Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities ( 2022 )


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  • USCA4 Appeal: 20-1163     Doc: 117         Filed: 04/07/2022   Pg: 1 of 31
    PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 20-1163
    JOHNNY TIMPSON, by and through his Conservator, Sandra Timpson; SANDRA
    TIMPSON, in her individual capacity,
    Plaintiffs – Appellants,
    v.
    ANDERSON COUNTY DISABILITIES AND SPECIAL NEEDS BOARD;
    MICHELLE RICKETSON, Chairman of The Anderson County Disabilities and
    Special Needs Board; DALE THOMPSON, former Executive Director of The
    Anderson County Disabilities and Special Needs Board; JERREL LYNN KING,
    current Director of The Anderson County Disabilities and Special Needs Board;
    SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF DISABILITIES AND SPECIAL
    NEEDS, DDSN; GARY C. LEMEL, Chairman, DDSN Commission; BEVERLY
    BUSCEMI, former Director of the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and
    Special Needs, in her individual capacity; SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT
    OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; CHRISTIAN SOURA, former Director
    of the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, in his individual
    capacity; GREENVILLE COUNTY DISABILITIES AND SPECIAL NEEDS
    BOARD; ROBERT M. ARIAIL, Chairman of the Board of Thrive Upstate,
    formerly known as the Greenville County Disabilities and Special Needs Board;
    TYLER REX, Director of Thrive Upstate; THRIVE UPSTATE; HENRY
    DARGAN MCMASTER, Governor of the State of South Carolina in his official
    capacity; MARY POOLE, Director of the South Carolina Department of Disabilities
    and Special Needs; JOSHUA BAKER, Director of the South Carolina Department
    of Health and Human Services; NIKKI HALEY, in her individual capacity,
    Defendants – Appellees,
    and
    UNKNOWN ACTORS, at the Anderson Disabilities and Special Needs Board;
    UNKNOWN ACTORS, at the Greenville County Disabilities and Special Needs
    Board and/or Thrive Upstate,
    USCA4 Appeal: 20-1163     Doc: 117        Filed: 04/07/2022    Pg: 2 of 31
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
    Greenville. Donald C. Coggins, Jr., District Judge. (6:16-cv-01174-DCC)
    Argued: January 25, 2022                                       Decided: April 7, 2022
    Before MOTZ, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote
    the opinion in which Judge Motz and Judge Wynn joined.
    ARGUED: Patricia L. Harrison, Cleveland, South Carolina, for Appellants. Patrick John
    Frawley, DAVIS FRAWLEY, LLC, Lexington, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON
    BRIEF: Robert C. Childs, III, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellants. William H.
    Davidson, II, Kenneth P. Woodington, DAVIDSON, WREN & DEMASTERS, P.A.,
    Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees South Carolina Department of Disabilities and
    Special Needs, Lemel, and Buscemi. Damon C. Wlodarczyk, RILEY, POPE & LANEY,
    LLP, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees South Carolina Department of Health and
    Human Services and Soura. James W. Logan, Jr., LOGAN & JOLLY, LLP, Anderson,
    South Carolina, for Appellee Henry McMaster, Governor of the State of South Carolina.
    Knox L. Haynsworth, III, BROWN, MASSEY, EVANS, MCLEOD & HAYNSWORTH,
    LLC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellees Thrive Upstate, formerly the Greenville
    County Disabilities & Special Needs Board, Arial, and Rex. Karl S. Bowers, Jr., BOWERS
    LAW OFFICE, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee Nikki Haley.
    2
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    AGEE, Circuit Judge:
    Johnny and Sandra Timpson (the “Timpsons”) appeal from various preliminary
    orders of the district court and the entry of directed verdicts on several of their claims. For
    the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment in part, vacate it in part, and
    remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    I.
    A.
    Before turning to the Timpsons’ allegations, we first summarize the pertinent
    regulatory framework. Medicaid, established as part of the Social Security Act in 1965, “is
    a cooperative federal-state public assistance program that makes federal funds available to
    states electing to furnish medical services to certain impoverished individuals.” Mowbray
    v. Kozlowski, 
    914 F.2d 593
    , 595 (4th Cir. 1990). The state agency responsible for
    administering and supervising Medicaid in South Carolina is the South Carolina
    Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”). 1 DHHS, in turn, contracts with the
    South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs (“DDSN”) 2—a seven-
    member commission appointed by the Governor 3—to operate the state’s treatment and
    training programs for individuals with intellectual and related disabilities. Relevant here,
    1
    Christian Soura was DHHS’s Director during the relevant timeframe of 2014 to
    2017, at which point current Director Joshua Baker succeeded him.
    2
    Beverly Buscemi was DDSN’s Director from 2009 to 2017.
    3
    Nikki Haley was the Governor of South Carolina from 2011 to 2017 and later
    served as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations from 2017 to 2018. Henry
    McMaster has served as Governor since 2017.
    3
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    DDSN contracts with the Anderson County Disabilities and Special Needs Board (the
    “Board”) 4 to “offer[] an array of services to Medicaid-eligible clients.” J.A. 2427. DDSN
    funds the Board, which follows DHHS’s and DDSN’s policies and procedures.
    Although many Medicaid benefits are available only to those in intermediate care
    facilities (“ICF”), Congress has established a waiver program that allows states to provide
    home- and community-based services to eligible persons. The Medicaid program requires
    states to inform individuals who qualify for ICF services “of the[se] feasible alternatives,
    if available under the waiver.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C).
    B.
    Johnny Timpson (“Johnny”) was born with severe intellectual disabilities and
    cerebral palsy. 5 In 1968, when Johnny was ten years old, DDSN placed him in an ICF
    called the Whitten Center, where he remained for almost thirty years. In response to a 1997
    Department of Justice investigation reporting systemic abuse and neglect at the facility,
    DDSN moved Johnny to a separate system of Board-operated group homes, including Tiny
    Greer.
