Colony Insurance Company v. Charles Peterson , 582 F. App'x 156 ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-1033
    COLONY INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    CHARLES A. PETERSON; EVERGREEN COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY, LLC;
    RANDOLPH BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    v.
    EDWARD L. CLAYTON, JR.; HPB INSURANCE GROUP INCORPORATED,
    Third Party Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.   William L. Osteen,
    Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:10-cv-00581-WO-LPA)
    Argued:   May 15, 2014                    Decided:   August 25, 2014
    Before KING, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the majority
    opinion, in which Judge King joined.      Judge Floyd wrote a
    dissenting opinion.
    ARGUED: Reid C. Adams, Jr., WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE,
    LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.    Patrick
    Michael Kane, SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP, Greensboro, North
    Carolina; James W. Bryan, NEXSEN PRUET, PLLC, Greensboro, North
    Carolina; Stephen G. Teague, TEAGUE, ROTENSTREICH, STANALAND,
    FOX & HOLT, PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON
    BRIEF: James R. Morgan, Jr., Jonathan R. Reich, WOMBLE CARLYLE
    SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
    Appellant.    M. Jay Devaney, NEXSEN PRUET, PLLC, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellee Randolph Bank and Trust Company.
    Manning A. Connors, SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD LLP, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellees Evergreen Composite Technology,
    LLC   and  Charles   A.  Peterson.     Lyn  K.   Broom,  TEAGUE,
    ROTENSTREICH, STANALAND, FOX & HOLT, PLLC, Greensboro, North
    Carolina, for Appellees Edward L. Clayton, Jr. and HPB Insurance
    Group, Incorporated.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    WYNN, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiff Colony Insurance Company (“Colony”) appeals from
    a final judgment entered upon a jury verdict awarding $2,369,000
    to   Defendants     Charles          A.   Peterson       (“Peterson”),         Evergreen
    Composite Technology, LLC (“Evergreen”), and Randolph Bank and
    Trust Company (“Randolph Bank”) (collectively “Defendants”) on
    their insurance claim.           The jury found that Colony waived its
    right     to   rescind    a     commercial        property         policy     issued      to
    Defendants and was estopped from denying coverage for loss after
    a fire damaged a building covered by the policy.                              On appeal,
    Colony contends that the district court erred in denying its
    motion for judgment as a matter of law.                    For the reasons below,
    we affirm.
    I.
    In    reviewing     the    denial      of    a    motion      for    judgment   as   a
    matter of law, we must view and recite the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the non-movants.                    Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods.,
    Inc., 
    335 F.3d 325
    , 331 (4th Cir. 2003).
    Effective      March      16,    2010,      Colony,      a    Virginia    insurance
    company, issued a commercial property policy insuring a 95,000-
    square-foot     vacant      building        located      at       501    Hamilton    Road,
    Montezuma,     Georgia    (“the       501    building”).            The    policy    named
    Evergreen,      a   Georgia          corporation        headquartered         in     North
    3
    Carolina, and its owner, Peterson, a North Carolina resident, as
    the insured.       The policy also listed Randolph Bank, a community
    bank in Randolph County, North Carolina, as a mortgage holder
    and loss payee under the policy.                   The policy provided coverage
    limits of up to $1 million for the 501 building and $3.5 million
    for the business-related personal property on the site.
    Peterson had obtained loans from Randolph Bank to launch
    Evergreen, which manufactured composite wood products used in
    residential decking, fencing, and railings.                       As collateral for
    its   loans,    Randolph     Bank      held    a    deed   of    trust      on    the   501
    property    and    perfected      a    security      interest     in    the      equipment
    located    there.      By    late      2009,       Evergreen     had    suspended       its
    operations and was in default on its loans from Randolph Bank.
    In February 2010, a fire, caused by arson, damaged a nearby
    building    also     owned     by       Evergreen       (“the      261      building”).
    Thereafter, upon learning that the insurance on both buildings
    had lapsed, Randolph Bank engaged third-party defendant Edward
    Clayton    (“Clayton”),      an       insurance      agent      with    HPB      Insurance
    Group, to assist in obtaining insurance coverage for the 501
    building.      The policy issued by Colony insured the 501 building
    against, among other things, risk of loss caused by fire.                                To
    mitigate    this     risk,     the      policy       contained         an   endorsement
    requiring certain fire protective safeguards.
