Adris Abdus-Shahid v. Mayor and City Council , 674 F. App'x 267 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2181
ADRIS ABDUS-SHAHID; BAIYINA JONES,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:15-cv-01972-JFM)
Submitted: October 6, 2016 Decided: January 4, 2017
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jennifer S. Lubinski, LAW OFFICE OF JENNIFER S. LUBINSKI,
Columbia, Maryland, for Appellants. Nicholas C. Sokolow,
Assistant Solicitor, BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Idris Abdus-Shahid and Bayina Jones appeal the district
court’s dismissal of their claims against the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore (“the City”). Abdus-Shahid’s 1 Complaint
alleged violations of state and federal law based upon the
City’s policy of requiring its employees to submit proof of
their recorded civil marriage certificate in order to establish
a spouse as eligible for health insurance coverage. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district
court dismissing the Complaint.
I. 2
In 1998, Abdus-Shahid and Jones were married in an Islamic
ceremony performed in Baltimore, Maryland. They are Muslims
who, as part of their faith, “believe that their relationship is
governed by Islamic law and that a civil, or secular, marriage
license is both unnecessary to their union and contrary to their
1 For simplicity, when referring to Abdus-Shahid and Jones
as parties in this case, the opinion will refer to them
collectively as “Abdus-Shahid.”
2 Because the district court decided the case on a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we “assum[e]
all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the”
Complaint and attached exhibits are true. Burnette v. Fahey,
687 F.3d 171, 180 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Tallabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)
(discussing use of exhibits attached to a complaint).
2
religious beliefs.” App. 6, ¶ 7. Accordingly, they did not
obtain a civil marriage license prior to their religious
ceremony, nor have they obtained a civil marriage certificate.
In 2008, Abdus-Shahid began working as a civil engineer for
the City’s Department of Transportation. As part of his
employment, Abdus-Shahid was provided the opportunity to
participate in the City’s health insurance program, including
coverage for his spouse and children. He enrolled Jones and
their children without objection for several years.
In 2013, after a city-wide audit of the City’s employee
health insurance program, the City revoked Abdus-Shahid’s family
health insurance coverage. Although Abdus-Shahid was
subsequently allowed to re-enroll his children, the City refused
to allow him to re-enroll Jones because he could not “provide an
‘Official Court-Certified State Marriage Certificate (must be
Certified and dated by the appropriate state or County official,
such as the Clerk of Court) From [sic] the court in the County
or City in which the marriage took place’” (“the policy”). App.
7-8, ¶ 16. Abdus-Shahid attempted to file his religious
marriage certificate with the Clerk of the Baltimore Circuit
Court, but the Clerk refused to accept it for recording because
it was not a civil license and had not been obtained from the
Clerk prior to the ceremony. In August 2014, Abdus-Shahid
filed a charge of religious discrimination with the Baltimore
3
Community Relations Commission, the City’s equivalent of the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and also
with the EEOC (“EEOC charge”). Abdus-Shahid listed the
“particulars” of his charge as follows:
I. . . . In or about July 2013, an audit
was conducted which resulted in my family
being dropped from my health insurance
without explanation. . . . When I completed
the forms to [re-enroll] my family, I was
informed my Islamic marriage is not
recognize[d]; therefore, I have been unable
to reinstate my wife to my health insurance
plan. . . . I am aware of another employee
who is experiencing the same issue.
II. I have been given no explanation for
the employer’s actions.
III. I believe I have been discriminated
against in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
regarding benefits because of my religion,
Muslim.
App. 18.
After receiving a letter from the EEOC dismissing the
investigation and informing Abdus-Shahid of his right to sue, he
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The
City removed it to the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland. The Complaint alleges three claims: (1)
infringement of the free exercise of religion, in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution;
(2) deprivation of religious freedom and due process, in
violation of Articles 24 and 36 of the Maryland Constitution’s
4
Declaration of Rights; and (3) religious discrimination with
respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment, in violation of Title VII, as amended.
The Complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the City’s
refusal to recognize Abdus-Shahid’s marriage violates the U.S.
Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights, an order
directing the City to recognize his marriage (“and the lawful
marriages of other Muslims whose marriage certificates have not
been recorded by a clerk of the court”), and other monetary
damages, costs, and fees. App. 8-13.