    While under the Board’s care, Johnny exhibited troubling behaviors. He set fires,
    threatened suicide, and engaged in sexually deviant conduct and elopements. Johnny was
    hospitalized in 2002 after starting a fire and received sex education courses from 2010 to
    4
    Dale Thompson was the Board’s Director when Johnny Timpson lived at the Tiny
    Greer group home (“Tiny Greer”)—where he alleges he was mistreated. Thompson
    resigned in 2015 and has since worked for Thrive Upstate (“Thrive”), formerly known as
    the Greenville County Disabilities and Special Needs Board.
    5
    A psychologist has estimated that Johnny “operates on a grade equivalent similar
    to that of a pre-school student.” J.A. 1758.
    4
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    2013, despite his limited mental capacity. According to the Timpsons, even though Johnny
    had regular contact and visits with his family, the Board did not notify them about any of
    these events.
    On May 11, 2013, staff at Tiny Greer discovered burns on Johnny’s wrists. The
    Board notified Sandra Timpson (“Sandra”), one of Johnny’s sisters, but insisted that the
    injuries were “minor.” J.A. 6141. Sandra believed Johnny had second-degree burns based
    on photographs a staff member sent her. So she drove to Tiny Greer to speak with him.
    Johnny told her that he did not burn himself, that the staff had injured him, and that he was
    telling the truth. The Tiny Greer staff, on the other hand, reiterated that Johnny had burned
    himself. Sandra reported this and several other incidents to the police. But Johnny
    consistently changed his story, later insisting that his injuries were self-inflicted.
    On June 12, 2013, Sandra secured a health care power of attorney over Johnny, 6 and
    the Board discharged him to her care on August 30, 2013. While in her care, the only
    service the Board arranged for Johnny to attend was Thrive’s program. According to the
    Timpsons, neither the Board nor Johnny’s new case manager told Sandra that he was
    entitled to receive services from a non-DDSN-affiliated provider. Nor, they allege, was she
    told of the “feasible alternatives” of receiving in-home and behavior-support services, or
    that Sandra could be paid for providing care in her home. J.A. 258.
    6
    Johnny executed the health care power of attorney, authorizing Sandra to make
    health care decisions for him and to obtain his medical records. The power of attorney did
    not authorize Sandra to make financial decisions on his behalf.
    5
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    C.
    The Timpsons brought suit in South Carolina state court in February 2016. After the
    case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, 7
    the Timpsons filed an amended complaint, naming fourteen Defendants (ten individuals 8
    and four agencies 9) and alleging five causes of action: (1) negligence and gross negligence
    under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”); (2) violations of the Americans
    with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (3) violations of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”);
    (4) violations of the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act 10; and (5) violations of
    various Medicaid statutory and regulatory rights pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . The
    amended complaint alleged misconduct collectively against all Defendants, without citing
    any specific acts on the part of any specific individual. Defendants answered, asserting
    various affirmative defenses and denying liability.
    From the start, there was confusion about whether the Timpsons had sued then-
    Governor Haley in her official capacity as Governor or in her individual capacity. While
    she sought clarification from the district court, the Timpsons noticed her deposition. In
    response (and after she had left state office to assume her position at the United Nations),
    then-Ambassador Haley filed a motion for a protective order, arguing that Governor
    McMaster was automatically substituted as a party upon her resignation. The Timpsons
    7
    The federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
    , 1367.
    8
    These included then-Governor Haley, various members of the Board, as well as
    the Directors of DDSN, DHHS, and Thrive.
    9
    These included the Board, DDSN, DHHS, and Thrive.
    10
    The Timpsons’ Administrative Procedures Act claims are not at issue in this
    appeal.
    6
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    acknowledged that Governor McMaster should automatically be substituted for the claims
    against then-Ambassador Haley in her official capacity as Governor, but stated that they
    were still “entitled to take the deposition of Nikki Haley to establish facts alleged in their
    amended complaint and to determine whether she may be liable, in her individual capacity,
    for any of the claims alleged in the amended complaint.” J.A. 446 (emphasis added).
    The district court ordered that, before requiring then-Ambassador Haley to submit
    to an oral deposition, the Timpsons should first pose ten written interrogatories. The court
    then directed the parties to submit her answers and brief whether the deposition should
    proceed or if summary judgment was appropriate as to the Timpsons’ individual capacity
    claims. See J.A. 1016 (explaining that “the interrogatory procedure was the most efficient
    and reasonable means of determining whether Defendant Haley had any relevant
    information as a threshold matter” (citing Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 
    122 F.3d 406
    , 409 (7th
    Cir. 1997) (adopting a similar approach for deposing high-ranking public officials))). In
    reviewing the parties’ submissions, the court found the Timpsons had “not ask[ed] any
    questions about Defendant Haley’s knowledge of [Johnny’s] care or the provision of
    services to him.” J.A. 1020. 11 Instead, they posed “a variety of questions related to her
    knowledge, while Governor, of various alleged improprieties in the administration of
    Medicaid waiver services.” 
    Id.
     Unsurprisingly, then-Ambassador Haley’s answers
    “provide[d] no evidence whatsoever of her personal involvement in the issues raised in the
    11
    Before submitting the interrogatories, the Timpsons represented that, “[i]f Nikki
    Haley testifies under oath that she had no personal knowledge or involvement in the matters
    alleged in the amended complaint, then her deposition should be short.” J.A. 447.
    7
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    case at bar.” 
    Id.
     And because there was no evidence that she acted personally in the alleged
    deprivation of Johnny’s rights, the court entered judgment in her favor.
    The remaining Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the Timpsons moved
    for partial summary judgment. After argument, the district court directed the Timpsons to
    file “supplemental briefing on . . . how [the § 1983] claims survive[d], that is, what the
    claim[s] [were] and what the evidence [was] that create[d] at least a genuine issue of
    material fact.” J.A. 4651. The Timpsons submitted a brief, which the district court
    criticized as “not accurately address[ing] any of those issues” and instead, much like their
    amended complaint, amounting “again, [to] a diatribe against the system.” J.A. 4719.