    4
    Specifically,       the    fire    protective        safeguards          endorsement
    required      Evergreen     and     Peterson         to     maintain       an     automatic
    sprinkler system, fire extinguishers, and functioning utilities
    at the 501 building.            The fire protective safeguards endorsement
    stated that Colony would “not pay for loss or damage caused by
    or resulting from fire if, prior to the fire,” the named insured
    “[f]ailed to maintain any protective safeguard . . . in complete
    working    order”     or   “[k]new       of   any    suspension,          malfunction      or
    impairment in any protective safeguard” and failed to notify
    Colony.    J.A. 114.
    On the same day that Colony issued the policy, it retained
    an   independent      vendor,     Safety      Resources,         to     inspect     the   501
    building.       Colony      charged       Defendants        a     $250     non-refundable
    inspection     fee,    which      was    separate         from    the     $18,000    policy
    premium.      According to the policy, the inspection “relate[d]
    only to insurability and the premiums to be charged.”                             J.A. 75.
    The inspection provided Colony “the chance to independently look
    at the risk that it [was] insuring.”                      J.A. 454.        By paying the
    $250   fee,    Defendants        expected         Colony    “to       notify     [them]    if
    problems were identified by the inspection” so that they could
    remedy them.     J.A. 1376.
    Safety Resources inspected the 501 building on April 13,
    2010   and    prepared      a    written      report,       which        noted    that    the
    utilities for the 501 building were off and that there was no
    5
    heat.   This contradicted information provided to Colony during
    the insurance application process.                  Specifically, Clayton had
    submitted   a    “Specialty    Property       Vacant       Supplement”           form    that
    indicated that the power and heat would remain on at the 501
    building during vacancy.            Colony received the inspection report
    on April 21, 2010, but the underwriter at Colony did not review
    the report until June 18, 2010.               Nevertheless, Colony issued a
    mortgagee   endorsement       on    April     22,    2010,       and    a    loss       payee
    endorsement on May 6, 2010, both with retroactive effect as of
    March 16, 2010, and naming Randolph Bank as a mortgagee and loss
    payee on the policy.
    On May 18, 2010, a fire damaged the 501 building and its
    contents.         Firefighters       discovered           that    the        two     valves
    controlling the sprinkler system had been turned off.                              Evidence
    at the scene indicated that the valves had likely been “tampered
    with and vandalized.”        J.A. 761.
    Colony subsequently denied coverage for the loss and sought
    a declaratory judgment regarding its indemnity obligations under
    the policy.       Colony argued that material misrepresentations on
    the   insurance    application       rendered       the    policy      void      and    that
    breach of the fire protective safeguards endorsement precluded
    coverage.       Defendants    counterclaimed         for      breach        of   contract.
    Evergreen   and    Peterson        also   asserted        a   cross-claim           against
    6
    Randolph Bank and filed a third-party complaint against Clayton
    and HPB Insurance Group.
    All    parties       sought     summary      judgment,    which   the     district
    court denied.          Regarding Colony’s claims, the district court
    held that genuine issues existed “as to whether the doctrines of
    waiver/estoppel        prevent       Colony    from   contesting       coverage   under
    the [p]olicy.”         J.A. 355.         Accordingly, the case proceeded to
    trial.
    At    trial,     Defendants       introduced      deposition      testimony    by
    Roseanne Gauthier, the senior underwriter at Colony responsible
    for determining whether the conditions of insurance for the 501
    building were met.           In her testimony, Gauthier acknowledged that
    she   received       the    inspection       report   from     Safety   Resources    on
    April 21, 2010, but that she “just did not get to the inspection
    by the time the loss occurred.”                     J.A. 1051.        Gauthier stated
    that had she reviewed the inspection report when she received
    it,   she    would    have        “immediately”      taken   steps     to   cancel   the
    policy.      J.A. 1053.
    Defendants           also     presented       evidence     of     other     Colony
    underwriting files in which discrepancies appeared between some
    of the representations made on insurance applications and the
    conditions revealed by Colony’s inspections.                          Regarding those
    files,      Colony    did     not     seek    to    rescind,     and    policyholders
    remedied the conditions or paid higher premiums.