The City moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the constitutional claims
should be dismissed because the City’s policy was facially
neutral and did not prohibit the free exercise of religion; the
state-law claims should be dismissed because Abdus-Shahid failed
to follow the requisite statutory notice provisions to bring
suit; and the Title VII claim should be dismissed because the
Complaint did not allege any evidence of intentional
discrimination.
In response, Abdus-Shahid contended he had sufficiently
pled each claim. Citing the fundamental constitutional right to
marry and to exercise his religious beliefs, he argued the
City’s policy served no legitimate purpose and was not a neutral
law of general applicability. Furthermore, Abdus-Shahid claimed
5
the policy imposed an unfair burden on religious adherents of
any faith who sought religious rather than civil marriages. He
also asserted his state-law claims were not subject to the
statutory notice provisions because he only sought declaratory
relief. In the alternative, he asserted substantial compliance
with any state-law requirements. Lastly, Abdus-Shahid
maintained that his Title VII claim alleged disparate impact
discrimination rather than intentional discrimination and thus
should be allowed to proceed.
The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss as
to all claims. It held that the City’s policy “is neutral on
its face,” and “is reasonable since it provides a common
standard by which to determine whether spouses should be
afforded health insurance coverage.” App. 39. It also
concluded Abdus-Shahid’s state-law claims were barred by the
Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”), which
applied because he sought more than declaratory relief. And it
held Abdus-Shahid’s Title VII claim based on disparate impact
could not proceed because he had not exhausted his
administrative remedies as to that claim.
Abdus-Shahid noted a timely appeal, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
6
II.
On appeal, Abdus-Shahid challenges the dismissal of each of
his claims. We address each issue in turn, reviewing de novo
the district court’s grant of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 320
(4th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must “provide enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551
F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009), 3 meaning that it must “plead[]
factual content [that] allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“[P]laintiffs may proceed into the litigation process only when
their complaints are justified by both law and fact.” Francis
v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
A. Federal Constitutional Claim
Abdus-Shahid contends the district court erred in
dismissing his claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Pointing to Maryland and federal case law discussing civilly
recognized marriages and the fundamental right to marry, he
asserts that the City’s policy contradicts state law concerning
3 We have removed internal alterations, citations, and
quotations throughout this opinion, except as otherwise noted.
7
what it means to be married and it impermissibly divides
marriage into two tiers, marriages that are entitled to coverage
and marriages that are not. He submits that “intentionally or
not,” the City has “unconstitutionally burdened his free
exercise of religion” by failing to recognize his religious-
based marriage and that the district court’s dismissal of this
claim should be reversed.
We disagree with Abdus-Shahid; the district court did not
err in dismissing this claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The
arguments Abdus-Shahid makes do not address the proper analysis
for a Free Exercise claim. Instead, he points to Maryland case
law concerning when individuals are deemed to be “married.”
Those cases simply have no bearing on the matter before the
Court, which is whether the City’s policy violates the Free
Exercise Clause. Similarly, his arguments relying on case law
concerning same-sex civil unions and marriages ignore that those
discussions occurred within the context of civil marriages. Yet
again, these cases have no applicability to the Free Exercise
claim Abdus-Shahid pursues.
Reviewed in light of the applicable Free Exercise Clause
case law, Abdus-Shahid failed to articulate a constitutional
claim based on his right to free exercise of religion. The
First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend.
8
I. This provision applies to states and localities through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 380
(4th Cir. 2003) (“The Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, applicable to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, forbids the adoption of laws designed to suppress
religious beliefs or practices unless justified by a compelling
governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that
interest.”). The Free Exercise Clause “does not,” however,
“relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 879 (1990). The City’s requirement for a court-issued
certificate before recognizing any marriage for purposes of
health insurance coverage eligibility is just such “a valid and
neutral law of general applicability.”
Abdus-Shahid does not dispute that the City’s policy
requiring a civil marriage certificate to demonstrate
eligibility for spousal health insurance coverage is generally
applicable to City employees. Instead, he maintains that the
City’s policy is not neutral toward religion because it has the
effect of prohibiting Abdus-Shahid from enrolling Jones for
insurance coverage despite her being his spouse based on an
Islamic marriage ceremony. But that is not the test for
9
neutrality. The Supreme Court has held that a law lacks
neutrality if it “target[s] religious beliefs” or if its “object
. . . is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). The City’s policy is
silent as to religion or religious practice and thus is facially
neutral. See id. The City allows individuals of all faiths or
of no specific faith to enroll a spouse for coverage upon
presenting a civil marriage certificate. In so doing, it
simultaneously bars all employees from enrolling an individual
as his or her spouse if that employee cannot provide the
required documentation, regardless of the reason. See Liberty
Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 99 (4th Cir. 2013) (observing
that a neutral law of general applicability will have “no object
that infringes upon or restricts practices because of their
religious motivation and impose[] no burden . . . on conduct
motivated [only] by religious belief”). And while facial
neutrality does not end the analysis, Abdus-Shahid did not
allege any facts from which it could be inferred that the policy
was implemented with an improper motivation. See Lukumi Babalu
Aye, 508 U.S. at 534 (observing that the Free Exercise Clause
forbids “target[ing] religious conduct for distinctive
treatment” through “subtle departures from neutrality” and
“covert suppression of particular religious beliefs”).
