Ray v. Amelia County Sheriff's Office , 302 F. App'x 209 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-2051
LINDA RAY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
AMELIA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; JIMMY E. WEAVER,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-1425
LINDA RAY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
AMELIA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; JIMMY E. WEAVER,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:06-cv-00834-REP)
Submitted: October 27, 2008 Decided: December 9, 2008
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Linda Ray, Appellant Pro Se. John Adrian Gibney, Jr., THOMPSON &
MCMULLAN, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
-2-
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Linda Ray appeals the
following orders by the district court: the August 22, 2007, order
dismissing Ray’s claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000); the August 22, 2007, order
denying her motion to compel discovery; the November 15, 2007,
order denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint; and the
March 21, 2008, order granting summary judgment as to her
constitutional claims. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand.
I. Dismissal of ADEA claim
Ray first argues that the district court erred in
dismissing her ADEA claim for failure to state a claim, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal. See
Sec’y of State for Defense v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d
700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). An employment discrimination claim need
not include specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but “instead must
contain only ‘a short and plaint statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
A plaintiff’s statement of her claim “need only give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
-3-
it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007)
(citations and internal quotes omitted). “Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level” and have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. __,
__, __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 1974 (2007). “[W]hen ruling on a
defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson, 127
S. Ct. at 2200 (citations omitted). In particular, a pro se
complaint must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The district court erred in dismissing Ray’s ADEA claim
based upon its finding that her own complaint produced a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the defendants’
termination of her employment that rebutted her prima facie case,
while failing to demonstrate that the reasons stated in her own
complaint were a pretext for discrimination. Ray was not required
to plead specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination in her complaint, let alone to plead facts showing
that the non-discriminatory reason for termination suggested by her
own complaint was pretextual. Ray was required only to state her
claim so as to give the defendants fair notice of its nature and
-4-
the grounds upon which it rests, with enough factual allegations to
state a claim to relief that is plausible, not merely speculative.
Ray alleges in her complaint that she is a member of a
protected class (she is forty-five years old), she suffered an
adverse employment action (her employment was terminated), and she
was replaced by a substantially younger employee who is less
qualified for the position than Ray. Ray states several possible
reasons for the termination of her employment that are related to
her age: Sheriff Jimmy E. Weaver’s desire to have younger-looking
employees at the front of the Amelia County Sheriff’s Office;
Weaver’s desire to hire a replacement who was less familiar with
official policies and procedures; and a problem with Ray’s desire
to utilize her accrued annual leave benefits. Taken together,
these allegations provide the defendants with fair notice of the
nature of her claim and the grounds upon which it rests, and state
a claim to relief that is plausible, not merely speculative.
Although Ray’s complaint indicates that there were other ostensible
reasons why her employment was terminated, the inclusion of those
stated reasons in her complaint does not establish at the pleadings
stage that she is not entitled to relief on her stated
discrimination claim. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (“Given
that the prima facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary
standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid pleading
standard for discrimination cases”). Accordingly, we vacate the
-5-
district court’s August 22, 2007, order dismissing Ray’s ADEA claim
and remand for further proceedings.
II. Discovery
Ray next argues that the district court erred in denying
as moot her motion to compel discovery.
We review the denial of a request for discovery for an
abuse of discretion. Conner v. United States, 434 F.3d 676, 680
(4th Cir. 2006); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302
F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002). “An abuse of discretion may be
found where ‘denial of discovery has caused substantial
prejudice.’” Nicholas v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537, 542
(4th Cir. 2004) (quoting M & M Med. Supplies & Serv., Inc. v.
Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., 981 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1992)).
In her motion to compel discovery, Ray sought an order
requiring the defendants to answer unspecified discovery requests
over their objection that her requests were late. The district
court denied her motion to compel as moot after dismissing her ADEA
claim for failure to state a claim. In light of our decision to
vacate the dismissal of Ray’s ADEA claim, we also vacate the order
denying Ray’s motion to compel discovery.
III. Motion to Amend Complaint
Ray next argues that the district court erred in denying
her motion for leave to amend her amended complaint after
dismissing her ADEA claim. The district court denied Ray’s motion
-6-
based upon its finding that there appeared to be “no basis upon
which to permit the amendment,” without further explanation.
A district court’s denial of a motion to amend the
complaint is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Glaser v. Enzo
Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 2006).
Title VII creates a federal cause of action for
employment discrimination. Davis v. North Carolina Dep’t of Corr.,
48 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 1995). However, before a district court
can assume jurisdiction over a Title VII claim, the claimant must
have exhausted the administrative procedures contained in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b), which requires an investigation and determination by
the EEOC as to whether “reasonable cause” exists to believe that
the charge of discrimination is valid. Id. at 137. Action by the
EEOC is a “predicate for litigation based on the federal statute,”
as a complaint cannot be brought before a district court until the
EEOC has determined the validity of the claim. Id. at 137-38
(internal quotation marks, citation omitted). A “right-to-sue”
letter, issued by the EEOC, is “essential to initiation of a
private Title VII suit in federal court.” Id.; see also Smith v.
First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000) (before
bringing suit under Title VII, plaintiff must first exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC).
The EEOC’s right-to-sue letter covers only Ray’s ADEA
claim, and it does not appear that she submitted the facts
-7-
underlying her Equal Pay Act claim in her complaint to the EEOC.
Because Ray did not exhaust her administrative remedies regarding
this claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying her leave to amend her complaint to include it.
Ray did submit her retaliation claim to the EEOC,
claiming that her employment was terminated in retaliation for the
grievance she filed with Weaver after she was reprimanded for using
a County vehicle. However, Ray’s grievance did not challenge “the
disciplinary action taken against [Ray], but the violation of
Policy and Procedures that were followed in doing so and the direct
violation of [Amelia County’s] Travel Policy.” Because Ray’s
grievance did not concern an alleged violation of the ADEA or other
employment discrimination laws, only an alleged violation of local
administrative policies and procedures, she was not engaged in a
protected activity, and therefore did not state a retaliation claim
in her complaint to the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);
Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Services, 181 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir.
1999) (protected activity involves opposing, or participating in a
grievance proceeding concerning, employment practices made unlawful
by Title VII or the ADEA). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of
Ray’s motion for leave to amend her complaint.
IV. Constitutional Claims
Finally, Ray argues that the district court erred in
adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and
-8-
granting summary judgment as to her constitutional claims. We have
reviewed the record and affirm this aspect of the district court’s
judgment for the reasons cited by the district court and the
magistrate judge. (See Ray v. Amelia County Sheriff’s Office, E.D.
Va., case no. 3:06-cv-00834-REP, March 21, 2008, order).
For the reasons stated above, we vacate the district
court’s August 22, 2007, orders; affirm the district court’s
November 15, 2007, and March 21, 2008, orders; and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We deny
Ray’s motions for preparation of transcripts at government expense.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED
-9-