United States v. Murphy , 380 F. App'x 344 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4277
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TYAUNKA SHOLONDA MURPHY, a/k/a Tyannka Murphy, a/k/a Tyanuka
Murphy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (7:08-cr-00063-BR-1)
Submitted: April 30, 2010 Decided: May 28, 2010
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Jennifer Haynes Rose, LAW OFFICE OF JENNIFER HAYNES ROSE,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Tyaunka Sholonda Murphy
pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2006), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug
trafficking offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
The district court sentenced Murphy to fifty-seven months on the
drug count and a consecutive sixty months on the firearm count,
for a total sentence of 117 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of
the sentencing guidelines range. Murphy appeals her convictions
and sentence. Her attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no meritorious
grounds for appeal, but questioning whether Murphy’s plea was
knowing and voluntary in light of an alleged Fourth Amendment
violation, and challenging the reasonableness of Murphy’s
sentence. Murphy was advised of her right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but she did not file one. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm Murphy’s convictions but vacate her
sentence and remand for resentencing.
Because Murphy did not move in the district court to
withdraw her guilty plea, any error in the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez,
277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing standard). Our
careful review of the record convinces us that the district
2
court substantially complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in
accepting Murphy’s guilty plea and ensured that the plea was
supported by an independent factual basis. See United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Murphy argues that her plea was not constitutionally
valid because she contends that the evidence that formed the
basis for her convictions was seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and that she did not realize this at the time of her
plea. When assessing whether a guilty plea is constitutionally
valid, this court considers whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, it “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”
Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 190 (4th Cir. 2000).
Murphy does not dispute that she had adequate ability
to consult with her attorney or that she understood the
proceedings against her. Instead, she claims that her plea was
not knowing and voluntary because she did not realize at the
time of her plea that the evidence against her had been seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, even assuming
arguendo a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred, this would
not undermine her guilty plea because a plea is an admission of
past conduct and does not depend on the seized evidence. See
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989) (valid guilty
plea does not require conscious waiver of potential defenses);
3
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321 (1983) (explaining that
guilty plea amounts to admission of past conduct and is not
undermined by validity of Fourth Amendment violation because
plea does not rest on seized evidence). We therefore find
Murphy’s challenge to her guilty plea to be unavailing. To the
extent that Murphy seeks to raise the Fourth Amendment claim as
an independent issue, her valid guilty plea waives all
nonjurisdictional defects “not logically inconsistent with the
valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in
the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.”
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975); Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see United States v.
Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993).
Turning to her final argument, Murphy contends that
her sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than
necessary to achieve the sentencing objectives enumerated in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). An appellate court reviews a sentence
for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review
requires consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence. Id. This court must assess
whether the district court properly calculated the guidelines
range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed any arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
4
selected sentence. Id. at 49-50; see United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n individualized explanation
must accompany every sentence.”); United States v. Carter, 564
F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). The explanation need not be
extensive as long as the appellate court is satisfied “‘that
[the district court] has considered the parties’ arguments and
has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d
495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). Finally, this court reviews the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
In this case, Murphy sought a downward variance from
the guidelines range, citing substance abuse problems,
estrangement from her family, and emotional issues. Other than
stating that it was imposing a sentence “[p]ursuant to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and in accordance with the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, [543 U.S.
220 (2005)],” the district court offered no explanation of how
it determined that the 117-month sentence would accomplish the
sentencing goals set out in § 3553(a). There is no indication
5
in the record that the court considered Murphy’s nonfrivolous
arguments before sentencing her and the Government failed to
show that the absence of an individualized explanation of the
sentence was harmless. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 585. Because it is
not clear whether the district court’s explicit consideration of
Murphy’s arguments would have affected her sentence, we must
vacate Murphy’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for other meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm Murphy’s convictions, vacate her
sentence, and remand for resentencing that includes an
individualized explanation for the sentence imposed. This court
requires that counsel inform her client, in writing, of her
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
6