United States v. Griffin , 391 F. App'x 311 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4948
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONALD GRIFFIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (1:08-
cr-00033-JFM-1)
Argued: May 14, 2010 Decided: August 6, 2010
Before DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and
Arthur L. ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Alarcón wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.
ARGUED: Steven M. Klepper, KRAMON & GRAHAM, PA, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Michael Clayton Hanlon, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: John A. Bourgeois, KRAMON & GRAHAM, PA, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit Judge:
Donald Griffin was convicted of carjacking, possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and possession of a
firearm by a previously convicted felon, after a trial by jury. He
appeals from the District Court=s summary denial of his motion for a
new trial in a Amarginal order@ and his request for an evidentiary
hearing in support of his motion. 1 Griffin argued in his written
motion that he was entitled to a new trial because the Government
failed to disclose, prior to trial, exculpatory evidence in
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). We affirm. We conclude that
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Griffin=s
request for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing in support
thereof because the evidence that was not disclosed prior to trial
was not material.
I
A
Before discussing the merits of this appeal, we will summarize
the evidence presented to the jury by both sides. The record shows
that on October 31, 2007, Tom M. Brantley left his residence at
6:30 a.m. to go to his workplace. On that date, two of the
vehicles he owned were parked on the street: A black M45 Infiniti
1 The District Court wrote “Denied” in the margin of the first
page of Griffin’s motion and signed and dated this entry.
2
passenger automobile and a White ML320 Mercedes-Benz sports utility
vehicle.
Mr. Brantley observed a gray Acura Legend parked on the street
in a no parking area. Its engine was running. He observed three
persons in the car. After he walked past this vehicle, the two
passengers got out of the Acura Legend. The person sitting in the
driver’s seat never got out of the car. They crossed the street
and approached Mr. Brantley. One of them pointed an automatic
hand- gun at Mr. Brantley and told him not to run. The person
holding the gun was taller than his cohort (Athe taller male@). Mr.
Brantley could not identify the two men at trial because their
faces were covered. He also testified that the two men were
wearing gloves. The taller male seized Mr. Brantley=s key chain and
ordered him to sit down. He then hit Mr. Brantley on the back of
his head. The two men seized three cell phones, and twenty dollars
from Mr. Brantley=s clothing.
The shorter male searched the Mercedes-Benz SUV. Nothing was
removed.
The taller male asked Mr. Brantley if he had any more money.
Mr. Brantley replied that he had $800 in his residence.
The two men then escorted Mr. Brantley to his residence.
Mr. Brantley went to a closet and retrieved $800 and handed the
money to the taller male. The robbers also took a pair of blue Air
Jordan shoes.
3
The two men escorted Mr. Brantley outside. They ordered him
to walk down the street. The shorter male separated the vehicle
keys from Mr. Brantley=s keychain. The shorter male then entered
into Mr. Brantley=s M45 Infiniti and drove off. The taller male
entered the Mercedes-Benz SUV and drove off. The driver of the
Acura Legend get-away car also drove away. Five minutes after the
robbery, Mr. Brantley returned to his residence and asked his
mother to make a 911 call to report the crime. Mr. Brantley
testified on cross-examination that he was not asked by the police
whether the men who robbed him were wearing masks or gloves. His
written statement to the police does not mention that his
assailants wore masks or gloves. Mr. Brantley testified that he
was reluctant to testify before the grand jury in this matter. The
Government requested a material witness warrant to require him to
testify before the grand jury.
B
Detective Courtney Todman, an officer of the Baltimore City
Police Department, testified that at approximately 7:00 a.m., on
October 31, 2007, he and Officer James L. Howard were requested by
a police dispatcher to be on the lookout in the area of the 2800
block of Suffolk Avenue for a white Mercedes truck that had been
taken in a carjacking. Officer Todman saw a white Mercedes SUV and
three individuals in the street parked at the corner of Suffolk
Avenue and Reisterstown Road. Detective Todman also observed an
Acura Legend and a black Infiniti. A computer aided dispatch
4
recorded that a 911 telephone call reporting the carjacking was
made at 6:58 a.m.
