Delila Uwasomba v. Merrill Lynch ( 2022 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-1091
DELILA UWASOMBA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:18-cv-02520-RDB)
Submitted: November 18, 2021 Decided: January 6, 2022
Before MOTZ and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph D. Allen, SIMMS SHOWERS LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Elena D. Marcuss, Adam T. Simons, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Delila Uwasomba seeks to appeal the district court’s orders (1) granting summary
judgment in favor of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (“Merrill Lynch”) in
Uwasomba’s action alleging Merrill Lynch discriminated against her and wrongfully
refused to hire her for employment because of her Nigerian national origin, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; and (2)
denying Uwasomba’s purported Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment.
We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
“[W]e have an independent obligation to verify the existence of appellate
jurisdiction.” Porter v. Zook, 803 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). In civil cases, a notice of
appeal must be filed no more than 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final
judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal
period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(6).
When a party files a timely Rule 59(e) motion before filing a notice of appeal, the
time to file an appeal runs from the entry of the order resolving the Rule 59 motion. Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days of entry of
the district court’s judgment, however, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and a district court
cannot extend the time to file such a motion, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
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The district court here entered its dismissal order on March 31, 2020. Uwasomba
filed her purported Rule 59(e) motion nearly four months later, on July 21, 2020. After
appropriately construing the motion as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, see In re Burnley,
988 F.2d 1, 2-3 (4th Cir. 1992), the district court denied the motion by order entered
December 18, 2020. On January 19, 2021, Uwasomba noted an appeal from both the
order granting Merrill Lynch summary judgment and the order denying her Rule 59(e)
motion.
Because Uwasomba’s Rule 59(e) motion was not timely filed, the appeal period
for the dismissal order was not tolled by the filing of that motion. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4)(A). Consequently, Uwasomba’s appeal from the dismissal order was filed well
after the 30-day appeal period expired. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the
district court’s order granting Merrill Lynch’s summary judgment motion. See Bowles,
551 U.S. at 214. We reject Uwasomba’s argument that her time to file a Rule 59(e)
motion was extended by the district court’s Standing Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
We do, however, possess jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying
Uwasomba’s postjudgment motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the postjudgment motion, see Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501
(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (stating standard of review for Rule 60(b) motion), and
therefore affirm the district court’s order, Uwasomba v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02520-RDB (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2020).
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Based on the foregoing, we dismiss in part and affirm in part. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART
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