United States v. Angie Boatwright , 672 F. App'x 294 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4732
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANGIE DENISE BOATWRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00200-CCE-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2016 Decided: January 5, 2017
Before SHEDD and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Duberstein,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Clifton T.
Barrett, Michael Francis Joseph, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Angie Denise Boatwright pled guilty to possession and
distribution of pseudoephedrine knowing that it would be used to
manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(c)(2) (2012). The district court sentenced Boatwright to
64 months’ imprisonment, a term falling within the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Boatwright argues that
the district court erred in failing to accord reduced deference
to the applicable Guideline. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
“[A]ppellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to
determining whether they are reasonable.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Such review entails appellate consideration of both
the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
Id. at 51. In determining procedural reasonableness, this Court
considers whether the district court properly calculated the
applicable advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, sufficiently explained the selected
sentence, and did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. Id. at
49-51. This Court “review[s] the [district] court’s factual
findings for clear error [and] its legal conclusions de novo.”
United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012).
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We discern no procedural error in Boatwright’s sentencing.
It is clear from the record that the district court knew that it
could vary from the Guidelines range, but declined to do so. We
also reject Boatwright’s argument that the district court erred
by failing to expressly find that methamphetamine-related
Guidelines should receive reduced deference as a policy matter.
“Although a sentencing court may be entitled to consider policy
decisions underlying the Guidelines, including the presence or
absence of empirical data, it is under no obligation to do so.”
United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
If this Court finds no significant procedural error, it
examines the substantive reasonableness of a sentence “under an
abuse-of-discretion standard, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Any sentence
within a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumed to be
substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d
295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). The district court expressly found
that a variance or sentence at the low end of applicable
Guidelines range was not appropriate in light of the length of
time that Boatwright engaged in the criminal activity and her
continued methamphetamine use after pleading guilty. Boatwright
offers no argument regarding these factors.
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Accordingly, we conclude that Boatwright has failed to
demonstrate that her sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable, and we affirm her sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
expressed in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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