    7
    At   the    conclusion           of    the     evidence,          Colony     moved    for
    judgment as a matter of law.                  The district court took the motion
    under advisement and allowed the case to go to the jury.                                     The
    jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants, finding that
    although a material misrepresentation appeared on the insurance
    application       and   that        a    condition          of     the     fire     protective
    safeguards endorsement requiring functioning utilities to remain
    on had been breached, Colony had nonetheless waived its right to
    rescind     the    policy     and       was   estopped           from    denying     coverage.
    Further,     the     jury     determined            that        Randolph     Bank    was     not
    responsible for the misrepresentation on the application.                                    The
    jury   awarded      Defendants          $2,369,000         on    their     counterclaim      for
    coverage under the policy, and the court awarded pre-judgment
    interest.
    On December 3, 2012, the district court denied Colony’s
    motion for judgment as a matter of law and subsequently entered
    final judgment in favor of Defendants.                          This appeal followed.
    II.
    Colony argues that the district court erred in denying its
    motion for judgment as a matter of law.                           “We review de novo the
    grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law[,]”
    Anderson    v.     Russell,    
    247 F.3d 125
    ,    129    (4th     Cir.    2001),    to
    determine whether “a reasonable jury would not have a legally
    8
    sufficient     evidentiary       basis    to    find   for    the    [non-moving]
    party[.]”     Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). 1          “If, viewing the facts in
    the   light   most    favorable     to    the   non-moving    party,      there   is
    sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found in [the
    non-moving party’s] favor, we are constrained to affirm the jury
    verdict.”     Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    240 F.3d 255
    , 259 (4th
    Cir. 2001).
    We note that North Carolina law governs our analysis of
    this diversity case.            See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 64
    , 78 (1938).       Thus, we first look to see if the Supreme Court
    of North Carolina has spoken on this issue; if not, we must
    predict how that court would rule on it.                   Twin City Fire Ins.
    Co. v. Ben Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co. of S.C., 
    433 F.3d 365
    ,
    369   (4th    Cir.   2005). 2      In    forming   that    prediction,      we    may
    consider     opinions   from     the    North   Carolina     Court   of    Appeals,
    teachings of treatises, and practices of other states.                    
    Id. 1 Colony
    did not pursue any post-verdict motions under Rule
    50(b) or Rule 59.    As a result, Colony may not challenge the
    sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.
    Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., 
    679 F.3d 146
    , 154-55 (4th Cir. 2012).
    2
    Unlike other states within our circuit, there is no
    mechanism for certifying questions to the Supreme Court of North
    Carolina.   See SunTrust Bank, N.A. v. Macky, 
    669 F.3d 177
    , 182
    n.* (4th Cir. 2012).
    9
    A.
    Colony contends that the district court should have granted
    judgment as a matter of law because the jury determined that
    Peterson or Evergreen breached the fire protective safeguards
    endorsement.         Colony     asserts            that     maintaining     functioning
    utilities,     as    required      by        the     fire     protective     safeguards
    endorsement, was a condition of coverage immune to waiver, and
    that the district court therefore erred in denying judgment as a
    matter of law.
    Under North Carolina law, an insurer may waive “a provision
    or   condition      in   an   insurance        policy       which    is    for   its    own
    benefit.”    Brandon v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    271 S.E.2d 380
    , 383 (N.C. 1980).         North Carolina courts have long held that
    the breach of any condition in [an insurance] policy,
    as against an increase of risk or by keeping of
    certain hazardous goods . . . or, indeed, the
    violation of any of the conditions of the policy, may
    be waived by the insurer; and a waiver may be implied
    from the acts and conduct of the insurer after
    knowledge that such conditions have been broken.
    Blue Bird Cab Co. v. Am. Fid. & Cas. Co., 
    15 S.E.2d 295
    , 301
    (N.C. 1941) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
    Similarly,    an    insurer    may      be    estopped       from    denying     coverage
    under an insurance policy.               Estoppel arises if the insurer’s
    “actions     or     silence     when         [it]         ought     to    have    spoken,
    intentionally       or   through     culpable        negligence,         induce[s]     [the
    insured] to believe . . . coverage exist[s]” and the insured
    10
    relies upon such belief to his or her detriment.                             United States
    Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Country Club of Johnston Cnty., Inc., 
    458 S.E.2d 734
    , 740 (N.C. App. 1995).
