Bolden v. Rushing , 407 F. App'x 693 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1731
KENNETH S. BOLDEN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
BRENT RUSHING; JAMES MATTHEWS CULBERTON; SIMPSONVILLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, City of,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:07-cv-02985-GRA)
Submitted: November 23, 2010 Decided: January 14, 2011
Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hemphill P. Pride, II, Columbia, South Carolina; Katherine
Freeman, KATHERINE FREEMAN, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellant. David L. Morrison, MORRISON LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth S. Bolden appeals the district court’s orders
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and denying his
motion to alter or amend judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006). Bolden asserts that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to Defendants on his claim that they
used excessive force when arresting him. * We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s adverse grant
of summary judgment and construe the facts in the light most
favorable to Bolden, the non-moving party. Rowzie v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment
is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986).
Claims of excessive force during arrest are governed
by the Fourth Amendment and are analyzed under an “objective
*
Bolden fails to brief, and has therefore abandoned, his
claims for negligent hiring and training, unlawful search,
seizure, and arrest, and a violation of his right to be free
from “hostile” and “brutal” treatment. See Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999); Canady v.
Crestar Mortg. Corp., 109 F.3d 969, 973-74 (4th Cir. 1997).
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reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388,
395-96, 399 (1989). “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long
recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory
stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of
physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 396.
Determining whether the force used was reasonable requires that
the court weigh “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Factors considered include “the severity of the crime
at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he [wa]s actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.“[T]he question is whether the officers’ actions are objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”
Id. at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396.
We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs
and agree with the district court that, when taken in the light
most favorable to Bolden, the facts do not establish that the
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force used in effecting his arrest was excessive. Bolden
actively and repeatedly resisted Defendants’ authority and their
efforts to arrest him; accordingly, a degree of force beyond
Defendants’ verbal commands and efforts to restrain Bolden’s
hands was necessary to effect the arrest. We further conclude
that Bolden’s assertions that the district court improperly
resolved an issue of material fact and implicitly determined
that his conviction in state court rendered Defendants’ conduct
objectively reasonable are without merit. Consequently, we
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendants and in denying Bolden’s motion
to alter or amend the judgment.
We therefore affirm the district court’s orders. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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