Detective Todman saw Darrick Fraling approach the Mercedes-
Benz. Donald Griffin was standing next to the vehicle on the
inside of the open driver=s side door to the Mercedes-Benz. One of
the individuals saw the officers approaching, at which time the
suspects started running away. Griffin ran down Suffolk Avenue
toward a dead end. Officer Howard pursued Griffin. Detective
Todman saw Fraling run toward the back of a red pickup truck and
get underneath it. Detective Todman pulled Fraling out from
underneath the red pickup truck and arrested him. Fraling was
wearing blue Spiderman gloves. After Detective Todman retrieved
the gloves, he saw Fraling holding a set of keys. Detective Todman
seized the keys and placed them on the street next to the blue
gloves. One of the keys had an Acura logo on it. Detective Todman
saw a box containing shoes on the passenger seat of the Infiniti.
He also saw a handgun on the driver=s seat.
Officer Howard escorted Griffin back to where Detective Todman
was standing. Griffin was in handcuffs. One of the officers
seized $800 and three cell phones from Griffin.
A computer aided dispatch was admitted as Exhibit 21c. It
recorded that the arrests of Griffin and Fraling were made at
7:09 a.m., eleven minutes after the police dispatcher received the
911 call from Mr. Brantley=s mother.
5
C
Officer Howard testified that he saw Griffin=s feet Ahitting
the pavement@ as he got out of the Mercedes-Benz SUV. He observed
a second individual standing in front of the Mercedes-Benz SUV.
Officer Howard saw a black object in Griffin=s hand. It appeared to
match the description of the weapon described in the police
dispatch. Officer Howard identified himself as a police officer
and ordered the three males not to move. Griffin looked back at
Officer Howard and tossed the black object into the Mercedes-Benz.
It landed on the front seat. As the black object was tossed,
Officer Howard observed that it was a handgun. At the same time,
the three males ran off. Officer Howard pursued Griffin and the
third male who had been near the black Infiniti. At the end of the
block, the third male jumped over a fence and escaped. The male
who escaped was shorter than Griffin. Officer Howard pursued
Griffin and apprehended him. Griffin was wearing gloves when he
was handcuffed. He had a black and silver key in his hands.
Officer Howard identified the gloves that had been introduced
into evidence as the gloves worn by Griffin at the time of his
arrest. After Officer Howard returned to the Mercedes-Benz, he saw
a hand- gun on the front seat. At the police station, Officer
Howard saw Detective Todman remove $800 from Griffin=s left pants
pocket.
6
D
Rosemary Robinson testified that she was an officer with the
Baltimore City Police Department. On October 31, 2007, she
received a call at 7:03 a.m. that a carjacking had taken place at
4928 Litchfield Avenue. While en route to that address, she
received a broadcast that the stolen vehicles had been discovered
on Suffolk Avenue. When she arrived at that location, she looked
into the white Mercedes-Benz SUV and observed a handgun on the
driver=s side of the front seat. Officer Robinson unloaded the
weapon, took the magazine out, and removed the round that was in
the chamber. After doing so, she placed the handgun back on the
car seat, but not in the exact same position where she first saw
it.
E
Lissette Rivera testified that she worked for the Baltimore
City Police Department as a member of the Crime Lab Mobile Unit.
Her title was Crime Lab Tech 11. Her duties were to process crime
scenes for fingerprints and DNA.
On September 1, 2007, she processed the Mercedes-Benz SUV and
the Infiniti stolen from Mr. Brantley in the forensic lab at police
headquarters. She swabbed its steering wheel and its arm rests for
DNA. She also examined the surfaces of the Mercedes-Benz for
fingerprints. She did not recover any latent fingerprints.
7
In searching the Infiniti, she found a box of Air Jordan
shoes. She also swabbed it for DNA. She was able to lift a
fingerprint from the rear-view mirror of the Infiniti.
