United States v. Manna , 201 F. App'x 146 ( 2006 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-5191
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    RALPH MANNA,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
    (CR-05-71-WDQ)
    Submitted:   August 30, 2006            Decided:   September 28, 2006
    Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part; reversed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Denise C. Barrett, Assistant
    Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod
    J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Deborah A. Johnston,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Ralph   Manna    appeals    his    240-month      sentence   imposed
    following his jury conviction for solicitation to commit a crime of
    violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 373
     (2000).              Manna raises two
    issues on appeal:        whether the statutory language of 
    18 U.S.C. § 373
     establishes a maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment
    for soliciting another to travel interstate to commit murder-for-
    hire and whether the district court abused its discretion under the
    Mandatory     Victims     Restitution     Act       (“MVRA”),     18     U.S.C.A.
    § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), when it
    ordered restitution for counseling expenses and travel expenses
    absent bodily injury.       For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
    240-month   incarceration     sentence,       but   reverse    the   restitution
    order.
    Manna’s   indictment   charged       him   with    solicitation   to
    commit a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 373
    (a), and
    identified the crime of violence solicited as 
    18 U.S.C. § 1958
    (2000), use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of
    murder-for-hire.        The indictment did not charge that personal
    injury or death resulted.       The jury found Manna guilty as charged
    in the single-count indictment, and Manna was sentenced to 240
    months’ imprisonment.       The court also imposed restitution to the
    victims in the amount of $815 to cover the costs of counseling
    expenses and travel expenses related to counseling.                  The parties
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    dispute the applicable statutory maximum penalty and the authority
    to compensate victims for costs and expenses related to counseling,
    absent physical injury.
    Manna first questions whether the statutory language of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 373
     establishes a maximum sentence of twenty years’
    imprisonment for soliciting another to travel interstate to commit
    murder-for-hire.     Two statutes are at issue here:           § 373, the
    “solicitation” statute, and 
    18 U.S.C. § 1958
     (2000), the “murder-
    for-hire” statute.    The pertinent language of § 373 reads:
    Whoever . . . solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise
    endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such
    conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the
    maximum term of imprisonment . . . of the crime solicited
    . . . or if the crime solicited is punishable by life
    imprisonment or death, shall be imprisoned for not more
    than twenty years.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 373
    .      Section 1958 provides for graduated maximum
    penalties depending upon the harm suffered by the victim:                   a
    maximum   sentence   of    ten   years’   imprisonment   for   the   use   of
    interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire
    without resulting injury; a maximum sentence of twenty years’
    imprisonment for the use of interstate commerce facilities in the
    commission of murder-for-hire resulting in personal injury; and a
    maximum sentence of death or life imprisonment for the use of
    interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire
    resulting in death.       
    18 U.S.C. § 1958
    (a).    We review questions of
    - 3 -
    statutory construction de novo.             See United States v. Davis, 
    98 F.3d 141
    , 144 (4th Cir. 1996).
    Manna argues that without proof of death or serious
    bodily injury, the maximum penalty for solicitation to violate the
    murder-for-hire statute must be one-half of the ten-year maximum
    for a violation of § 1958 that does not result in any injury.                    The
    reference point when analyzing § 373, however, is the “crime
    solicited,” not the sentence of the resulting crime.                     See United
    States v. Devorkin, 
    159 F.3d 465
    , 467 (9th Cir. 1998).                          For
    example, § 373 imposes a maximum sentence of twenty years if “the
    crime solicited” is punishable by life imprisonment or death, while
    the maximum prison term “for all other solicitations” prohibited
    under   §   373    is   one-half    of    the    prison   term   for    “the   crime
    solicited.”       Id. (emphasis added).          Thus, § 373 does not instruct
    courts to look to the actual sentence that would be imposed for the
    underlying violation according to the particular facts of each
    case.   Based on the statutory language, we conclude the district
    court   did    not   err   when    it    imposed   the    maximum   sentence     for
    solicitation to travel interstate to commit murder-for-hire.
    Manna next contends that the district court erred in
    ordering him to pay $815 to the victims, his ex-wife and son, to
    cover the costs of counseling and travel expenses.                     The MVRA, 18
    U.S.C. § 3663A, governs here, because Manna was convicted of a
    crime of violence. Section 3663A(b)(2)(A) requires proof of bodily
    - 4 -
    injury to a victim before a court may order restitution for
    counseling.   It is undisputed that the victims of the solicitation
    sustained no bodily injury; the solicitation never proceeded beyond
    the point of a discussion between Manna and the undercover agent.
    In the absence of bodily injury, Manna correctly argues that
    restitution could not be ordered pursuant to § 3663A(b)(2)(A). See
    United States v. Follet, 
    269 F.3d 996
    , 1001 (9th Cir. 2001).
    Likewise,   under    the    particular     facts    here,    we    conclude     that
    restitution   was     not     authorized    by   either     §     3663A(b)(1)    or
    § 3663A(b)(4). We therefore reverse the court’s restitution order.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm Manna’s sentence of
    incarceration and reverse the restitution order.                We dispense with
    oral   argument     because    the   facts    and    legal      contentions     are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART
    - 5 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-5191

Citation Numbers: 201 F. App'x 146

Judges: King, Per Curiam, Wilkinson, Williams

Filed Date: 9/28/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/7/2023