United States v. Juan Gutierrez-Mira , 200 F. App'x 943 ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    OCT 17, 2006
    No. 06-13009
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 06-80009-CR-DMM
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JUAN GUTIERREZ-MIRA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (October 17, 2006)
    Before MARCUS, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Juan Gutierrez-Mira pleaded guilty to illegal re-entry after deportation in
    violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    . At the change-of-plea hearing, the Government
    alleged that Gutierrez-Mira had been found to be in the United States unlawfully
    after deportation and that he had previously been convicted of forcible rape in
    California. Gutierrez-Mira admitted the accuracy of the proffer. When defense
    counsel argued that the prior conviction was not an element of the charged
    offense, the district court reminded counsel that Gutierrez-Mira had admitted to
    the prior conviction and added that if the defendant “want[ed] to debate those
    issues” he should reconsider the plea as it was likely that the prior conviction
    would impact sentencing. Counsel indicated that she was only seeking to preserve
    a legal objection. The court then accepted the plea and found Gutierrez-Mira
    guilty.
    The probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI),
    assigning a base level of 8 under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 with a 16-level enhancement
    for the prior conviction under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The report also included a 3-level
    reduction for acceptance of responsibility, giving an adjusted offense level of 21.
    The report categorized Gutierrez-Mira’s criminal history as Category II given the
    prior conviction for forcible rape. The resulting guideline range was 41 to 51
    months imprisonment.
    Gutierrez-Mira objected to the PSI’s 16-level enhancement again, arguing
    2
    that the indictment did not refer to the prior conviction and thus, citing United
    States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), the prior conviction cannot be taken into
    account for sentencing. The district court overruled the objection and sentenced
    Gutierrez-Mira to a term of 46 months.
    Gutierrez-Mira appeals his sentence, claiming that the 16-level
    enhancement is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment because it is based
    on his prior conviction that was neither charged in the indictment nor proved to a
    jury beyond a reasonable doubt. He also argues that the district court violated the
    holding in Shepard v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
     (2005) by considering facts
    about his prior conviction (that the conviction was for an aggravated felony) rather
    than the fact of his prior conviction.
    We review constitutional challenges to sentencing de novo, but will reverse
    only if the error was harmful. United States v. Paz, 
    405 F.3d 946
    , 948 (11th Cir.
    2005).
    There is no merit to Gutierrez-Mira’s arguments. First, the Supreme Court
    specifically has held that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor that need not be
    charged in the indictment or proved to a jury. Almendarez-Torres v. United
    States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 228 (1998); See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (2005) (affirming
    that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor). This court has consistently held
    3
    that Almendarez-Torres remains good law and is bound by it until it is explicitly
    overruled by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Dowd, 
    451 F.3d 1244
    , 1253
    (11th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 24, 2006) (No. 06-6164); United
    States v. Gibson, 
    434 F.3d 1234
    , 1246 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martinez,
    
    434 F.3d 1318
    , 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).
    Second, contrary to Gutierrez-Mira’s argument, the district court did not
    violate Shepard by looking beyond the facts of the conviction to determine
    whether the enhancement applied. Rather, the district court merely referred to the
    commentary in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, that categorizes rape as a crime of violence.
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. (n.1(B)(iii)). See United States v. Houston, 
    456 F.3d 1328
    ,
    1340 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court properly considered the defendant’s
    prior convictions and properly categorized the convictions as “crimes of violence”
    under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1). Unlike the facts of Shepard where the district court had
    been asked to review police documents concerning the nature of the underlying
    offense, here the district court only took into account the prior conviction and
    applied the correct enhancement under the Guidelines.
    Moreover, Gutierrez-Mira’s acceptance of the factual proffer when he plead
    guilty constitutes an admission of the prior conviction sufficient to apply the
    enhancement. United States v. Williams, 
    444 F.3d 1286
    , 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)
    4
    (holding that the defendant’s admission of the factual basis for his sentence
    eliminated any Booker-error).
    For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.
    5