    The district court granted summary judgment for most of the Defendants on almost
    all of the Timpsons’ claims and denied the Timpsons’ motion for partial summary
    judgment. 12 Relevant here, the court granted summary judgment on all of the RA claims.
    At a later hearing, the district court dismissed all of the remaining claims, with these
    exceptions:
    12
    While this case was before the district court, Johnny filed an unrelated
    administrative appeal with DHHS to increase the number of hours he received care each
    week. He prevailed and later moved the district court to award interim attorney’s fees,
    arguing his administrative agency action was “both useful and of a type ordinarily
    necessary to advance the civil rights litigation to the stage it reached.” J.A. 690. The court
    denied the motion. Though the Timpsons briefly appear to challenge this ruling in their
    opening brief, see Opening Br. 36, 60, their efforts are so conclusory and vague that we
    conclude they have waived any challenge. See United States v. Diaz, 
    865 F.3d 168
    , 179
    (4th Cir. 2017) (treating an issue as waived when “the essential argument [was] contained
    in one sentence”); Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 
    440 F.3d 648
    , 653 n.7 (4th Cir. 2006)
    (explaining that a single “conclusory remark” in a brief is “insufficient” to constitute an
    argument). As discussed below, such vague challenges are woven throughout the
    Timpsons’ briefs.
    8
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    1. ADA Claims 13 against the Board, DDSN, DHHS, Thrive, and Governor
    McMaster;
    2. SCTCA Claims against the Board, DDSN, DHHS, Thrive, and Governor
    McMaster; and
    3. Section 1983 Claims against Thompson and Buscemi.
    At a pretrial hearing, the court barred testimony unrelated to Johnny and the
    facilities in which he was placed. The court also prohibited the Timpsons from presenting
    evidence related to alleged state-wide violations of law, admonishing, “You did not bring
    this as a class action. You did not bring this with [Johnny] as a representative plaintiff for
    all other[s] similarly situated. You are not going to put the system on trial.” J.A. 4766. 14
    The remaining Defendants objected to Johnny testifying at trial, arguing he was
    incompetent. The district court held a hearing, during which Johnny answered some basic
    questions correctly (including the name of the President of the United States and the fact
    that he lived with his sister), others incorrectly (including his year of birth and the current
    year), and acknowledged it was wrong to lie. The court ruled that the probative value of
    Johnny’s testimony was outweighed by the prejudice it would cause the Defendants. It also
    found that the jury was likely to be confused by Johnny’s “limited ability to communicate.”
    J.A. 4814–15.
    D.
    At trial, the district court allowed Johnny to answer questions only about “very basic
    13
    The district court found that the Timpsons’ RA and ADA claims were subject to
    the one-year statute of limitations found in South Carolina’s Human Affairs Law.
    14
    The district court also denied the Timpsons’ claims for injunctive relief. They do
    not meaningfully challenge this decision in their opening brief and have thus waived it. See
    Diaz, 865 F.3d at 179; Eriline, 
    440 F.3d at
    653 n.7.
    9
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    things” such as “his name, where he lives, who [he] lives with, . . . [and] if his arms were
    injured.” J.A. 4815.
    Although the Timpsons had designated Deborah McPherson (a former DDSN
    Commissioner), Lennie Mullis (a behavior support provider), and Randy Thomas (a former
    instructor at the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy) as hybrid witnesses prior to
    trial and disclosed the general subject matter on which they were expected to testify, none
    of these witnesses filed a written report. The district court thus excluded all three from
    presenting expert testimony. Moreover, it excluded Mullis altogether, but allowed
    McPherson and Thomas to testify as fact witnesses, though neither knew Johnny.
    At the end of the Timpsons’ case, the district court entered directed verdicts in favor
    of almost all of the remaining Defendants on almost all of the claims. The only claims that
    remained were the Timpsons’ ADA claim against the Board and SCTCA claims against
    the Board and DDSN. 15 The jury returned verdicts for the Defendants on these remaining
    claims.
    The Timpsons moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. They filed
    a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    15
    The court instructed the jury that the Board and DDSN could be liable under the
    SCTCA if the Timpsons had shown the agencies failed “to exercise slight care” or
    consciously failed “to do something which is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a
    thing intentionally that one ought not to do.” J.A. 3714.
    10
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    II.
    The Timpsons’ briefs are meandering and conclusory. They largely consist of one-
    sentence arguments and sparse (or no) citations to the record. 16 That said, as best we can
    discern, it appears the Timpsons have presented five preserved issues for our review. First,
    they challenge the district court’s rulings on the applicable statutes of limitations for their
    RA and ADA claims. Second, they submit the district court abused its discretion in
    excluding and limiting Johnny’s and the hybrid witnesses’ testimonies and in determining
    whether then-Ambassador Haley should have been deposed. Third, the Timpsons assert the
    district court improperly instructed the jury as to the duty owed under the SCTCA. Fourth,
    they argue the district court improperly dismissed their RA claims. And fifth, the Timpsons
    submit the district court erred in dismissing their § 1983 claims. We address each in turn.
    A. The Statutes of Limitations
    Before turning to the Timpsons’ specific challenges, we first set out the relevant
    limitations periods the district court applied to their claims. Because Title II of the ADA
    has no statute of limitations, federal courts “borrow the state statute of limitations that
    applies to the most analogous state-law claim.” A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655
    16
    For example, at one point in their opening brief, the Timpsons include the
    following assertion: “The Lower Court erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the
    guidelines set forth in [Blessing v. Freestone, 
    520 U.S. 329
     (1997)], to determine whether
    other provisions of the Medicaid Act create a private right enforceable under § 1983.”
    Opening Br. 60. They never delineate the Blessing guidelines or how they would apply.
