/supination (palm down/palm up),” the “use
    of vibratory tools,” overhead work, climbing poles or ladders,
    and unprotected heights.                  J.A. 583.        He suggested a “[s]lower
    pace work” and limited her to a “[w]ork day not to exceed more
    that 6 hours per day/5 days per week.”                     J.A. 583.
    In    light       of     the     continuing       conflict    between          Mullins’
    physicians,        CGLIC        next     referred       Mullins     for    a        functional
    capacity examination (“FCE”).                        The evaluation took place for
    several hours over 2 days, and identified a number of physical
    10
    strengths and limitations.              Because Mullins was unable to lift
    10 pounds occasionally and right-hand carry, the FCE indicated
    that Mullins capabilities could not be classified as “sedentary”
    under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.                       However, the FCE
    recommendation was that Mullins should be able to return to a
    job within the specific capabilities and restrictions set forth
    in    the   activity    report    of    the     FCE.    No    additional         physical
    rehabilitation was recommended.
    CGLIC forwarded the results of the FCE to Drs. Ratliffe,
    Strang, Williams, and Atasoy for their review and comment.                                 Dr.
    Ratliffe did not respond.              Dr. Strang stated that Mullins was
    still unable to work.             Dr. Williams and Dr. Atasoy, however,
    both agreed that Mullins was capable of performing full-time
    sedentary work in accordance with the limitations listed in the
    FCE.
    In   October     2000,    CGLIC     referred        Mullins’       file       for    a
    Transferable Skills Analysis (“TSA”) to determine whether there
    were    jobs   that    Mullins    could       perform   within      the    limitations
    identified in the FCE.           The TSA revealed three jobs that Mullins
    could perform based upon her skills, education, and abilities,
    and    which   met    the   salary     restrictions     for       resolution         of    her
    claim.       Specifically,       Mullins      was   able     to   work    as     a    space
    scheduler, insurance clerk, or call-out operator.                         In November
    2000, CGLIC also referred Mullins’ file for a Labor Market Study
    11
    (“LMS”),    in    order       to    determine       whether    there       were      employers
    within     Mullins’           geographical          area      that     would          actually
    accommodate       her     limitations        and     meet     the     wage       replacement
    requirements of the Plan.                 The LMS identified six employers with
    existing      job        openings         that      would      accommodate            Mullins’
    limitations.
    On November 27, 2000, CGLIC sent Mullins a letter upholding
    the initial denial of LTD benefits, based upon its determination
    that    Mullins     was      able    to    perform    sedentary        work      within    her
    limitations       and,       therefore,      that    she    was      not    “incapable        of
    performing the requirements of any job for any employer” under
    the terms of the Plan.                    J.A. 365.         Mullins again requested
    reconsideration         of    the   decision.         On    January        9,   2003,    after
    review by an appeals team, CGLIC issued its final denial of
    Mullins’ claim for LTD benefits.
    II.
    Mullins brought this lawsuit in district court under 29
    U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), claiming that the defendants improperly
    denied her benefits under the LTD Plan.                        Mullins later amended
    her    complaint    to       seek   statutory       penalties       under       29   U.S.C.    §
    1132(c)(1)(B) for AT&T’s failure to produce to her a copy of the
    SPD upon her request for the LTD Plan documents.                                     On cross-
    motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary
    12
    judgment for the defendants on Mullins’ claim for LTD benefits.
    However, the district court granted summary judgment to Mullins
    on her claim for statutory penalties and ordered AT&T to pay
    Mullins     penalties    totaling   $18,400.          Mullins   appealed    the
    district court’s decision on her claim for LTD benefits and AT&T
    appealed the district court’s imposition of the penalty.
    This is the third appeal from the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment to the defendants on Mullins’ claim for LTD
    benefits.      Mullins    argued    below    that   CGLIC   had    abused   its
    discretion    by   denying    her   claim    in   part   because    CGLIC   had
    violated its internal procedures during its consideration of her
    claim.    However, until recently, Mullins’ attempts to obtain the
    production of the claims manuals, protocols, and other internal
    guidelines relating to the processing of LTD claims and appeals
    from claims denials had been unsuccessful.               Without addressing
    the merits of the issues, we twice remanded this matter to the
    district court with instructions that it ascertain the existence
    of any such claims-processing documents and produce the relevant
    documents to Mullins.        See Mullins v. AT&T Corp., 290 Fed. Appx.
