United States v. Mattocks , 408 F. App'x 717 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5171
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAMES ELLIS MATTOCKS, JR.,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan,
Chief District Judge. (4:09-cr-00017-FL-1)
Submitted: December 9, 2010 Decided: January 20, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jorgelina E. Araneda, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Ellis Mattocks, Jr., pled guilty pursuant to a
plea agreement to one count of manufacturing child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(a), (d) (West Supp. 2010)
(“manufacturing count”), and transportation of child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(1)
(West Supp. 2010) (“transportation count”), and was sentenced to
600 months in prison. Mattocks’ sole assertion on appeal is
that the magistrate judge’s failure to inform him that his
guilty plea could result in a “life sentence” because of the
possibility of consecutive sentencing renders his plea unknowing
and involuntary and violates his equal protection and due
process rights. * Finding no error, we affirm.
Because Mattocks did not raise this issue in the
district court and did not move to withdraw his guilty plea on
this basis, we review for plain error. See United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002); United States v. Massenburg, 564
F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining standard of review for
unpreserved Rule 11 error). To establish plain error, Mattocks
“must show: (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; and
*
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (2006) and United
States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 288 (4th Cir. 2003), the record
establishes that the magistrate judge was properly authorized to
conduct Mattocks’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing.
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(3) the error affects substantial rights.” Massenburg, 564 F.3d
at 342-43. To demonstrate impact on his substantial rights,
Mattocks must show that but for the alleged Rule 11 error, he
would not have pled guilty. See United States v. Martinez, 277
F.3d 517, 532 (4th Cir. 2002). Even if such error is found,
“[t]he decision to correct the error lies within [this court’s]
discretion, and [the court] exercise[s] that discretion only if
the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Massenburg, 564 F.3d at
343 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The standard for determining whether a guilty plea is
constitutionally valid is whether the plea “represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses
of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); see Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172,
190 (4th Cir. 2000). Such an evaluation requires the court to
examine “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
guilty plea.” Burket, 208 F.3d at 190. A defendant is bound by
the representations he made in the plea colloquy, unless he
presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See
Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 462 (4th Cir. 2003).
We hold that Mattocks cannot demonstrate any error,
plain or otherwise, nor has he established that his
constitutional rights were violated, when the magistrate judge
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accepted his plea as knowing and voluntary. Mattocks points to
no authority for the proposition that the magistrate judge erred
when he accepted his plea as knowing and voluntary, despite
failing to notify Mattocks that a consecutive sentence could be
imposed and result in a lengthy (or according to Mattocks,
“life”) sentence. In fact, Rule 11, which sets forth the
information about which a court must inform a criminal defendant
during the plea colloquy, requires, in relevant part, only that
the court “inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands, . . . any maximum possible penalty,
including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised release.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H).
The record amply demonstrates that the magistrate
judge complied with this provision, explicitly advising Mattocks
multiple times that he faced a statutory maximum sentence of
thirty years for the manufacturing count and twenty years for
the transportation count, and specifically questioning Mattocks
to ensure he understood the sentences he faced. Moreover, this
court has held explicitly that “Rule 11 . . . does not require a
district court to inform the defendant of . . . consecutive
sentencing.” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 395 (4th
Cir. 2002). Although Mattocks attempts to distinguish this
court’s holding in General because, according to Mattocks, that
case did not “deal[] with a life sentence,” merely because
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Mattocks’ fifty-year sentence may result in him being
incarcerated for the remainder of his life does not render his
sentence “life imprisonment,” which carries with it a distinct
meaning. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1368 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining life sentence as “[a] sentence that imprisons the
convicted criminal for life”).
Accordingly, we reject Mattocks’ argument that his
plea was unknowing and involuntary and affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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