United States v. Solin , 201 F. App'x 171 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4212
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    LAWRENCE SOLIN, a/k/a Martin Scott, a/k/a
    Martin Steele, a/k/a John Jordan, a/k/a Carl
    Sinclair, a/k/a James Baldwin, a/k/a Wade
    Carter,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
    District Judge. (1:05-cr-00263-WLO)
    Submitted: September 26, 2006             Decided: September 29, 2006
    Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.    Anna Mills Wagoner,
    United States Attorney, L. Patrick Auld, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Lawrence    Solin     appeals      from     his     thirty-six      month
    sentence, imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to mail fraud.                      On
    appeal, he contends that his sentence was unreasonable because the
    district court did not properly consider certain factors, including
    his age, his health, his lack of a criminal background, and the
    needs of his son.     After consideration of the briefs and record on
    appeal, we affirm.
    This   court   will       affirm   a     sentence    if   it   is     both
    reasonable and within the statutorily prescribed range.                     United
    States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005); see also
    United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 457 (4th Cir.) (stating a
    sentence imposed within a properly calculated guideline range is
    presumptively reasonable), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2309
     (2006).
    Reasonableness review involves both procedural and substantive
    components.     United States v. Moreland, 
    437 F.3d 424
    , 434 (4th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2054
     (2006).                    When conducting
    reasonableness    scrutiny,     we    note    two    considerations.        First,
    although   a   sentence   may    be    procedurally      unreasonable       if   the
    district court provides an inadequate statement of reasons or fails
    to make a necessary factual finding, a district court need not
    “robotically tick” through every relevant factor. United States v.
    Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 345 (4th Cir. 2006).                  Second, although a
    sentence may be substantively unreasonable if the court relies on
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    an improper factor or rejects policies articulated by Congress or
    the   Sentencing     Commission,         see     Moreland,       
    437 F.3d at 434
    ,
    “excessive weight” may not be given to any one factor.                         See United
    States   v.    Hampton,    
    441 F.3d 284
    ,    288-89    (4th       Cir.     2006).
    Applying    the    above    principles,       we    cannot       find   that
    Solin’s sentence was unreasonable.               The district court considered
    lengthy argument on the relevant factors, made certain factual
    findings in Solin’s favor, and sentenced Solin in the mid-range of
    his calculated guideline range.                The court noted the seriousness
    and extensive nature of Solin’s crime but also recommended that
    Solin be placed in an institution close to his son and delayed his
    reporting for several months so that Solin could make arrangements
    for his son.         Finding that the court properly considered the
    relevant factors and imposed a reasonable sentence, we affirm.                         We
    grant Solin’s motion to file a pro se supplemental brief but
    conclude      that   it   does    not     provide    a   basis         to   change    our
    disposition.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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