F
Camella Nuttroy testified that she was a crime scene
technician for the Baltimore City Police Department. On November
1, 2007, she processed the Acura Legend seized on October 31, 2007
on Suffolk Avenue at the Northwest District station garage. In
searching the Acura Legend, she found a set of Acura keys inside
the vehicle, and a pair of gloves on the front seat. She also
processed the vehicle for fingerprints and took DNA swabs. She
found 13 latent fingerprints on the exterior and interior of the
Acura Legend. She did not look for latent prints in the backseat
area.
G
Sean Dorr testified that he was a latent print examiner for
the Baltimore City Police Department. His duty was to analyze
fingerprint lift cards to determine whether they contained suitable
prints. If so, the latent fingerprints are entered into the
Automatic Fingerprint Identification System to compare its known
prints with the unknown latent prints. The witness found that some
of the latent fingerprints matched the known fingerprints of
Darrick Fraling. None of the latent prints matched Griffin=s known
fingerprints.
8
H
Christy L. Silbaugh testified that she was a crime lab
technician for the Baltimore City Police Department. On October
31, 2007, she responded to a crime scene at 2800 Suffolk Avenue.
There she photographed items at the crime scene after consulting
with the primary police officer. She photographed the Mercedes-
Benz SUV, a black Infiniti, and an unloaded handgun on the front
seat of the Mercedes-Benz SUV. She also photographed a black cap,
a pair of blue gloves, a black knit cap, and a pair of black
gloves. She photographed a single key at 2814 Suffolk Avenue. In
addition, she photographed a set of black gloves in front of the
Infiniti.
The witness was directed to go to Mr. Brantley’s residence at
4928 Litchfield Avenue. She did not attempt to locate latent
prints, or swab for DNA, because she had been told by the victim
and the primary police officer that the suspects were wearing
gloves.
II
A
Griffin testified in his own defense as follows: He admitted
on direct examination that he has been twice convicted of
possession of drugs with the intent to distribute them. On October
31, 2007, he left his house at 6:30 a.m. During that month he was
working at a house near Suffolk Avenue. He took the subway to the
9
Mondawmin subway station. He then walked up Reistertown Road and
turned left on Suffolk Avenue. There he saw three or four men. He
also observed a white minivan, a bronze Legend, and a black truck.
He recognized Fraling, and two men whose names were Ronnie and
Stefan. They were throwing objects out of vehicles, including cell
phones. Griffin asked Stefan – “what was going on.” Stefan told
Griffin he could have the cell phones. Griffin testified he picked
up the cell phones and a set of car keys from the street. When he
saw the police officers, he ran away. Griffin testified that he
always runs from the police. Griffin asserted that he was not
wearing gloves when he was apprehended.
Griffin denied participating in the armed robbery of
Mr. Brantley, stealing his money, or taking his keys, and any of
his vehicles. He also denied picking up a handgun or money.
Griffin testified that the money that he had in his pocket when he
was searched was part of the proceeds he received from an insurance
company as the result of injuries he received in a vehicle
accident.
B
Griffin also presented the testimony of three relatives as
part of his defense. His mother, Dorothy Lambert, testified that
she is a property manager for Westinghouse Real Estate. Her
company employed Griffin cleaning out houses and doing home
repairs. On October 31, 2007, Griffin telephoned her at around
10
6:00 a.m. She reminded him that his work site for that day was on
Hillsdale Avenue.
Griffin’s fourteen year old son testified that his father
awakened him at 6:00 a.m. on October 31, 2007. His father left for
work at about 6:30 a.m.
Griffin’s brother, Darrin, testified that in October of the
year 2007, the two of them were doing home improvement at a house
located at 2902 Hillsdale Avenue. He also stated that his brother
left home at 6:45 a.m. on October 31, 2007.
III
The jury returned its guilty verdict on July 18, 2007. On
July 23, 2008, the prosecutor sent a letter to Griffin’s trial
counsel which reads as follows:
Dear Mr. Bourgeios:
I am writing to advise you of information
which, upon review of my file, may not have
been included in discovery or mentioned at
trial. During a July 12, 2008 preparation
session with the victim in the above-
referenced case, Thomas Brantley, I asked Mr.
