United States v. Coletraine , 207 F. App'x 283 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4038
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    DEONTAE RAYSHAUN COLETRAINE,     a/k/a    Deonte
    Reshawn Coletrain,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Roanoke.  Samuel G. Wilson, District
    Judge. (CR-05-49)
    Submitted:   October 31, 2006            Decided:   November 27, 2006
    Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Gary M. Bowman, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant.        John L.
    Brownlee, United States Attorney, Edward A. Lustig, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Deontae Rayshaun Coletraine appeals his conviction and
    33-month prison sentence pursuant to his conditional guilty plea to
    one count of possession of a firearm by a user of marijuana, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) (2000).         Coletraine reserved the
    right to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to
    suppress a firearm recovered in a search of his person.
    We review factual findings underlying a district court’s
    suppression determination for clear error and the district court’s
    legal conclusions de novo.      United States v. Rusher, 
    966 F.2d 868
    ,
    873 (4th Cir. 1992).     When a suppression motion has been denied, we
    review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.
    United States v. Seidman, 
    156 F.3d 542
    , 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
    “[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
    conduct   a    brief,   investigatory   stop   when   the   officer   has   a
    reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
    Illinois v. Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. 119
    , 123 (2000) (citing Terry v.
    Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
     (1968)).      To conduct a Terry stop, there must be
    “at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the
    stop.”    Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. at 123
    .       Reasonable suspicion requires
    more than a hunch but less than probable cause and may be based on
    the collective knowledge of officers involved in an investigation.
    Id.; see also United States v. Hensley, 
    469 U.S. 221
    , 232 (1985).
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    In assessing police conduct in a Terry stop, courts must
    look to the totality of the circumstances.                 United States v.
    Sokolow, 
    490 U.S. 1
    , 8 (1989).         Officers conducting a lawful Terry
    stop may take steps reasonably necessary to protect their personal
    safety, check for identification, and maintain the status quo.
    Hensley, 
    469 U.S. at 229, 235
    ; see also United States v. Moore, 
    817 F.2d 1105
    , 1108 (4th Cir. 1987) (brief but complete restriction of
    liberty is valid under Terry).
    We have reviewed the record, the district court’s order,
    and   the   parties’   briefs   on    appeal.    Viewing    the   conflicting
    evidence    in   the   Government’s    favor,   as   we   must,   the   officer
    observed Coletraine, whom he knew from past dealings was involved
    in drug activity, in a high drug trafficking area.                The officer
    knew that Coletraine did not live on the property, which was posted
    “No Trespassing.”       Moreover, the officer knew that Coletraine and
    the other individuals present were suspects in a recent shooting.
    When he saw the officers, Coletraine looked surprised and began to
    walk backwards.
    Given these facts, the officer had reasonable suspicion
    that crime was afoot.        He was therefore entitled to conduct a
    limited frisk to ensure his own safety and that of the others
    present.     During the patdown, the officer felt an object he
    immediately knew to be a firearm.         Looking at the totality of the
    circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
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    to the Government, we find that the gun was lawfully seized as part
    of a proper Terry stop-and-frisk.    See United States v. Mayo, 
    361 F.3d 802
    , 805-08 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Raymond, 
    152 F.3d 309
    , 312 (4th Cir. 1998).
    Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying
    Coletraine’s motion to suppress the firearm.   Therefore, we affirm
    Coletraine’s conviction and sentence.       We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
    aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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