United States v. Anthony , 202 F. App'x 617 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-5268
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    KEVIN IVAN ANTHONY, a/k/a Van,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 05-5269
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    CARLOS DEAN SCOTT, a/k/a Bink, a/k/a Binky,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Chief
    District Judge. (CR-02-241)
    Submitted:   September 15, 2006           Decided:   October 13, 2006
    Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Troy N. Giatras, GIATRAS & WEBB, Charleston, West Virginia; Dennis
    H. Curry, Spencer, West Virginia, for Appellants.      Charles T.
    Miller, United States Attorney, John L. File, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
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    PER CURIAM:
    Kevin Ivan Anthony (Appeal No. 05-5268) and Carlos Dean
    Scott (Appeal No. 05-5269) appeal their sentences imposed after
    resentencing,* on their convictions of one count each of conspiracy
    to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base and a quantity of
    hydromorphone, and distribution of five grams or more of cocaine
    base, and aiding and abetting same, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1) (2000) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
     (2000), respectively
    (Anthony); and one count of conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or
    more of cocaine base and a quantity of hydromorphone, and three
    counts of distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1) (2000) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    (2000), respectively (Scott).         Following a resentencing hearing,
    the   district     court   adopted   its     findings   from   the   original
    sentencing hearing and imposed the same sentences it previously
    imposed.       The district court sentenced Anthony to 324 months’
    imprisonment, five years of supervised released, and ordered that
    he pay a $5000 fine.        The district court sentenced Scott to 360
    months’ imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and ordered
    that he pay a $5000 fine.        Anthony and Scott again appeal their
    *
    This court previously affirmed Anthony’s and Scott’s
    convictions, but remanded their cases to the district court for
    resentencing in accordance with United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), which case was decided after their original sentencing
    hearing. See United States v. Anthony, No. 03-4909 (4th Cir. Jul.
    12, 2005) (unpublished).
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    sentences, challenging:      (1) the standard of proof used by the
    district court; (2) the constitutionality and reasonableness of the
    use of the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine differential in sentencing;
    and (3) the district court’s imposition of the same sentence
    previously imposed, and alleging that the district court’s sentence
    resulted in unwarranted disparity, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a)(6) (West 2000 and Supp. 2006).         For the reasons set forth
    below, we affirm Anthony’s and Scott’s sentences.
    Appellants     first     challenge     the       district   court’s
    application of a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in
    resentencing.     This assertion is without merit.              See generally
    United   States   v.   Hughes,    
    401 F.3d 540
    ,   546    (4th   Cir.   2005)
    (“Consistent with the remedial scheme set forth in Booker, a
    district court shall first calculate (after making the appropriate
    findings of fact) the range prescribed by the guidelines.”); see
    also United States v. Gonzalez, 
    407 F.3d 118
    , 125 (2d Cir. 2005);
    McReynolds v. United States, 
    397 F.3d 479
    , 481 (7th Cir. 2005);
    United States v. Tabor, 
    439 F.3d 826
    , 830 (8th Cir. 2006).
    Next, Appellants challenge the constitutionality and
    reasonableness of the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine differential in
    the advisory guidelines in the wake of Booker. We find Appellants’
    equal protection challenge to be without merit.             See, e.g., United
    States v. Castillo, ___ F.3d ___, 
    2006 WL 2374281
     (2d Cir. Aug. 16,
    2006).   Moreover, as we previously have held, a sentencing court
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    may not properly substitute its view of an appropriate ratio
    between crack cocaine and powder cocaine for that determined by
    Congress.     United States v. Eura, 
    440 F.3d 625
    , 633 (4th Cir.
    2006), petition for cert. filed, June 20, 2006 (No. 05-11659).    We
    decline Appellants’ invitation to revisit our decision in Eura.
    The district court here did not err in refusing Appellants’ request
    to substitute its own ratio for that set forth in the advisory
    guidelines.    
    Id.
    Appellants also contend that the district court erred by
    applying a “de facto mandatory Guidelines standard” in resentencing
    them to the same sentence.    During the resentencing hearing, the
    district judge clearly and accurately enunciated this court’s
    directive on remand, as well as its statutory and legal obligations
    in resentencing Appellants, considered the arguments of counsel,
    and decided that its original findings did not need to be altered.
    We will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it is both reasonable and
    within the statutorily prescribed range.    United States v. Hughes,
    
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546 (4th Cir. 2005).      As Appellants’ sentences are
    within the properly calculated advisory guideline range, they are
    presumptively reasonable, see United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    ,
    457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2309
     (2006), and we find
    Appellants’ conclusory assertions on appeal to be insufficient to
    overcome that presumption.
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    Finally, Appellants contend that the sentences imposed on
    them by the district court resulted in “unwarranted disparity” in
    contravention of § 3553(a)(6), as compared to those sentences
    imposed on co-defendants in the same prosecution.    Merely noting
    that co-defendants received lesser sentences is insufficient to
    establish an unwarranted sentencing disparity, which renders a
    within-Guidelines sentence unreasonable.     See United States v.
    Montes-Pineda, 
    445 F.3d 375
    , 380 (4th Cir. 2006).     The district
    court properly rejected Appellants’ claim of disparity, as the
    characteristics and circumstances of these individual Defendants
    and the application of the advisory guidelines and § 3553(a)
    factors to them produced the disparity, the disparity was not
    unwarranted, and Appellants have failed to demonstrate error by the
    district court in sentencing.
    Accordingly, we affirm Anthony’s and Scott’s sentences.
    Because the district court appropriately treated the guidelines as
    advisory, and properly calculated and considered the guideline
    range and the relevant § 3553(a) factors, we find their sentences
    to be reasonable. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
    and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
    before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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