10
Because the City’s policy is generally applicable and
neutral toward religion it “need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if [it] has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Id. at
531. Thus, as the Complaint failed to state a claim for the
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district
court did not err in dismissing the claim.
B. State Constitutional Claim
Abdus-Shahid next asserts the district court erred in
dismissing his state constitutional claims for failure to comply
with the notice provisions of Maryland’s LGTCA. See Ransom v.
Leopold, 962 A.2d 1025, 1030-31 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)
(observing that the LGTCA’s requirements apply to all torts,
including constitutional ones). He contends that the LGTCA
notice provisions do not apply to his claim because he only
sought declaratory relief for the alleged violations of state
law. Alternatively, he alleges he substantially complied with
the LGTCA’s requirements.
Under the version of the LGTCA applicable to Abdus-Shahid’s
claim, before suing the City for “unliquidated damages” he was
required to provide the municipality written notice of his
claimed injury within 180 days of that injury. Md. Code, Cts. &
Jud. Proc. § 5-304 (2013). That notice must “state the time,
place, and cause of the injury,” “be given in person or by
11
certified mail, return receipt requested, bearing a postmark
from the [post office],” and, in the case of the City, be given
to the City Solicitor. Id. Abdus-Shahid does not allege that
he, in fact, fulfilled these specific requirements.
The district court did not err in concluding that the
LGTCA’s notice provisions apply to Abdus-Shahid’s state-law
claims because the Complaint specifically asks, in relevant
part, “that the Court determine the respective rights and
remedies of the parties hereto with respect to the[]” state
constitutional claim. App. 11, ¶ 33 (emphasis added).
Elsewhere, the Complaint plainly contemplated an award of
damages to compensate for the sums Abdus-Shahid was having to
pay for out-of-pocket medical expenses. See App. 8, ¶ 18
(“Plaintiffs are currently expecting and, as a result of the
City’s refusal to recognize their marriage, Baiyina Jones is
without health insurance coverage. As a result, Plaintiffs are
incurring out-of-pocket healthcare expenses and expect to
continue to incur such expenses until Baiyina Jones is properly
insured.”); App. 10, ¶ 30 (expressly incorporating the
allegation in paragraph 18 into the state law claim); see also
App. 12-13 (plea for relief, containing a free-standing request
for “[a] judgment for monetary damages”). Moreover, as the
district court correctly surmised from these allegations, Abdus-
Shahid is “requesting that the City reinstate Jones’s health
12
insurance and pay the City’s portion of Jones’s premiums,” a
request that also involves more than “solely . . . declaratory
relief.” App. 38.
Based on the foregoing, the Complaint contemplates the
possibility of more than solely declaratory relief related to
the state law claim. As such, the district court did not err in
concluding that Abdus-Shahid was required to comply with the
notice provision of the LGTCA prior to bringing his state law
claim and that he did not do so. Cf. Rounds v. Md.-Nat’l
Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 109 A.3d 639, 646 n.10 (Md.
2015) (concluding plaintiffs sought unliquidated damages –- and
thus fell “under the purview of the LGTCA” -– despite labelling
their claim as one for “Declaratory Judgment” -- because they
sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages arising
from the alleged violation).
Abdus-Shahid does not contend he strictly complied with the
LGTCA’s provisions. Instead, Abdus-Shahid argues the district
court erred by not considering whether he had substantially
complied with the LGTCA’s provisions. He asserts that had the
district court done so, it would have concluded he had
substantially complied by filing the EEOC charge and therefore
could proceed with the state law claim.
To be sure, Maryland courts do not require strict
compliance with the LGTCA’s notice provisions. See Faulk v.