    The Supreme Court of North Carolina has not spoken directly
    on the precise issue in this matter, but the decisions of that
    state’s       second    highest       court,      the   North        Carolina     Court      of
    Appeals, provide us with guidance.                    See Twin City Fire Ins. 
    Co., 433 F.3d at 369
    .      In    that   regard,         we    find     Durham    v.   Cox
    particularly illuminating.             
    310 S.E.2d 371
    (N.C. App. 1984).
    In Durham, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined
    that material issues of fact existed as to whether the defendant
    insurance      company       waived    its   right      to    deny    coverage       under    a
    homeowner’s policy for loss following a 
    fire. 310 S.E.2d at 376-77
    .         The    policy      stated      that     “[t]his       coverage       excludes
    structures used in whole or part for business purposes.”                              
    Id. at 373.
       In breach of this provision, the insured plaintiff used
    the    building,       a     garage,    in     connection          with     his   furniture
    upholstery business, but asserted that such use was known to the
    insurer,      resulting       in   waiver.        
    Id. at 373-74.
        The     insurer
    argued that the policy exclusion was a “matter of coverage” that
    could not be expanded by waiver or estoppel as a matter of law.
    
    Id. at 374.
    On appeal from summary judgment in favor of the insurer,
    the North Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned that waiver and
    11
    estoppel “properly apply” to the business use exclusion “since
    the property itself, an appurtenant structure, and the risk,
    loss due to fire, [were] already within the coverage of the
    policy.”     
    Durham, 310 S.E.2d at 376
    .        Thus, the risk of loss to
    the covered property due to fire was an “accepted risk” subject
    to    forfeiture,   rather   than   an    “excepted     risk”   immune    from
    waiver:
    The distinction between an accepted risk to be
    defeated by conditions set forth in the policy and an
    excepted risk is clear, and it is logical to hold that
    it takes a new contract to cover an excepted risk. By
    way of illustration: A. has a plantation on which
    there are 10 buildings.   All are covered by a policy
    of insurance, but the policy provides that, in case A.
    shall store certain inflammable materials in any of
    the houses, then the insurance on that building shall
    instantly cease. That is an assumed risk, which will
    be void upon a condition subsequent.        B. has a
    plantation upon which there are 10 buildings; 9 of
    them are covered by a policy of insurance.    Building
    No. 10 is excluded from the policy.     It is entirely
    logical to hold that it takes a new contract to
    include insurance on B.’s No. 10, but not on A.’s No.
    10.
    
    Id. (citation omitted);
    accord United States Fid. & Guar. 
    Co., 458 S.E.2d at 739
    .
    Applying   this   distinction      between     accepted   and   excepted
    risk, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that using
    the garage for business purposes did not create an entirely new
    risk.     Rather, such use “enhance[d] a risk already assumed by
    the   insurer”—namely,    the   risk     of   fire   destroying   a    covered
    structure.     
    Durham, 310 S.E.2d at 376
    .            Moreover, observed the
    12
    court, “conditions regarding permissible or prohibited uses to
    which the property may be put are clearly inserted in the policy
    for the benefit of the insurer and therefore may properly be
    waived     by   it    or    its   authorized        agent.”    
    Id. at 376-77.
    Accordingly, the court held that the insurer could waive the
    policy provision excluding coverage for business use.                       
    Id. at 377.
    Turning to the facts at issue here, the relevant part of
    the fire protective safeguards endorsement states:
    A. The following is added to the COMMERCIAL PROPERTY
    CONDITIONS:
    PROTECTIVE SAFEGUARDS
    1. As a condition of this insurance, you are
    required   to  maintain   the   protective devices  or
    services listed in the [s]chedule above.
    J.A. 113.         The protective safeguards schedule specifies that
    “ALL   UTILITIES       MUST   REMAIN   ON     AND    FUNCTIONING.”     J.A.      113.