    Nor do they provide any argument about how the district court failed to apply them. The
    Timpsons likewise include no record citations to guide our review. As a result, we find this
    claim—and others like it scattered throughout the Timpsons’ briefs—waived. Diaz, 865
    F.3d at 179; Eriline, 
    440 F.3d at
    653 n.7.
    11
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    31 F.3d 342
    , 347 (4th Cir. 2011); accord McCullough v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 
    35 F.3d 127
    , 129 (4th Cir. 1994). 17 Here, the district court determined that the South Carolina
    Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations applied to the Timpsons’ ADA and
    RA claims. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-90
    (d)(6). The district court also applied § 15-3-40
    of the South Carolina Code to extend the applicable limitations periods for Johnny’s claims
    by five years due to his intellectual disability. Therefore, because the Timpsons filed this
    suit in February 2016, the district court allowed Johnny to present his ADA and RA claims
    extending back to February 2010, and Sandra to present hers extending back to February
    2015. 18
    The Timpsons challenge two aspects of the district court’s statutes of limitations
    rulings. First, they argue the district court erred in finding the South Carolina Human
    Affairs Law was the most analogous state law to their ADA and RA claims. Second, they
    argue the district court erred in failing to apply South Carolina’s discovery rule to toll the
    applicable limitations periods.
    17
    The Court considers RA and Title II ADA claims together “because these
    provisions impose the same integration requirements.” Pashby v. Delia, 
    709 F.3d 307
    ,
    321 (4th Cir. 2013).
    18
    As for the Timpsons’ other causes of action, all SCTCA claims must be filed
    “within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered.” 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110
    . And § 1983 claims in this context are subject to a three-year statute of
    limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 
    471 U.S. 261
    , 271 (1985); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530
    (5).
    As a result, Johnny was allowed to present claims extending back to: (a) February 2008 for
    his § 1983 claims; and (b) February 2009 for his SCTCA claims. Sandra was allowed to
    present claims extending back to: (a) February 2013 for her § 1983 claims; and (b) February
    2014 for her SCTCA claims.
    12
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    1. The Most Analogous State Law
    We agree with the Timpsons that the district court erred in finding that their ADA
    and RA claims alleging discrimination in the provision of public services and retaliation
    were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations.
    Although “the most analogous [state law claim for statute of limitations purposes] need not
    be identical,” we have made clear that the controlling state legislation is that which
    provides substantially “the same rights and remedies” as the ADA. Wolsky v. Med. Coll. of
    Hampton Roads, 
    1 F.3d 222
    , 224–25 (4th Cir. 1993). In Semenova v. Maryland Transit
    Administration, 
    845 F.3d 564
     (4th Cir. 2017), we held that when a state’s anti-
    discrimination statute “does not contain a cause of action for disability discrimination in
    the provision of public services, the closer state-law analog to [an ADA] claim is a general
    civil action.” 
    Id. at 566
    .
    The South Carolina Human Affairs Law prohibits disability discrimination in
    employment, 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-80
    , and in conducting certain medical examinations
    or inquiries of a job applicant or employees, 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-80
    , not in the provision
    of public services. Moreover, South Carolina’s public accommodations statute provides
    that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
    facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
    accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
    religion, or national origin.” 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 45-9-10
    (A) (emphasis added); 
    id.
     § 45-9-
    10(B)(3) (defining “public accommodation” as “any hospital, clinic, or other medical
    facility which provides overnight accommodations”). That statute is silent about claims for
    13
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    disability discrimination. As a result, under Semenova, the district court erred in applying
    the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s statute of limitations rather than the three-year
    period for general civil actions. See id. § 15-3-530(5). We first address the implications of
    this error as it applies to Sandra before turning to Johnny’s claims.
    Though the Timpsons vaguely assert that this decision prevented Sandra from
    recovering for retaliatory acts before 2015, they mostly fail to specify what retaliation she
    suffered or how she (and not Johnny) was harmed. See Opening Br. 38 (“Because of this
    error, the jury was not allowed to award damages for retaliatory acts against Sandra before
    2/23/2015, when Defendants concealed records, delayed Johnny’s discharge, refused to
    provide records, reported to law enforcement that Sandra was exploiting her brother,[19]
    [and] failed to investigate sexual assaults[.]”). The Timpsons’ sparse record cites offer little
    guidance in our review. See Rodriguez-Machado v. Shinseki, 
    700 F.3d 48
    , 49–50 (1st Cir.
    2012) (per curiam) (“Essentially, [counsel] is asking us to do one of two things: accept
    what she says as gospel or mine the record ourselves to confirm the truth of her story—and
    there is no reason for us to do either. . . . [D]oing [counsel’s] work for her is not an option,
    since that would divert precious judge-time from other litigants who could have their cases
    resolved thoughtfully and expeditiously because they followed the rules.”); United States
    19
    The only record citation to support this claim in the opening brief makes no
    mention of such a report. See Opening Br. 19 (citing J.A. 2189 (detailing various incidents
    involving Johnny while he was under the Board’s care)). There was a note in a case status
    report suggesting that Angela Timpson (also Johnny’s sister) had told law enforcement that
    she believed Sandra “was in the process of building a new home and . . . felt that [Johnny’s
    complaints were] a means for Sandra Timpson to be able to take Johnny and be able to
    access his finical [sic] monies.” J.A. 1758. The Timpsons did not name either Angela or
    the Anderson County Sherriff’s Office (who authored the report) as Defendants.
    14
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    v. Dunkel, 
    927 F.2d 955
    , 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (explaining that “[j]udges are
    not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in [the record]”).