Brantley whether the perpetrators of the
October 31, 2007 carjacking were wearing
anything on their hands. Mr. Brantley’s
response was that he believed or thought that
they were wearing gloves. Mr. Brantley related
that he thought it possible that the gunman
was wearing weightlifter’s gloves, of the type
that often do not have fingers.
When shown a photograph of the gloves
recovered at the scene, Mr. Brantley stated
that the pair of brown/black gloves (which
were admitted at trial) looked like the ones
the gunman was wearing, but he was not sure
11
about the fingers. The victim was not certain
as to any of these details, with exception
that he believed the men were wearing gloves.
Please let me know if you have any questions.
Two days later, Griffin filed a motion for a new trial in
which he alleged,
[t]hat the information belatedly
disclosed in Government counsel’s letter
constituted exculpatory evidence that the
Government was required to disclose as
Brady material. “It also constituted
Giglio material once Mr. Brantley
testified from the stand that the gloves
recovered by Officer Howard looked like
the ones the gunman was wearing.”
Griffin requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The
District Court denied the motion on August 7, 2008, without
awaiting the Government’s response, in a “marginal order”. The
District Court did not provide any reasons for denying the motion
for a new trial, nor did it set forth any findings of fact or
conclusions of law. Griffin filed a timely notice of appeal on
September 12, 2008. This Court has jurisdiction over the
District Court’s final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
IV
A
Griffin first argues that we should vacate the District
Court’s order denying his motion for a new trial based on an
alleged Brady violation because it failed to make express findings
of fact and law to support its decision. Ordinarily, this Court
12
reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 54 (4th Cir.
1996); United States v. Cote, 293 F.3d 153, 163 (4th Cir. 2002).
“When faced with a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we review a
District Court’s factual findings for clear error; if, as here, no
findings exist, our review is plenary.” United States v. Ellis, 121
F.3d 908, 927 (4th Cir. 1997). Thus, under the law of this
Circuit, we are not compelled to vacate a trial court’s order
because it failed to make factual findings and set forth its legal
conclusions. Although it is the better practice for the district
court to provide its reasons for denial of a motion for a new
trial, under the law of this Circuit, we are not compelled to
vacate the court’s order because it failed to do so. Instead, we
must review the record independently to determine whether the
failure to disclose Mr. Brantley’s statement concerning the
possibility that the gloves worn by his assailant were fingerless
was material. 2
2 Griffin’s reliance on United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799
(4th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that a trial court must
support its conclusions in denying a motion for a new trial orally
or in a written opinion is misplaced. In Derrick, the trial court
wrote a lengthy opinion explaining its reasons for dismissing the
defendants’ indictments. Id. at 810. This Court vacated the trial
court’s order because “the District Court’s assertions of
intentional misconduct by the Government and its prosecutors are
simply unsupported by the records before the Court.” Id. at 835.
Contrary to Griffin’s assertion, this Court did not hold that it is
always incumbent for a trial court to set forth its conclusions in
dismissing an indictment. (Appellant’s Opening Br. 38) Instead,
this Court held that if a trial court writes an opinion, it must be
based on facts, and not “mere inference and innuendo.” Derrick,
163 F.3d at 810.
13
B
Griffin contends that the failure of the District Court to
hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial “impedes
plenary review”. He did not cite any authority to support this
contention. A trial court’s decision to deny an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 585 (6th Cir. 2009).
The motion was filed July 25, 2008, seven days after the jury
returned its verdict on July 18, 2008. The District Court issued
its order on August 7, 2008, thirteen days after the motion was
filed. The District Court heard the testimony of all the witnesses
and observed their demeanor while testifying. It also was aware of
the evidence that Griffin was apprehended eleven minutes after the
911 call was made. Griffin had the victim’s cell phones, car key,
and $800 in his pockets, and he was seen throwing a handgun into
the front seat of the Mercedes-Benz SUV.
The District Court also heard Griffin’s explanation of how he
gained possession of the victim’s property. Furthermore, it had
Griffin’s motion and the prosecutor’s letter regarding Mr.