    Further,    the      fire   protective   safeguards      endorsement      adds    the
    following language to the exclusions section of the policy:
    We will not pay for loss or damage caused                     by    or
    resulting from fire if, prior to the fire, you:
    1.  Knew of any suspension, malfunction or
    impairment in any protective safeguard listed in the
    [s]chedule above and failed to notify [Colony] of that
    fact;
    2.  Failed to maintain any protective safeguard
    listed in the [s]chedule above in complete working
    order[.]
    J.A. 114.
    13
    There      is   no    dispute      that      the    policy    issued     by     Colony
    expressly insured the 501 building against the risk of loss due
    to fire.      As such, the loss that occurred was contemplated by
    the parties and encompassed by the policy.                              See 
    Durham, 310 S.E.2d at 376
    (broadly viewing the risk of loss to property by
    fire as covered, notwithstanding a business use exclusion).                                 By
    requiring Defendants to maintain functioning utilities, the fire
    protective safeguards endorsement limited Colony’s exposure to
    risk it had already “accepted”—namely, risk of loss to the 501
    building posed by fire.            
    Id. Consequently, we
       agree      with       the    district      court       that
    “applying the doctrines of waiver/estoppel to the conditions at
    issue in this case would not expand the [p]olicy to cover risks
    not currently contemplated by that agreement–i.e., that fire may
    destroy    the    subject        property.”        J.A.      323.       Accordingly,       the
    district court did not err by submitting the issues of waiver
    and   estoppel        to   the    jury.       And       Colony’s    arguments        to    the
    contrary are unavailing.
    Colony also argues that, under United Capitol Ins. Co. v.
    Kapiloff,     waiver       did    not    apply     as    a     matter    of   law    because
    insufficient time had passed between Colony’s receipt of the
    inspection report and the fire.                 Again, we disagree.
    First and foremost, Kapiloff, on which Colony’s argument
    heavily     relies,        required      us   to     apply       Maryland,     not    North
    14
    Carolina, law.         
    155 F.3d 488
    (4th Cir. 1998).                  “No one doubts
    that a federal court called upon to adjudicate a state law claim
    in the diversity jurisdiction must apply the relevant state law
    in determining the substantive rights and duties of the parties
    . . . .”        Auer v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 
    830 F.2d 535
    ,
    537 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc).              Here, that relevant state law is
    North Carolina’s. 3
    Turning,        then,   to   North    Carolina         law,    “[w]aiver    by   an
    insurer    of    a    forfeiture        provision      in    an     insurance    policy
    requires   (1)       ‘knowledge    on    the    part    of    the    insurer    of    the
    pertinent facts,’. . . , and (2)‘conduct thereafter inconsistent
    with an intention to enforce the condition’. . . .”                            Mabry v.
    Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    422 S.E.2d 332
    , 334 (N.C. App.
    1992) (quoting Gouldin v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 
    102 S.E.2d 846
    ,
    849 (N.C. 1958)).         “When the evidence is sufficient to justify,
    but not require, a finding of waiver on the part of the insurer,
    then the issue of waiver is one to be determined by the jury.”
    
    Id. (citing Gouldin,
    102 S.E.2d at 851 (because the evidence of
    3
    The dissenting opinion, too, focuses on Kapiloff.
    Undoubtedly, that opinion includes some broad statements and few
    citations, as the dissent notes.     Those stylistic choices do
    not, however, change the fact that “[t]here is no federal
    general common law[,]” 
    Erie, 304 U.S. at 78
    , and that North
    Carolina law governs this dispute.
    15
    waiver was “susceptible of diverse inferences, it is improper
    for     the   presiding        judge     to        give    the      jury    a     peremptory
    instruction”); and 
    Brandon, 271 S.E.2d at 385
    (noting that “the
    evidence in this case is sufficient to permit, but not compel, a
    jury to find that defendant, by words or conduct, waived the
    requirement of proofs of loss [and] [t]he defendant’s evidence
    does not, as a matter of law, compel a contrary conclusion” and
    thus    “hold[ing]      that      the   issue       of     waiver    should       have   been
    submitted to the jury”)).
    Here, sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to
    determine that Colony had “‘knowledge . . . of the pertinent
    facts.’”      