    Still, Sandra appears to have made one potential claim for ADA and RA retaliation
    that would be impacted by the district court’s statute of limitations ruling: that
    Defendants—which ones is unclear—“failed to inform [her] of feasible alternatives under
    the waiver.” Opening Br. 38. In the amended complaint, the Timpsons generally alleged
    “Defendants have failed to inform Sandra of . . . feasible alternatives and to provide
    sufficient services in the home so that she can return to work and so that her brother can
    avoid institutionalization.” J.A. 258. “Sandra repeatedly complained about Defendants
    [sic] conduct towards Johnny. In retaliation for those complaints the defendants withheld
    and delayed services to Johnny for Sandra when she took him into her home” in August
    2013. J.A. 259. The amended complaint concluded that “Defendants have retaliated against
    persons, including Johnny and Sandra, who have advocated for waiver participants and
    employees who have reported abuse, neglect and exploitation[, and] have experienced
    reprisals, and these wrongful acts by Defendants have resulted in injury to Johnny and
    Sandra.” J.A. 266; see also J.A. 2729 (Sandra’s affidavit claiming she “was never told that
    family members or friends could be paid to provide personal care attendant hours or that if
    [she] was appointed as Johnny’s guardian, [she] could not be paid to provide attendant
    care”). Therefore, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of Sandra’s ADA and RA
    retaliation claims that occurred between February 23, 2013, and February 23, 2015. On
    remand, we direct Sandra to specify which Defendants, if any, she claims retaliated against
    her during this period and to state, with specificity, how they did so.
    15
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    We affirm, however, the district court’s dismissal of Johnny’s claims because he
    has failed to show how this ruling prejudiced him. The Timpsons vaguely allege in their
    opening brief that, “[a]s a result of [the district court’s ruling], the jury also did not consider
    Johnny’s pre-2010 claims for ongoing ADA and [RA] violations.” Opening Br. 38. They
    make no mention of what these claims were or upon what facts they were based. The lone
    reference in their opening brief to an incident during the 2008 through 2009 period
    (incorporating the added two years Johnny’s ADA and RA claims would have received
    had the district court applied the correct statute of limitations) was a claim that his
    “surrogate was not informed of his elopements and threat to injure himself in 2008.”
    Opening Br. 11. But this appears to be a reference to the consent-based claims the district
    court expressly rejected because the Timpsons failed to allege any issue related to it in their
    amended complaint. See J.A. 5811 (“[I]n the amended complaint there is no claim pled
    involving consent,” meaning “anything related to consent is really not before the [c]ourt.”).
    And the Timpsons have waived any challenge to this ruling by failing to raise it on appeal.
    Therefore, Johnny has no ADA or RA claims for the additional time period.
    2. The Discovery Rule
    The Timpsons similarly failed in framing their arguments under the discovery rule.
    See Young v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 
    511 S.E.2d 714
    , 718–19 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (applying
    the discovery rule—that the statute of limitaitons begins to run when a cause of action
    reasonably ought to have been discovered—to claims brought under the SCTCA). They
    summarily assert, “The Lower Court erred in ruling that the state tolling statute and the
    discovery rule were mutually exclusive, prohibiting Johnny from recovering for any injury
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    prior to 2010 and Sandra from recovering for injuries prior to 2015.” Opening Br. 43. But
    they never state with any specificity what those injuries were or how they would have
    supported cognizable claims. Because they have claimed no prejudice from the district
    court’s ruling, we affirm on this ground as well.
    B. Limited and Excluded Testimony
    Moving to the Timpsons’ second point of error, they claim the court improperly:
    (1) limited Johnny’s testimony; (2) limited and excluded the hybrid witnesses’ testimonies;
    and (3) prevented them from taking then-Ambassador Haley’s deposition. We review each
    in turn, cognizant that “evidentiary rulings are entitled to substantial deference and will not
    be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion,” which occurs “only when the district court
    act[s] arbitrarily or irrationally.” United States v. Moore, 
    27 F.3d 969
    , 974 (4th Cir. 1994)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    1. Johnny’s Testimony
    A witness’s competency to testify is a threshold question of law lying exclusively
    in the trial court’s discretion. United States v. Odom, 
    736 F.2d 104
    , 111 (4th Cir. 1984).
    When a party questions a witness’s competency, the trial court must satisfy itself that the
    witness is competent to testify. 
    Id.
     Though it did not need to conduct a formal hearing, the
    court did so here and found it “reasonable to question whether or not [Johnny] possesse[d]
    the legal competence to testify.” J.A. 4783.
    In response to the court’s questions at the hearing, Johnny correctly stated his name
    and age, recognized the importance of telling the truth, identified the current President of
    the United States, and confirmed that he lived with his sister. He could not, however, name
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    his state of residence, state the current year or his year of birth, identify his claims with any
    particularity beyond the fact that they related to the arm-burning incident, or define what
    it meant to swear an oath. The transcript indicates several times where Johnny’s responses
    were “inaudible” or the court otherwise struggled to understand him. See J.A. 4784–88,
    4813.
    After hearing argument, the court found that Johnny met “the minimum
    qualifications of competence to the extent that he underst[ood] the importance of telling
    the truth, and that telling the truth is the right thing to do, that lying is wrong, and that . . .
    not telling the truth would carry with it negative consequences.” J.A. 4814. And that was
    enough “to get over the low bar” of competency. 
    Id.
     But the court also determined that
    Johnny was “not a reliable historian based upon his response . . . about his date of birth,
    and his inability to tell [the court] what state he lives in and some of the other responses.”
    
    Id.
     As such, the court found that the probative value of Johnny’s testimony would be
    substantially outweighed by the prejudice involved:
    [There would be] confusion to the jury in that . . . it would likely result in
    both the direct and cross examinations being nothing more than testimony by
    the respective attorneys with Mr. Timpson having limited ability to
    communicate either his agreement or disagreement with what the attorney
    was propounding in their question.
    J.A. 4815. As a result, the court allowed the Timpsons to call Johnny, but limited his
    testimony to “very basic things” like “his name, where he lives, who [he] lives with, how
    long he’s lived there,” and “if his arms were injured.” 