    642 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).           After the relevant documents
    were   produced    to   Mullins,    the    district    court    again   granted
    summary judgment to the defendants.               The district court found
    that CGLIC had substantially complied with its claims-processing
    documents and that Mullins had failed to prove that CGLIC abused
    13
    its discretion in considering and denying her claim under the
    LTD Plan.      Accordingly, the parties’ cross-appeals are now back
    before us and ready for disposition.
    III.
    We    begin   with    Mullins’        appeal      of    the    district     court’s
    decision     awarding     summary         judgment    to      the    defendants    on    her
    claim for LTD benefits.
    A.
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
    novo, applying the same legal standards that the district court
    employed.      See Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan,
    
    514 F.3d 315
    , 321 (4th Cir. 2008).                      Where, as here, an ERISA-
    covered plan confers discretion on the plan’s administrator to
    interpret its provisions and issue a determination, we review
    the administrator’s determination under an abuse-of-discretion
    standard.       See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 
    554 U.S. 105
    , 111 (2008); 
    Evans, 514 F.3d at 321
    .                            Under the abuse-of-
    discretion      standard,          we      will    not        set     aside     the     plan
    administrator’s decision if it is reasonable, even if we would
    have reached a different conclusion independently.                            See Booth v.
    Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates Health & Welfare Plan, 
    201 F.3d 335
    ,   341    (4th   Cir.        2000).      The     administrator’s          decision    is
    reasonable     “if   it     is    the     result   of    a    deliberate,       principled
    14
    reasoning    process     and    if     it    is    supported    by     substantial
    evidence.”      Bernstein v. CapitalCare, Inc., 
    70 F.3d 783
    , 788
    (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In Booth, we set forth eight nonexclusive factors to be
    considered     by    courts    in    reviewing     the   plan    administrator’s
    decision:
    (1) the language of the plan; (2) the purposes and
    goals of the plan; (3) the adequacy of the materials
    considered to make the decision and the degree to
    which they support it; (4) whether the fiduciary’s
    interpretation was consistent with other provisions in
    the plan and with earlier interpretations of the plan;
    (5) whether the decisionmaking process was reasoned
    and   principled;  (6)   whether   the   decision   was
    consistent   with  the   procedural   and   substantive
    requirements of ERISA; (7) any external standard
    relevant to the exercise of discretion; and (8) the
    fiduciary’s motives and any conflict of interest it
    may have.
    
    Booth, 201 F.3d at 342-43
    ; see also Williams v. Metropolitan
    Life Ins. Co., 
    609 F.3d 622
    , 630 (4th Cir. 2010). 1
    B.
    Mullins        contends    that    the       district     court    erred   in
    concluding that CGLIC’s decisionmaking process was reasoned and
    1
    In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 
    554 U.S. 105
    (2008), the Supreme Court clarified that an administrator’s
    conflict of interest does not alter or modify the abuse-of-
    discretion standard of review.     See 
    id. at 115-16;
    see also
    Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
    609 F.3d 622
    , 630-31
    (4th Cir. 2010).    Instead, the conflict of interest is to be
    weighed along with other applicable factors.      See 
    Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117
    ; 
    Williams, 609 F.3d at 631
    . In this case, however,
    the parties agree that there was no conflict of interest.
    15
    principled, and erred in concluding that substantial evidence
    supported the denial of benefits.            We disagree.
    When Mullins first sought LTD benefits under the Plan, she
    had been seen by two surgeons and a neurologist for the pain and
    sensitivity in her hands.           The medical opinions of Mullins’ own
    treating physicians conflicted, however, both as to her specific
    diagnosis as well as to her functional capacity to perform work.
    Resolving such conflicts in the opinions of Mullins’ treating
    physicians    was    CGLIC’s       responsibility     and     well     within   the
    discretion conferred to it under the terms of the LTD Plan.                     See
    
    Booth, 201 F.3d at 345
    ; Brogan v. Holland, 
    105 F.3d 158
    , 162-63
    (4th Cir. 1997).        In determining that Mullins had failed to
    prove, as was her burden, that she was “incapable of performing
    the requirements of any job for any employer,” J.A. 365, CGLIC
    reasonably    considered     and     relied    upon   the     opinions     of   Dr.