    Mabry, 422 S.E.2d at 334
    (quoting 
    Gouldin, 102 S.E.2d at 849
    ).      The inspection paid for by Defendants and conducted by
    Colony’s independent vendor revealed that the utilities were off
    at the 501 building, in contravention of the fire protective
    safeguards endorsement.               Colony received this information from
    Safety Resources on April 21, 2010, approximately four weeks
    before    the   May    18,     2010     fire.        And    in   North      Carolina,     “an
    insurance company is presumed to be cognizant of data in the
    official files of the company[.]”                   
    Gouldin, 102 S.E.2d at 849
    .
    Further, sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury
    to     determine      that     Colony     engaged          in    “‘conduct       thereafter
    inconsistent       with      an   intention         to    enforce     the       condition.’”
    
    Mabry, 422 S.E.2d at 334
    (quoting 
    Gouldin, 102 S.E.2d at 849
    ).
    16
    Although Colony knew for weeks that the utilities were off, it
    neither informed Defendants of the violation nor took steps to
    cancel the policy.            See Faircloth v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 
    117 S.E.2d 404
    , 408-09 (N.C. 1960) (“Equitably, if [the insurer] did
    not desire to carry the risk longer, because of the [breach of
    the   policy     conditions],        it    ought,   in     fair    dealing,     to    have
    returned       the   unearned       premium,      and    rescinded       the   insurance
    contract, so that plaintiff could have known he no longer was
    protected thereby and would have been afforded an opportunity to
    obtain    a    new   policy    from       another   agent.”).           Instead,   Colony
    confirmed coverage by issuing a mortgagee endorsement on April
    22, 2010, and a loss payee endorsement on May 6, 2010, naming
    Randolph Bank as a mortgagee and loss payee on the policy. 4
    Moreover,         testimony     by     Colony’s       underwriter,        Roseanne
    Gauthier, contradicts Colony’s assertion that the time period
    between       receipt    of   the    inspection         report    and    the   fire   was
    inadequate to permit a finding of waiver.                         Gauthier testified
    4
    The dissent cites Nelson v. Hartford Underwriters Ins.
    Co., 
    630 S.E.2d 221
    (N.C. App. 2006), for the notion that “only
    a few weeks” provides an insurer with little time to affirm or
    deny coverage.    
    Id. at 233.
       Notably, however, at issue in
    Nelson was whether the insurer’s failure to make a coverage
    determination   within  nineteen   days  of   receiving  a   re-
    investigation report of a previously-denied claim constituted an
    unfair and deceptive trade practice. 
    Id. The facts
    and issues
    in play in Nelson have little in common with, and shed little
    light on, those before us here.
    17
    that if she had reviewed the inspection report on April 21,
    2010, when she received it, she would have “immediately” taken
    steps to cancel the policy.           J.A. 1053.
    North   Carolina’s     highest       court   has   underscored      that
    forfeiture      “is   not   imposed   as   a   penalty   for   making   a   false
    statement, which the insurer may invoke at his pleasure at any
    time, regardless of its own antecedent conduct.                It is based on
    the principle that the insurer has been misled to its damage.”
    Hicks v. Home Sec. Life Ins. Co., 
    39 S.E.2d 914
    , 916 (N.C.
    1946).      Crucially, however, an insurer “is not misled when it
    knows the facts; and when that knowledge exists or is acquired,
    it becomes the right and the duty of the insurer” to act.                     
    Id. at 916-17.
         And a failure to do so “will operate as a waiver.”
    
    Id. 5 Based
    on the proffered evidence and the pertinent North
    Carolina law, a reasonable jury could determine that Colony was
    not misled because it knew the facts, and that Colony had the
    right and the duty to act but failed to do so.                 Accordingly, we
    must agree with the district court that we “cannot say that the
    5
    We concern ourselves neither with homogenizing state laws
    for fear that insurance companies will otherwise need to
    “operate drastically differently across state lines” nor with
    “the day-to-day realities of the business.”         Post at 32.
    Instead, we stick to our business, which is using North Carolina
    substantive law to decide the issues presented by this appeal.
    18
    27 days between the time Colony received the inspection report
    and the fire was insufficient, as a matter of law, for Colony to
    take action on the inspection as provided—especially in light of
    testimony      that       had     the     inspection      been        reviewed,         immediate
    action would have occurred.”                      J.A. 323.           The district court
    therefore properly submitted the waiver issue to the jury and
    did not err in instructing the jury that it could find waiver.
