Sangafio v. Holder , 378 F. App'x 273 ( 2010 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-2255
    ABIY BERECHA MAMMO,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals.
    Submitted:   April 29, 2010                 Decided:   May 14, 2010
    Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jason A. Dzubow, MENSAH & DZUBOW, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
    Petitioner.    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Susan
    Houser, Senior Litigation Counsel, Steven F. Day, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Abiy Berecha Mammo, a native and citizen of Ethiopia,
    petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals    (“Board”)      affirming            without     opinion      the     immigration
    judge’s     order       denying      Mammo’s         applications             for        asylum,
    withholding     of     removal      and       withholding       under     the      Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”).            We deny the petition for review.
    The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes
    the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee.                                   
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a),      (b)    (2006).           It    defines     a    refugee       as    a     person
    unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of
    persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion.”                  
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A) (2006).
    “Persecution        involves       the        infliction       or   threat         of     death,
    torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
    of the enumerated grounds . . . .”                       Li v. Gonzales, 
    405 F.3d 171
    , 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted).
    An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
    for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 
    455 F.3d 484
    , 486 (4th Cir.
    2006);    see   
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a)       (2009),        and    can      establish
    refugee status based on past persecution in his native country
    on account of a protected ground.                        
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)
    2
    (2009).     “An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject
    of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
    persecution.”       Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 
    371 F.3d 182
    , 187 (4th Cir.
    2004).      Without      regard    to   past        persecution,    an       alien   can
    establish    a   well-founded      fear   of        persecution    on    a    protected
    ground.    
    Id.
    “Withholding of removal is available under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3) if the alien shows that it is more likely than not
    that her life or freedom would be threatened in the country of
    removal because of her race, religion, nationality, membership
    in a particular social group, or political opinion.”                          Gomis v.
    Holder, 
    571 F.3d 353
    , 359 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
    marks omitted), cert. denied, 
    130 S. Ct. 1048
     (2010).                         “This is
    a more stringent standard than that for asylum . . . . [and],
    while     asylum    is    discretionary,            if   an   alien       establishes
    eligibility for withholding of removal, the grant is mandatory.”
    Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 351
    , 353-54 (4th Cir.
    2006) (internal citations omitted) (alteration added).
    Credibility      findings         are    reviewed     for    substantial
    evidence.    A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony
    on credibility grounds must offer a “specific, cogent reason”
    for doing so.       Figeroa v. INS, 
    886 F.2d 76
    , 78 (4th Cir. 1989)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).                   “Examples of specific and
    cogent    reasons    include      inconsistent        statements,       contradictory
    3
    evidence,    and    inherently     improbable       testimony[.]”           Tewabe    v.
    Gonzales, 
    446 F.3d 533
    , 538 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).              Likewise, “the immigration judge
    cannot    reject     documentary      evidence      without      specific,     cogent
    reasons    why     the    documents    are    not     credible.”          Kourouma    v.
    Holder, 
    588 F.3d 234
    , 241 (4th Cir. 2009).
    The REAL ID Act of 2005 also amended the law regarding
    credibility      determinations       for     applications       for      asylum     and
    withholding of removal filed after May 11, 2005, as is the case
    here.     Such determinations are to be made based on the totality
    of the circumstances and all relevant factors, including:
    the   demeanor,   candor,  or   responsiveness    of  the
    applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the
    applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency
    between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral
    statements (whenever made and whether or not under
    oath, and considering the circumstances under which
    the statements were made), the internal consistency of
    each   such   statement,   the    consistency   of   such
    statements with other evidence of record . . . . and
    any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,
    without    regard    to   whether    an    inconsistency,
    inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the
    applicant’s claim[.]
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added).
    This     court      accords      broad,     though      not    unlimited,
    deference     to    credibility       findings      supported       by    substantial
    evidence.        Camara    v.   Ashcroft,     
    378 F.3d 361
    ,   367     (4th   Cir.
    2004).     If the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding
    is based on speculation and conjecture rather than specific and
    4
    cogent reasoning, however, it is not supported by substantial
    evidence.    Tewabe, 
    446 F.3d at 538
    .
    Furthermore,      this    court     may    not    reverse    a   finding
    regarding the availability of corroborative evidence unless a
    reasonable       factfinder    is    compelled        to     conclude     that    the
    corroborative evidence is unavailable.                  
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)
    (2006).
    A    determination      regarding    eligibility      for    asylum    or
    withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
    evidence on the record considered as a whole.                         INS v. Elias-
    Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992).              Administrative findings of
    fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
    compelled to decide to the contrary.                  
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B)
    (2006).     This court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence
    . . . presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
    could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.”                        Elias-
    Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. at 483-84
    ; see Rusu v. INS, 
    296 F.3d 316
    , 325
    n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
    We    find   substantial     evidence          supports    the   adverse
    credibility finding, which was based on several discrepancies
    noted by the immigration judge and Mammo’s testimonial demeanor.
    We further note the record does not compel a different result
    with respect to the immigration judge’s findings regarding the
    need for additional corroborating evidence.                   We also note Mammo
    5
    fails    to   challenge     the    immigration       judge’s    alternate       finding
    that,    assuming    he     was     credible,        he   failed   to     show    past
    persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution based on a
    protected ground. *
    Accordingly,    we    deny       the   petition   for     review.      We
    dispense      with   oral    argument      because        the   facts     and     legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
    *
    By failing to raise a challenge in his brief to that
    portion of the immigration judge’s order denying relief under
    the CAT, review is abandoned. See Yousefi v. INS, 
    260 F.3d 318
    ,
    326 (4th Cir. 2001); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 
    178 F.3d 231
    ,
    241 (4th Cir. 1999).
    6