    Id.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. See Odom, 
    736 F.2d at 111
     (stating that the court may consider “the witness’ demeanor and testimony at the time,
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    his ability to recall, his knowledge of the facts, and his ability to narrate, then resolve the
    issue as one of credibility more than one of competency”). Indeed, Johnny’s testimony
    during trial supported the court’s decision to limit it. For example, during his direct
    examination, when asked how old he was, Johnny responded:
    A: I’m 50.
    Q: Sir?
    A: 50. I 51. I’m 50. I’m 58.
    Q. Are you 61?
    A: 58.
    Q: You think you’re 58.
    A: (Witness moves head up and down.)
    J.A. 5480. Johnny was 61 years old at the time.
    And like the preliminary hearing, the courtroom reporter repeatedly stated during
    Johnny’s trial testimony that he was “undiscernible” and that she could not understand him.
    See J.A. 5481–82, 5485–86, 5488, 5490. When asked if he could read and write, Johnny
    responded, “Yes. No. . . . I can read. I can read. I can read.” J.A. 5485. But when asked to
    do so, he responded “I didn’t learn that.” J.A. 5486. Given these inconsistent answers to
    simple questions coupled with the difficulty in understanding Johnny, we have no difficulty
    concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting his testimony.
    The Timpsons have also failed to show they were prejudiced by the court’s ruling.
    They have made no proffer of what facts Johnny would have testified about that were not
    already in evidence. Nor have they detailed how those facts would have supported their
    claims. See Nicholas v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 
    373 F.3d 537
    , 542–43 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding
    no abuse of discretion as to the denial of a discovery request where the complaining party
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    “ha[d] not been substantially prejudiced”). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
    limitation of Johnny’s testimony during trial on this alternate ground as well.
    2. The Hybrid Witnesses
    Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in excluding in part and limiting in part
    the testimonies of the Timpsons’ hybrid witnesses. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    26(a)(2)(B) requires any party who identifies a witness it may call at trial to include “a
    written report—prepared and signed by the witness—if the witness is one retained or
    specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case.” See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
    advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The requirement of a written report in
    paragraph (2)(B) . . . applies only to those experts who are retained or specially employed
    to provide [expert] testimony . . . or whose duties as an employee of a party regularly
    involve the giving of such testimony.”).
    Hybrid witnesses—fact witnesses with expertise that will inform their testimony—
    do not fall under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s purview. But most witnesses do not qualify as hybrid
    witnesses. See Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 
    849 F.3d 355
    , 371 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[H]ybrid fact/expert witnesses . . . must testify from the personal
    knowledge they gained on the job,” and “[t]he district court certainly may preclude these
    witnesses from testifying beyond the scope of facts they learned and opinions they formed
    during the course of their project duties.”); Downey v. Bob’s Disc. Furniture Holdings,
    Inc., 
    633 F.3d 1
    , 6 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that a hybrid witness whose opinion testimony
    arose “not from his enlistment as an expert but, rather, from his ground-level involvement
    in the events giving rise to the litigation” fell “outside the compass of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)”).
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    If a party wants to present opinion evidence through a hybrid witness, it still must
    disclose: “(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under
    Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to
    which the witness is expected to testify.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Failure to comply
    with either requirement typically will result in mandatory exclusion. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
    37(c)(1); S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 
    318 F.3d 592
    , 595–96
    (4th Cir. 2003).
    The Timpsons’ hybrid witness disclosures failed to satisfy Rule 26(a)(2)(C)(ii). The
    disclosures included only “the subject matter on which” the Timpsons expected
    McPherson, Mullis, and Thomas to testify. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(i); see J.A. 373–75,
    378–79. At no point, however, did the disclosures set out “a summary of the facts and
    opinions to which” each was expected to testify. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(ii). And the
    Timpsons cite no record evidence in their briefs before us to support their broad claim that
    they satisfied Rule 26(a)(2)(C)’s requirements in full. Thus, the district court did not abuse
    its discretion in preventing the claimed hybrid witnesses from providing expert testimony.
    But even if the Timpsons had properly disclosed McPherson, Mullis, and Thomas,
    the district court would not have erred in holding they failed to qualify as hybrid witnesses.
    None had any relevant factual evidence pertaining to the Timpsons’ claims. McPherson
    and Thomas had never met Johnny. And Mullis had only interacted with him briefly
    seventeen years before trial (well outside the statutes of limitations). Thus, their only
    involvement in the case occurred in the context of having been hired to provide their
    opinions, meaning the Timpsons should have produced expert reports for each under Rule
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    26(a)(2)(B). Because they failed to do so, the district court properly excluded these
    witnesses from offering their expert opinions during trial.
    3. Deposing Then-Ambassador Nikki Haley
    We next consider the Timpsons’ argument that the district court erred in denying
    their request to depose then-Ambassador Haley. “[F]ederal courts have consistently held
    that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a government decision-maker will not be
    compelled to testify about [her] mental processes in reaching a decision, including the
    manner and extent of [her] study of the record and [her] consultations with subordinates.”
    Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Ryan, 
    922 F.2d 209
    , 211 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). That practice was especially appropriate here because Haley, in her role as
    Governor, was “not an official with responsibility for” decisions relating to “service levels
    of waiver participants,” determinations of services for specific patients, or “provid[ing]
    funding for [patients] to live outside of a congregate setting.” Kobe v. Haley, 666 F. App’x
    281, 299 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Nor did she “have the authority to change them.” 
    Id.
    What’s more, the Timpsons presented no theory (viable or otherwise) for proceeding
    against then-Ambassador Haley in her individual capacity. See J.A. 446 (the Timpsons
    suggesting they had a right to take then-Ambassador Haley’s deposition “to determine
    whether she may [have] be[en] liable, in her individual capacity, for any of the claims
    alleged in the amended complaint”).
    Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a direct, but limited
    approach to determine whether then-Ambassador Haley’s deposition had any potential to
    lead to relevant, admissible evidence in this case. The Timpsons failed to seize on this
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    opportunity and squandered their ten interrogatories on matters unrelated to her knowledge
    of Johnny or decisions involving his care. Nor have they shown on appeal why then-
    Ambassador Haley’s continued presence here is anything more than an attempt to uncover
    some unknown claim against her in her individual capacity. At bottom, we perceive no
    error in the district court’s denial of this request.