    And “we are constrained to affirm the jury verdict.”                                    
    Lack, 240 F.3d at 259
    .
    In sum, we conclude, based on North Carolina law, that the
    fire   protective          safeguards          endorsement      set     forth     in     Colony’s
    policy    is     a   provision          of     forfeiture       subject     to     waiver      and
    estoppel, that the issue was properly submitted to the jury, and
    that there existed “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
    have     found       in     [Defendants’]             favor,     [such      that]        we    are
    constrained to affirm the jury verdict.”                        
    Lack, 240 F.3d at 259
    .
    B.
    Next, Colony contends that it is entitled to judgment as a
    matter    of   law        because    the       jury    determined       that      there    was   a
    material       misrepresentation                on      the     insurance          application
    regarding      whether       heat        and    power    would        be   on     at     the   501
    building.        Although         Colony        correctly       notes      that    a     material
    misrepresentation            on     an       insurance        application         may     forfeit
    19
    coverage, see Gore v. Assurance Co. of Am., 
    704 S.E.2d 6
    , 12
    (N.C. App. 2010), waiver and estoppel may overcome a material
    misrepresentation, and such a question is for a jury to resolve.
    See, e.g., Cullen v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., 
    589 S.E.2d 423
    ,
    428 (N.C. App. 2003).       Accordingly, the district court did not
    err in allowing the jury to decide whether Colony had waived its
    right     to     rescind    the     policy,     notwithstanding        the
    misrepresentation on the application. 6
    III.
    We   have   reviewed   and   summarily   reject   all   of   Colony’s
    arguments.     The judgment of the district court is therefore
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    Not least given our resolution of the issues above, we
    reject Colony’s arguments as regards Randolph Bank, including
    Randolph Bank’s status as an innocent mortgagee.
    20
    FLOYD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    I agree with the majority that prolonged inaction by an
    insurer can amount to a waiver of rights under an insurance
    policy if the insurer has received notice of a breach of a
    requirement and takes no steps to notify the insured of the
    breach within a reasonable time.                 However, in this case, and as
    a matter of law, Colony could not be said to have waived the
    endorsement provision of the insurance policy on account of its
    inaction during the twenty-seven days between its receipt of the
    inspection    report     on    April 21,        2010,       and   the    burning    of   the
    501 building on May 18, 2010.                   Accordingly, I think that the
    district court erred by submitting to the jury Issues 4 and 5
    regarding    waiver      and    estoppel    in        the    first      instance,   and    I
    therefore would reverse the district court’s denial of Colony’s
    Rule 50(a) motion and respectfully dissent to the majority’s
    contrary conclusion.           I would also remand this case for trial on
    the sole issue of whether Randolph Bank had knowledge that the
    utilities were off and failed to notify Colony pursuant to the
    policy.
    I.
    It has long been the law in North Carolina that “[u]pon
    being    informed   of    [a    breach],        [an    insurer]         should   within   a
    reasonable time . . . notif[y] the insured of its determination
    21
    to cancel the policy[.]”          Horton v. Home Ins. Co., 
    29 S.E. 944
    ,
    946 (N.C. 1898) (emphasis added); see also Dailey v. Integon
    Gen. Ins. Corp., 
    331 S.E.2d 148
    , 154–55 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)
    (insurer’s responsiveness assessed for reasonableness).                   It is
    also well established that “time . . . may be so short or so
    long   that   the   court    will    declare   it    to   be    reasonable    or
    unreasonable as a matter of law.”              Claus-Shear Co. v. E. Lee
    Hardware House, 
    53 S.E. 433
    , 434 (N.C. 1906).                  Although Claus-
    Shear Co. was a contractual dispute pertaining to the delivery
    of goods, the principle regarding temporal reasonableness as a
    matter of law has been applied widely by North Carolina courts.
    See, e.g., Harris v. Lamar Co., 
    563 S.E.2d 642
    , 
    2002 WL 1013571
    ,
    at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. May 21, 2002) (unpublished table decision)
    (opinion by Wynn, J.) (quoting the above text from Claus-Shear
    Co. in a property case presenting the question of whether a
    billboard should be considered “abandoned”).                   Thus, I see no
    reason to limit its import in this case.