    Williams and Dr. Atasoy, as well as the results of the FCE,
    which indicated that she was capable of performing sedentary
    work within her limitations.             CGLIC also took the additional
    step of obtaining both the TSA and LMS, and determined that
    there were actual jobs available in the market which Mullins
    could    perform    within   her    limitations     and   which      exceeded   the
    minimum     wage    requirement      necessary    for     a   finding      against
    disability under the definition in the LTD Plan.                     Thus, CGLIC’s
    16
    determination was clearly supported by substantial evidence in
    the administrative record.
    Mullins       acknowledges            that      the     medical        evidence      was
    conflicting on the issue of her disability.                         However, she argues
    that we should find that CGLIC abused its discretion because it
    did   not     strictly         adhere    to     its      internal    claims      processing
    procedures when considering her claim and, consequently, denied
    her   claim      based     upon    evidence         that     it   should     have     neither
    solicited nor relied upon.                  Most notably, Mullins contends that
    CGLIC   was      limited       under    its     claims      processing       procedures      to
    considering the opinion of Mullins’ “attending physician,” and
    asserts that while Drs. Ratliff, Strang, and Schroering might be
    considered        “attending       physicians,”           Drs.    Williams      and      Atasoy
    should not have been.
    Although the term ”attending physician” is used in CGLIC’s
    claims-processing          materials,         it    is      not   defined      therein     and
    common medical definitions of that term vary depending upon the
    context     in    which    it     is    used.         For   example,     the     meaning     of
    “attending       physician”       in    a     hospital       setting     might      be    quite
    different        from    the    meaning       of    that     term   in   a     non-hospital
    setting.      The district court rejected Mullins’ narrow definition
    of the term “attending physician” and found that its use was not
    intended to distinguish a claimant’s primary physician from all
    other treating physicians, but rather to delineate physicians
    17
    who have actually seen and treated the claimant from those who
    have not. 2         At the time that Mullins filed her claim for LTD
    benefits, she had been seen on three occasions by Dr. Strang,
    the orthopedic surgeon who assumed her care after Dr. Schroering
    left his practice, and on one or two occasions by Dr. Williams,
    the neurologist who had seen her previously and to whom she was
    referred for additional evaluation and treatment by Dr. Strang.
    Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court’s
    determination        that     the    term    “attending    physician”        did     not
    exclude CGLIC’s initial consideration of Dr. Williams’ opinion
    or    its   later     consideration         of   the   second    surgical        opinion
    solicited from Dr. Atasoy.                  Furthermore, even if we were to
    consider      the    term    “attending      physician”    to    be    limited     to   a
    single physician in other settings or circumstances, we cannot
    say    that    CGLIC        abused   its     discretion    or        otherwise     acted
    unreasonably in considering Drs. Williams and Atasoy to be an
    attending     or     treating    physicians       here,   or    in    requesting     and
    considering their medical records and opinions on the issue of
    Mullins’ functional capacities and ability to work.
    2
    We also note that the LTD Agreement between CGLIC and AT&T
    similarly defines an “Attending Physician” as “a duly licensed
    physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist treating the Claimant
    or Covered Person.” J.A. 70.
    18
    Building upon this “attending physician” argument, Mullins
    also   claims   that      CGLIC     abused       its    discretion      by    failing   to
    strictly follow certain preferred procedures set forth in its
    claims-processing         documents       for    resolving       conflicting     medical
    information.      The district court found that although CGLIC had
    an   obligation      to     some    degree      to     process    Mullins’     claim    in
    accordance with these procedures, and that such compliance is
    always a consideration on the question of reasonableness of a
    decision, strict compliance is not a prerequisite to a finding
    that the plan administrator’s overall decision was principled
    and reasonable.
    We   agree.        It   is   well     settled      that    the   decisionmaking
    process by a claims administrator, including external standards
    relevant to the exercise of the administrator’s discretion, is a
    factor to be considered in the overall determination of whether
    the administrator abused its discretion in denying LTD benefits.
    See 
    Booth, 201 F.3d at 342-43
    .               However, it is but one factor to
    weigh alongside the other factors and the administrative record.
    Cf. 
    Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117
    ; 
    Williams, 609 F.3d at 631
    .                           Indeed,
    as noted by the district court, a contrary ruling would rob the
    plan    administrator          of   the    discretion       granted      in    the    same
    documents.      Having reviewed the administrative record and the
    claims processing documents, we agree with the district court’s
    determination        that      CGLIC      substantially          complied      with     its
    19
    procedures and, to the extent it varied therefrom, did not abuse
    its discretion in doing so.