Brantley’s statement before it when it ruled. Thus, the District
Court was in a position to determine whether the undisclosed
evidence was material. The District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Griffin’s motion for an evidentiary hearing.
In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due
14
process “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. “[T]he duty to disclose is
applicable even though there has been no request by the accused.”
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).
“There are three components of a true
Brady violation: The evidence at issue must
be favorable to the accused, either because it
is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;
that evidence must have been suppressed by the
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued.”
Id. at 281-82. This Court has paraphrased these elements as
follows: “[A] Brady violation has three essential elements:
(1) the evidence must be favorable to the accused; (2) it must have
been suppressed by the government either willfully or
inadvertently; and (3) the suppression must have been material,
i.e., it must have prejudiced the defense at trial.” Monroe v.
Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 299 (4th Cir. 2003).
The record shows, and the Government does not dispute, that
the undisclosed evidence was favorable to Griffin and relevant
because it had a tendency to show that Mr. Brantley “believed or
thought it was possible that the gunman was wearing weightlifter’s
gloves, of the type that often do not have fingers.” 3 It is also
3 “Relevant Evidence” is defined as follows in Rule 401 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Relevant evidence” means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
15
undisputed that the undisclosed evidence was known to the
prosecutor before trial, but was suppressed until after the jury
found Griffin guilty.
What is disputed by the parties is whether the suppressed
evidence was material. In Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004),
the Supreme Court held: “[T]he materiality standard for Brady
claims is met when the ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict’.” Id. at 698 (quoting Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). “In short, [a defendant]
must show a ‘reasonable probability of a different result’.” Id.
at 699.
In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), a prosecution
witness testified falsely. The prosecutor did not correct the
false evidence. Id. at 153. The Supreme Court held in Giglio that
“[a] new trial is required if ‘the false testimony could ... in any
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury’.”
Id. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)).
Griffin argues that this Court should apply the Giglio
reasonable likelihood standard in determining whether the failure
to disclose Mr. Brantley’s pre-trial statement to the prosecutor
would have affected the judgment of the jury. He argues that his
testimony “conveyed a false impression to the jury.” (Appellant’s
Opening Br. 36.)
probable or less probable than it would be without the
16
Mr. Brantley testified at trial that the man who robbed him at
gun point wore gloves. He was not asked for a description of the
gloves and gave none. His testimony was not false. It is
undisputed that Mr. Brantley’s assailant wore gloves. Griffin has
failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor knew that Mr. Brantley’s
testimony that his assailant wore gloves was false. Therefore, the
Giglio reasonable likelihood standard is inapplicable. For that
reason, we must reject Griffin’s argument that the burden shifted
to the Government to persuade this Court that the failure to
disclose Mr. Brantley’s pre-trial statement that it was possible
that his assailant’s gloves were fingerless was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. In applying the Brady reasonable probability
standard, we must determine whether we are persuaded by the
totality of the circumstances that the outcome of the trial would
have favored Griffin if evidence that Mr. Brantley was uncertain
about whether the taller male’s gloves were fingerless had been
presented to the jury.
We agree with Griffin that evidence that Mr. Brantley was
uncertain about the type of gloves worn by his assailant would have
been relevant to the question whether Griffin was the person who
robbed and assaulted Mr. Brantley.
Griffin’s counsel contends that “Fraling, who pled guilty, had
fingerprints throughout the Legend, but the other fingerprints
recovered from the car were not Griffin’s. The unidentified person
evidence.
17
who left those fingerprints likely was the gunman.” (Appellant’s
Opening Br. 22.) This argument ignores Mr. Brantley’s
uncontroverted testimony that the taller of the two masked males
pointed a gun at him and robbed him of the items that were found in
Griffin’s possession when he was arrested.
As summarized above, Mr. Brantley testified that he was
accosted by two masked males, each of whom wore gloves. The taller
male pointed a handgun at him and seized his key chain, three cell
phones, and twenty dollars. Mr. Brantley also handed the taller
male $800 that he had hidden in his closet.