13
Ewing, 808 A.2d 1262, 1275 (Md. 2002) (“[W]here . . . [a]
claimant provides the local government, through the unit or
division with the responsibility for investigating [such] claims
against that local government, or the company with whom the
local government or unit has contracted for that function, the
information required by § 5-304(b)(3) to be supplied, who thus
acquires actual knowledge within the statutory period, the . . .
claimant has substantially complied with the notice provisions
of the LGTCA.”). That legal principle has no effect here,
however, because Maryland courts also require plaintiffs to
plead their strict or substantive compliance with the LGTCA as
part of their state-law claims. See Hansen v. City of Laurel,
25 A.3d 122, 137 & n.16 (Md. 2011). Failure to do so makes the
claim “subject to a motion to dismiss . . . based on a failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. at 137.
Here, the Complaint fails to plead any compliance with the
LGTCA. Although Abdus-Shahid attached a copy of the EEOC charge
to his Complaint, he failed to allege any facts directly in the
Complaint from which his compliance with the LGTCA -–
substantial or otherwise -- could be gleaned.
In any event, we readily conclude that the documentation
Abdus-Shahid attached to the Complaint does not constitute
substantial compliance under Maryland law. The substantial
compliance exception is “narrow,” Huggins v. Prince George’s
14
County, 683 F.3d 525, 538 (4th Cir. 2012), and must be
demonstrated with respect to each of the LGTCA’s requirements,
see Moore v. Norouzi, 807 A.2d 632, 643 (Md. 2002).
Here, the EEOC charge alleges religious discrimination in
employment practices, in violation of Title VII, but it does not
necessarily follow that claim adequately alerted the City to a
potential claim based on violations of Maryland’s constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom and due process. Faulk, 808
A.2d at 1272 (observing that substantial compliance requires
fulfillment of the notice requirement’s purpose, which is “to
apprise [the] local government of its possible liability” such
that it can, among other things “ascertain the character and
extent of [its] responsibility”). Moreover, because the charge
alleges discrimination that began in November 2013 and the
charge was not filed until August 12, 2014, it was not provided
to the City until well after the 180-day period in which notice
is to be provided under the LGTCA. Abdus-Shahid does not offer
any explanation for this delay, nor does he claim he should be
excused from the statutory deadline requirement. Cf. Rounds,
109 A.3d at 652-54 (analyzing whether “good cause” excused
plaintiff’s failure to comply with the LGTCA’s notice deadline).
On this record, the EEOC charge was not sufficient to constitute
substantial compliance with all of the LGTCA’s requirements. As
15
such, the district court did not err in dismissing Abdus-
Shahid’s state-law claims for failure to comply with the LGTCA.
C. Title VII Claim
The final issue Abdus-Shahid raises on appeal challenges
the district court’s dismissal of his Title VII claim for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. He maintains that
“the City’s policy disparately impacts [him], and other
religiously observant employees and their families, by requiring
that they either engage in conduct that interferes with their
religious beliefs or forego the privileges ordinarily accorded
to married people.” Appellants’ Opening Br. 16. He argues that
this claim was adequately alleged in his EEOC charge, which
referred to “religious discrimination,” and he urges that it
requires too much of the non-lawyers filling out EEOC charges to
require more than a layman’s explanation of the conduct at
issue.
Title VII authorizes two causes of action against
employers: disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and
disparate impact. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575
U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). Although they are
similar in their objectives, each cause of action has different
elements. A disparate treatment claim requires proof of
discriminatory motive, “although [that impermissible motive] can
in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences
16
in treatment.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). A disparate impact claim, in
contrast, does not require proof of discriminatory motive. Id.
Instead, disparate impact claims “involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity.” Id.
In order to promote voluntary compliance with the law,
Title VII claimants must pursue their administrative remedies
before filing a lawsuit. Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus.,
711 F.3d 401, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2013). They do so by filing a
“charge” with the EEOC “notif[ying] the charged party of the
asserted violation” and “bring[ing] the charged party before the
EEOC.” Id. at 407. “[A] federal court may only consider those
allegations included in the EEOC charge.” Id. Any other claims
that “would naturally have arisen from an investigation” are
procedurally barred and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider
them. Id.