    C. The SCTCA Claims
    The Timpsons also challenge two aspects of the district court’s jury instructions for
    their SCTCA claims. “We review a district court’s decision to give a particular jury
    instruction for abuse of discretion, and review whether a jury instruction incorrectly stated
    the law de novo.” United States v. Miltier, 
    882 F.3d 81
    , 89 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal citations
    omitted).
    First, the Timpsons argue the court erred in instructing the jury that the Board and
    DDSN could be liable under the SCTCA only if they committed “gross negligence,” that
    is, if they failed “to exercise slight care” or consciously failed “to do something which
    [was] incumbent upon [them] to do or [did] [some]thing intentionally that [they] ought not
    to [have] do[ne].” J.A. 3714. The Timpsons maintain that, under Madison ex rel. Bryant v.
    Babcock Center, Inc., 
    638 S.E.2d 650
     (S.C. 2006), the appropriate standard required the
    Board and DDSN to provide “reasonable care and treatment,” which “may be established
    and defined by the common law, statutes, administrative regulations, industry standards,
    or a defendant’s own policies and guidelines.” 
    Id.
     at 659–60. Finding no error in the district
    court’s instruction, we affirm.
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    The SCTCA “governs all tort claims against governmental entities and is the
    exclusive civil remedy available in an action against a governmental entity or its
    employees.” Shirley’s Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 
    743 S.E.2d 778
    , 783 (S.C. 2013);
    see also 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20
    (b) (“The remedy provided by this chapter is the
    exclusive civil remedy available for any tort committed by a governmental entity, its
    employees, or its agents[.]”). To that end, the statute provides several exceptions to
    liability, including a provision establishing that a “governmental entity is not liable for a
    loss resulting from” “responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision,
    protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student, patient, prisoner, inmate, or
    client of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a
    grossly negligent manner.” 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60
    (25) (emphasis added). Thus, as the
    district court correctly found, the statute expressly establishes gross negligence as the
    applicable standard of care for the Timpsons’ claims stemming from Johnny’s care in the
    group homes. And, as the Supreme Court of South Carolina clarified in Etheredge v.
    Richland School District One, 
    534 S.E.2d 275
     (S.C. 2000), “[g]ross negligence is the
    intentional conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the
    doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do. It is the failure to exercise slight
    care.” 
    Id. at 277
     (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
    Contrary to the Timpsons’ argument, Madison did not change this analysis. There,
    the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that, by “accept[ing] the responsibility of
    providing care, treatment, or services to a mentally retarded or disabled client,” DDSN
    “ha[d] a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising the client and providing appropriate
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    care and treatment to the client.” Madison, 638 S.E.2d at 660. But as the court made clear,
    [w]hen a governmental entity owes a duty of care to a plaintiff under the
    common law and other elements of negligence are shown, the next step is to
    analyze the applicability of exceptions to the waiver of immunity contained
    in 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60
     which are asserted by the governmental entity.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added). And in proceeding to that next step—which, as quoted above,
    provides that a governmental agency is not liable for “responsibility or duty including but
    not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any . . . patient
    . . . or client of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised
    in a grossly negligent manner,” S.C. Code § 15-78-60(25) (emphasis added)—the Supreme
    Court of South Carolina simply determined that whether DDSN had acted in a grossly
    negligent manner was a factual issue for the jury. It did not, as the Timpsons would have
    it, remove the gross negligence standard from the SCTCA’s exceptions to the waiver of
    immunity provision (i.e., the second step of the analysis). Thus, the district court correctly
    instructed the jury as to the appropriate standard of care.
    For their second SCTCA challenge, the Timpsons claim the district court erred in
    instructing the jury that DDSN could not be held liable unless Tiny Greer’s employees
    were also its employees. But in Young v. South Carolina Department of Disabilities &
    Special Needs, 
    649 S.E.2d 488
     (S.C. 2007)—the decision on which the district court relied
    in framing this instruction—the Supreme Court of South Carolina made clear that “[t]he
    plain language of the statutes and ordinances establishes the Board as a separate entity from
    DDSN and grants the Board the authority to hire employees.” 
    Id. at 491
    . And because “the
    Board has been established as a separate entity with powers and duties separate from
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    DDSN. . . , the doctrine of non-delegable duty does not apply.” 
    Id. at 492
    . In other words,
    DDSN is not liable for the conduct of the Board or the Board’s employees (including those
    who work at Tiny Greer). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in framing its
    instruction on this issue.
    D. The ADA and RA Claims
    For their next point of error, the Timpsons contend the district court improperly
    dismissed their ADA and RA claims and wrongly excluded evidence of South Carolina’s
    financial resources. See generally Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603, 607 (“[T]he resources
    available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities” may be considered
    in determining whether providing requested services would “entail a fundamental
    alteration of the State’s services and programs.” (alterations and internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    For context, the RA provides, “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability
    . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
    denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
    receiving Federal financial assistance.” 
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    (a). Title II of the ADA provides
    that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
    excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
    activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 12132
    . Title II defines “public entity” as, inter alia, “any State or local government” or
    “any department, agency, [or] special purpose district.” 
    Id.
     § 12131(1). “To the extent
    possible, we construe the ADA and [RA] to impose similar requirements. Thus, despite the
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    different language these statutes employ, they require a plaintiff to demonstrate the same
    elements to establish liability.” Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 
    669 F.3d 454
    ,
    461 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
    We need not reach the merits of the Timpsons’ claims, however, because their
    opening brief on this issue—much like their amended complaint below—fails to identify:
    (1) either the specific conduct complained of or which Defendant allegedly engaged in any
    given unlawful action; (2) how that conduct injured either Johnny or Sandra; or (3) how
    that conduct violated either statute. Nor do the Timpsons present any argument that they
    were harmed by the dismissal of their RA claims. Thus, they have presented no basis for
    reversing the judgment below, Carter v. Lee, 
    283 F.3d 240
    , 252 n.11 (4th Cir. 2002)
    (“[T]his Court normally views contentions not raised in an opening brief to be waived.”),
    and have “failed to point to persuasive indications that any one of [their] bases for reversal
    of the district court’s judgment has merit,” First Pros. Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 607 F. App’x 276,
    290 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished).