Mr. Brantley saw the taller male drive away in the Mercedes-
Benz SUV. The shorter male stole Mr. Brantley’s Infiniti.
Eleven minutes after receiving the 911 call, reporting the
crimes committed against Mr. Brantley, Griffin was observed getting
out of Mr. Brantley’s Mercedes-Benz SUV. Another male was seen
standing near the black Infiniti. He was shorter than Griffin.
Fraling was observed walking toward the Mercedes-Benz SUV. Griffin
and the man standing next to the Infiniti ran when Officer Howard
ordered the three men not to move. The shorter male escaped. When
Officer Howard captured Griffin, he had the key to Mr. Brantley’s
Mercedes-Benz SUV, three cell phones, and $800 in his left front
pocket. He was also wearing gloves.
The evidence that Fraling did not leave the Acura getaway car
at the scene of the crimes committed against Mr. Brantley is
undisputed. Fraling also did not flee down the street when Officer
18
Howard ordered Griffin, Fraling, and the man standing next to the
Infiniti not to move. Instead, Fraling crawled under one of the
vehicles where he was subsequently recovered and arrested.
Griffin testified that he did not rob Mr. Brantley of his
Mercedes-Benz SUV, his money and his cell phones. Instead, as he
walked to work, he happened upon three or four men who appeared to
be engaged in looting property from some vehicles. One of these
men invited him to steal any of the items that were lying on the
street. Griffin testified that he found the key to the Mercedes-
Benz SUV and Mr. Brantley’s cell phones in the street. He also
told the jury that the money he had in his possession when he was
arrested did not come from robbing Mr. Brantley. He further
testified that he was not wearing gloves when he was arrested.
It has long been established that when a defendant testifies,
the trier of fact may consider his or her testimony in determining
whether it shows guilt if it finds that the testimony was false.
In Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896), the Supreme
Court instructed as follows:
“[T]here [cannot] be any question that if the
jury were satisfied, from the evidence, that
false statements in the case were made by
defendant, or on his behalf, at his
instigation, they had the right, not only to
take such statements into consideration, in
connection with all the other circumstances of
the case, in determining whether or not
defendant’s conduct had been satisfactorily
explained by him upon the theory of his
innocence, but also to regard false statements
in explanation or defense made or procured to
be made as in themselves tending to show
guilt.”
19
Id. at 620-21.
More recently, in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), the
Supreme Court held that a jury is “entitled to consider whatever it
concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of
guilt.” Id. at 296. In United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th
Cir. 1996), this Court stated: “Relating implausible, conflicting
tales to the jury can be rationally viewed as further
circumstantial evidence indicating guilt.” Id. at 867.
In this matter, the jury was aware that Griffin’s credibility
had been impeached by his admission that he had been convicted of a
felony. Furthermore, his implausible explanation of his
acquisition of Mr. Brantley’s property clearly contributed to the
finding of guilt.
Griffin also maintains that the fact that Mr. Brantley was not
sure whether the gloves worn by the taller male who robbed him at
gunpoint were fingerless “undermined or destroyed Brantley’s
supposed corroboration of Officer Howard in the credibility contest
between Griffin and Officer Howard.” (Appellant’s Opening Br. 28.)
Griffin is apparently referring to Officer Howard’s testimony that
Griffin was wearing gloves that were not fingerless when he was
arrested. Griffin testified that he was not wearing any gloves
when he was captured. The jury resolved this conflict in favor of
Officer Howard’s testimony. The fact that the gloves worn by
Griffin when was arrested were not fingerless does not demonstrate
that Officer Howard testified falsely. Instead, it demonstrates
20
that Mr. Brantley’s speculation that it was possible that the
gloves worn by the taller male were fingerless was erroneous. None
of Griffin’s remaining contentions demonstrate that the outcome of
the trial would have been different if Mr. Brantley’s uncertainty
about the type of gloves worn by his assailant had been disclosed
pretrial.
CONCLUSION
Griffin has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable
probability that pretrial disclosure of Mr. Brantley’s uncertainty
about the type of gloves worn by the person who robbed him would
have resulted in a finding of not guilty.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
21