On appeal, as he did in opposing the motion to dismiss,
Abdus-Shahid repeatedly disavows raising a disparate treatment
claim in his Complaint. E.g., Appellants’ Opening Br. 9
(“Abdus-Shahid’s claim is based upon disparate impact
discrimination, not disparate treatment discrimination.”);
Appellants’ Opening Br. 16 (“Appellants do not allege that the
17
City deliberately targeted Islam for attack.”). Instead, he
maintains that he is relying solely on disparate impact
discrimination. E.g., App. 33 (“This is a case of disparate
impact discrimination.”); Appellants’ Opening Br. 16
(“Appellants . . . allege that the City’s policy disparately
impacts them[.]”). In light of Abdus-Shahid’s clear position
from the opposition to motion to dismiss stage and through to
appeal, we will not address any arguments related to a disparate
treatment claim because that is a cause of action he represents
he is not seeking to bring.
Turning to whether Abdus-Shahid’s disparate impact claim
can survive the motion to dismiss stage, we conclude it cannot.
Even construing the EEOC charge broadly, we agree with the
district court that it fails to assert a disparate impact claim.
“Central to proof of a prima facie case under th[at] theory” is
proof of a policy or practice, “which, though facially neutral
or even benign in actual purpose, nevertheless imposes a
substantially disproportionate burden upon a claimant’s
protected group as compared to a favored group within the total
set of persons to whom it is applied.” Wright v. Nat’l Archives
& Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979). Abdus-
Shahid’s allegations in the EEOC charge sound as a disparate
treatment or intentional discrimination claim rather than a
disparate impact claim: he claims he has been denied insurance
18
and believes that he is being “discriminated against . . .
because of [his] religion, Muslim.” App. 18. Critically, the
EEOC charge does not identify any policy (neutral or otherwise)
being challenged as discriminatory in its effect, and, in fact,
it asserts Abdus-Shahid had “been given no explanation for [his]
employer’s action.” App. 18 (emphasis added).
Abdus-Shahid also did not assert any facts that would allow
a conclusion that Muslims were being disproportionately impacted
by the City’s actions. While he claims another employee
experienced the “same issue,” that allegation is vague and does
not suggest anything more than discrete discriminatory acts.
E.g., Wright, 609 F.2d at 712 (“The policy or practice
contemplated by disparate impact doctrine consists of more than
the mere occurrence of isolated or . . . sporadic discriminatory
acts, having reference instead to an employer’s standard
operating procedure[; it concerns] the regular rather than the
unusual practice.”). 4 Lastly, in his brief on appeal, Abdus-
4Abdus-Shahid’s brief goes even farther in suggesting that
the City’s policy does not disparately impact Muslims, but
rather affects anyone who elects not to obtain a civil marriage
certificate for whatever reason. E.g., Appellants’ Opening Br.
15 (“Any religious person who chooses [to forego the state
licensing requirement for marriage] will, upon accepting
employment with the City of Baltimore, be impacted by the City’s
discriminatory health insurance coverage policy.”). Even
assuming that Abdus-Shahid could assert a disparate impact claim
on behalf of “devout religious adherents” of multiple faiths,
Abdus-Shahid offered no contentions in his EEOC charge as to any
(Continued)
19
Shahid contends that the “heart” of his disparate impact claim
is a failure to accommodate, Appellants’ Opening Br. 17, but the
EEOC charge does not provide any information suggesting that to
be the case. To be clear, the problem is not –- as Abdus-Shahid
incorrectly suggests the district court held –- that his EEOC
charge lacked any specific legal terminology. Abdus-Shahid is
correct that “the exhaustion requirement should not become a
tripwire for hapless plaintiffs [and that] we may not erect
insurmountable barriers to litigation out of overly technical
concerns.” Sydnor v. Fairfax Cty., 681 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir.
2012). Rather, the problem is that the words used in the EEOC
charge do not correlate to the sort of assertions and facts from
which a future cause of action based on disparate impact can be
discerned. See, e.g., Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505,
509 (4th Cir. 2005) (observing “the factual allegations in the
administrative charge [must be] reasonably related to the
factual allegations in the formal litigation” to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement).
Abdus-Shahid thus failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to a disparate impact claim under Title
VII and the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.
effect on such non-Muslims who also do not possess a civil
marriage certificate.
20
See, e.g., Burgis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63, 71
(2d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of disparate impact claim
for failure to exhaust where the EEOC charge “complain[ed] of
individualized disparate treatment”); Pacheco v. Mineta, 448
F.3d 783, 792 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding plaintiff failed to
exhaust remedies as to a disparate impact theory where the EEOC
charge “facially alleged disparate treatment,” “identified no
neutral employment policy,” and “complained of past incidents of
disparate treatment only”).
III.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
21