    The Timpsons’ appeal to Olmstead is also unavailing. A state that decides to provide
    services under the Medicaid Act must do so “in the most integrated setting appropriate to
    the needs of qualified individuals.” 
    28 C.F.R. § 35.130
    (d). But “the State generally may
    rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an
    individual meets the essential eligibility requirements for habilitation in a community-
    based program. Absent such qualification, it would be inappropriate to remove a patient
    from the more restrictive setting.” Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602 (internal quotation marks
    omitted). The Supreme Court expressly did not hold “that the ADA imposes on the States
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    a standard of care for whatever medical services they render, or that the ADA requires
    States to provide a certain level of benefits to individuals with disabilities.” Id. at 603 n.14
    (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Timpsons made no showing or assertion in
    their opening brief as to how South Carolina’s purportedly improper diversion of funds had
    any effect on Johnny’s treatment and care. See Carter, 
    283 F.3d at
    252 n.11. We therefore
    affirm on this ground as well.
    E. The § 1983 Claims
    Finally, the Timpsons argue that the district court erred by excluding evidence of
    Defendants’ alleged § 1983 violations and ruling that any official who lacked knowledge
    of Johnny or the Board-operated groups homes in which he resided could not be held liable
    for the wrongdoing of that officials’ subordinates. Missing from the Timpsons’ argument,
    however, is the long-recognized principle that there is no doctrine of respondeat superior
    under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 691–94 (1978); see also
    Slakan v. Porter, 
    737 F.2d 368
    , 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (reasoning that liability is premised not
    on respondeat superior but on “a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit
    authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional
    injuries they inflict on those committed to their care”).
    Public administrators (such as the individual Defendants here) may be liable in their
    individual capacities only for their personal wrongdoing or supervisory actions that
    violated constitutional norms. Shaw v. Stroud, 
    13 F.3d 791
    , 799 (4th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff
    must satisfy three elements to establish supervisory liability under § 1983:
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    (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his
    subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable
    risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the
    supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show
    deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
    practices; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the
    supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
    plaintiff.
    Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Establishing a “pervasive and unreasonable” risk of harm under the first element
    “requires evidence that the conduct is widespread, or at least has been used on several
    different occasions and that the conduct engaged in by the subordinate poses an
    unreasonable risk of harm of constitutional injury.” Id. To prove “deliberate indifference”
    under the second element, the plaintiff typically must show a supervisor’s “continued
    inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses.” Slakan, 
    737 F.2d at 373
    . The
    plaintiff assumes a heavy burden of proof on this point because, ordinarily, he cannot
    satisfy it
    by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents, for a supervisor cannot
    be expected to promulgate rules and procedures covering every conceivable
    occurrence within the area of his responsibilities. Nor can he reasonably be
    expected to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained
    employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct.
    
    Id. at 373
     (internal citation omitted). Finally, under the third element, causation is
    established when the plaintiff proves “an affirmative causal link”—a concept quasi-
    analogous to proximate cause—between the supervisor’s inaction and the harm suffered.
    
    Id. at 376
    .
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    Against this backdrop, the Timpsons have failed to show reversible error. They
    neither pleaded nor proved any action or inaction by any of the individually named
    Defendants that caused them harm. Indeed, the Timpsons’ § 1983 claim did not mention
    six of the ten individual Defendants by name. And the four they did mention were
    referenced only once, in a boilerplate statement that alleged no wrongdoing. See J.A. 275
    (“These practices are so permanent and well settled as to constitute custom or usage with
    the force of law and the Defendants Haley, Danielson, Buscemi and Soura are persons who
    have final policymaking authority.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor did the
    Timpsons make any evidentiary showing of personal involvement by any individual in any
    complained-of action in response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See J.A.
    4148 (“As to the merits of Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims, the [c]ourt granted summary
    judgment and directed verdicts because the Plaintiffs offered no actual evidence that any
    officials violated the Constitution.”).
    And the Timpsons made no substantive argument to the contrary in their opening
    brief. See Opening Br. 59 (“Haley, McMaster, Soura, Buscemi and Thompson are liable
    for violations committed by their subordinates because they were empowered to propose
    rules and regulations for the government of the State system and they shouldered specific
    responsibility for classifying facilities and developing programs so as to permit the proper
    segregation and treatment of participants according to their character and mental
    condition.” (cleaned up)). We have affirmed a district court’s decision denying a plaintiff’s
    request to add defendants when he “failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate any
    personal or supervisory wrongdoing by the administrators.” Clark v. Md. Dep’t of Pub.
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    Safety & Corr. Servs., 316 F. App’x 279, 282 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see Shaw, 
    13 F.3d at 799
    . We similarly affirmed a grant of summary judgment when the plaintiff “failed
    to allege any specific wrongful action on the part of” a supervisor. Clark, 316 F. App’x at
    282; Slakan, 
    737 F.2d at 376
    . This case is no different. The Timpsons made no showing of
    liability for acts by any of the individual Defendants.
    Finally, as to the agency Defendants, the Supreme Court has made clear that “neither
    a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will
    v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 71 (1989). As a result, the district court properly
    entered judgment in their favor. And the Timpsons have offered no justification (persuasive
    or otherwise) to reverse. See Carter, 
    283 F.3d at
    252 n.11.
    III.
    For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is
    AFFIRMED IN PART,
    VACATED IN PART,
    AND REMANDED.
    31