United States v. Jabori Jones ( 2022 )

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4065 Doc: 24 Filed: 08/09/2022 Pg: 1 of 4
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4065
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JABORI DIERE JONES, a/k/a Spunk,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (6:15-cr-00786-HMH-1)
Submitted: July 21, 2022 Decided: August 9, 2022
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Erica M. Soderdahl, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Corey F.
Ellis, United States Attorney, Jamie Lea Schoen, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Jabori Diere Jones appeals the eight-month term of imprisonment imposed upon the
revocation of his supervised release. Jones contends that his sentence is plainly
unreasonable because the district court failed to address his nonfrivolous mitigation
arguments and adequately explain the reasons for the sentence. We vacate Jones’ sentence
and remand for resentencing.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). “We
will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable, evaluating “the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide
our review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture than we
do when reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th
Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing sentencing factors applicable to revocation proceedings). “A
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be
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when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons
for the sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, a district court must, “at a minimum
acknowledge[] its consideration of nonfrivolous arguments in favor of mitigation.”
Patterson, 957 F.3d at 439; see United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 2018)
(noting that district court must demonstrate that it “considered any potentially meritorious
arguments raised by [the defendant] with regard to his sentencing” (cleaned up)).
Here, the district court generally referenced its obligation to consider the policy
statements in Chapter Seven of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual and the
statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). However, the district
court failed to address a majority of Jones’ mitigation arguments. See Patterson, 957 F.3d
at 438-39; cf. United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 745 (4th Cir. 2019) (stating, in context
of original sentencing, that “the district court cannot meet its responsibility through broadly
referring to the § 3553(a) factors in lieu of addressing the parties’ non-frivolous
arguments”).
We decline the Government’s invitation to infer the district court’s consideration of
Jones’ mitigation arguments from the hearing as a whole as the “district court’s reasons
for” rejecting Jones’ arguments are not “clear from context.” See Thompson, 595 F.3d at
547. The Government places significant weight on two questions the district court asked
Jones before imposing the sentence; however, those questions related only to comments
Jones made during his allocution, not to any of Jones’ various other mitigation arguments.
The Government also relies heavily on the district court’s remarks that Jones would not
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comply with supervision even if imposed. Yet, the district court made these remarks after
it had already imposed the sentence and only in response to Jones’ inquiry about whether
an additional term of supervised release would be imposed. Thus, the district court’s
remarks justified its decision to not impose supervised release, rather than the term of
imprisonment the court chose. Therefore, the record provides inadequate assurance that
the district court considered the mitigation arguments proffered by Jones and his counsel.
The district court’s “failure to so much as mention [Jones’] arguments” violated our
established minimum procedural requirements and renders the sentence plainly
unreasonable. Patterson, 957 F.3d at 440; see Slappy, 872 F.3d at 210 (explaining that
sentence is “plainly unreasonable” when “it runs afoul of clearly settled law” (cleaned up)).
And because, on our review of the record, it remains “plausible the court may have imposed
a lower sentence” had it expressly considered Jones’ mitigation arguments, we conclude
that the error is not harmless. Patterson, 957 F.3d at 440.
Accordingly, we vacate Jones’ sentence and remand for resentencing. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. The
mandate shall issue forthwith so that resentencing may proceed without delay.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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