    As noted above, CGLIC was presented from the outset with
    conflicting medical opinions among Mullins’ treating physicians
    regarding both her diagnosis and her ability to work.                          Indeed,
    the   most    direct     conflict       was    between    the    surgeon      who    had
    recently     assumed     her    care     and    the   neurologist      to     whom    he
    referred     her   for    further       evaluation      and    treatment.        CGLIC
    considered     the     conflicting        opinions       of     Mullins’      treating
    physicians, solicited the opinion of a physician consultant, and
    obtained an FCE to independently evaluate her physical strengths
    and limitations for employment. 3               CGLIC then made a reasonable,
    principled determination that Mullins, who was in her mid-30s
    with some college education at the time, had failed to prove
    that she was “incapable of performing the requirements of any
    job   for    any   employer”      for    which    she    was     or   could    become
    reasonably qualified.          J.A. 365.
    3
    As correctly noted by the district court, Mullins’
    challenge to CGLIC’s FCE referral under its internal procedures
    also fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. The procedure
    relied upon by Mullins does not, by its terms, apply to the FCE
    obtained.
    20
    IV.
    We turn now to AT&T’s cross-appeal of the district court’s
    decision to impose a statutory penalty upon AT&T under 29 U.S.C.
    § 1132(c)(1).       We review the district court’s decision for an
    abuse of discretion.          See Davis v. Featherstone, 
    97 F.3d 734
    ,
    735-36 (4th Cir. 1996).
    In February 2001, Mullins’ former counsel requested copies
    of the “AT&T [LTD] policy . . . and a copy of all other plan
    documents concerning that [LTD] policy.”                    J.A. 63.      Two months
    later,    AT&T    produced    copies     of     the   LTD   plan   and    AT&T/CGLIC
    Agreement, but did not include a copy of the SPD.                           In March
    2003, after litigation was initiated by Mullins’ new counsel,
    AT&T produced a copy of the SPD to Mullins.
    Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1), the district court may, in
    its discretion, impose penalties of up to $100 per day against
    plan     administrators      who   fail        to   furnish     certain     documents
    requested by plan participants under ERISA.                      See Faircloth v.
    Lundy Packing Co., 
    91 F.3d 648
    , 659 (4th Cir. 1996).                              “Two
    factors     generally     guide    [the]        district      court’s     discretion:
    prejudice to the plaintiff and the nature of the administrator’s
    conduct    in    responding   to   the     participant’s        request     for   plan
    documents.”      
    Davis, 97 F.3d at 738
    ; see also 
    Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 659
    (noting that the court may consider prejudice and bad
    faith in exercising its discretion).
    21
    The district court found that Mullins’ written request for
    “a    copy    of   all    other    plan    documents        concerning      [the      LTD]
    policy,” was sufficient to notify AT&T that the response should
    include the SPD.          With regard to prejudice, the district court
    noted that while the SPD did contain some additional information
    not otherwise provided in the documents produced, Mullins was
    not    ultimately        prejudiced   by        the    delay   in       obtaining     the
    information.       With regard to the conduct of AT&T, the district
    court found that AT&T did not act in bad faith, but nevertheless
    had failed to produce complete information in violation of the
    statute.      Under the circumstances, the district court concluded
    that the maximum penalty of $100 per day was unwarranted but
    that a penalty of $25 per day would be appropriate.
    We     cannot   say   that    this    was       an   abuse   of    the    district
    court’s discretion.          “Although prejudice is a pertinent factor
    for the district court to consider, it is not a prerequisite to
    imposing a penalty.”           
    Davis, 97 F.3d at 738
    .               It is also not
    necessary     that    the   plan   administrator’s           conduct     rise    to    the
    level of bad faith.         
    Id. Rather, [t]he
    purpose of the penalty provision is to provide
    plan administrators with an incentive to meet requests
    for information in a timely fashion.    When there is
    some doubt about whether a claimant is entitled to the
    information requested, the Supreme Court has suggested
    that an administrator should err on the side of
    caution.
    22
    
    Id. (citation omitted);
    see also 
    Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 659
    (“The
    purpose of [§ 1132(c)(1)] is not to compensate participants for
    injuries,   but   to   punish    noncompliance   with      ERISA.”).
    Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Mullins
    on her claim for statutory penalties under § 1132(c)(1).
    V.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Mullins’ claim
    for LTD benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and we affirm
    the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Mullins on her
    claim for penalties under § 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1).
    AFFIRMED
    23