    The North Carolina Supreme Court has not spoken regarding
    what time period is reasonable for an insurer to receive an
    inspection    report   and   to   process   that    report     and   notify   the
    insured of any deficient conditions or breaches.                 Therefore, we
    must look to secondary indicia to try to predict how the North
    Carolina Supreme Court would rule in such a case, including,
    inter alia, opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals
    22
    and the practices of other states.                       Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v.
    Ben Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co. of S.C., 
    433 F.3d 365
    , 369 (4th
    Cir.    2005).       As    between        these    two    secondary      sources,        North
    Carolina’s       “intermediate        appellate      court       decisions       constitute
    the    next   best    indicia        of    what    state    law    is,      although     such
    decisions may be disregarded if the federal court is convinced
    by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state
    would   decide     otherwise.”            Liberty    Mut.       Ins.   Co.    v.   Triangle
    Indus.,   Inc.,      
    957 F.2d 1153
    ,    1156       (4th   Cir.   1992)       (citation
    omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).                           For the reasons
    that follow, both North Carolina appellate decisions and the
    practices of other states, together and separately, yield the
    conclusion     that,       as   a    matter   of    law,    Colony       could     not    have
    waived the endorsement provision of the insurance policy.
    A.   North Carolina Law
    As the majority notes, waiver requires “(1) knowledge on
    the part of the insurer of the pertinent facts” and “(2) conduct
    thereafter       inconsistent         with     an    intention         to    enforce      the
    condition which leads the insured to believe that he is still
    protected by the policy.”                  Mabry v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
    Co., 
    422 S.E.2d 332
    , 334 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).                      As to the first criterion,
    the majority claims that Colony had knowledge of the utilities
    23
    being      off        at   the    501     building     simply       by    virtue       of    Colony’s
    receipt of the inspection report on April 21, 2010.                                          See ante
    at 17 (citing Gouldin v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 
    102 S.E.2d 846
    ,
    849    (N.C.          1958)      (“[A]n    insurance       company        is    presumed       to    be
    cognizant of data in the official files of the company, received
    in    formal          dealing      with     the   insured.” 1)).               But    surely,       the
    majority does not mean to extract from Gouldin the notion that
    an insurer has no time whatsoever after receiving an inspection
    report          to    process      that    report      and    run    it    up        the    corporate
    flagpole             to    be    reviewed    by      the     appropriate         personnel          and
    decision-makers.                  Indeed,     North        Carolina’s          appellate       courts
    appear to recognize that some time period is necessary between
    receipt of information and action on that information.
    For example, in Nelson v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance
    Co.,       an    insurer         received    an   inspection         report          regarding      the
    condition            of    the    insured    property        on   July 17,           2002,    but    on
    August 5, 2002—nineteen days later and “before [the insurer] had
    made its determination of whether the . . . claim was covered by
    the policy”—“plaintiffs’ counsel sent [to the insurer] a letter
    directing it to have no further contact with plaintiffs[.]”                                         630
    1
    I note that                Colony did not receive the inspection report
    from Peterson and                Evergreen (the insured), but rather from an
    independent third                 party (Safety Resources).     Nonetheless, I
    assume, argudendo,               that this difference is immaterial here.
    
    24 S.E.2d 221
    , 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).               Plaintiffs then sued the
    insurer     for   failing    to   affirm     or    deny     coverage   “within    a
    reasonable time.”      
    Id. In holding
    that the insurer did not act
    unreasonably for not having responded to plaintiffs on or before
    August 5, the court noted that “[t]he report . . . was provided
    to   [the   insurer]   only   a   few   weeks      before    [the   insurer]     was
    warned not to have any contact with plaintiffs, providing little
    time for [the insurer] to determine whether it should cover a
    claim it had previously denied.”             
    Id. Although nineteen
    days is
    fewer than twenty-seven days, the court’s use of “only a few
    weeks” (emphasis added), and the description of nineteen days as
    “little time,” certainly indicates that the insurer would have
    been allowed additional time to respond. 2                See also Meadlock v.
    Am. Family Life Assurance Co., 
    729 S.E.2d 127
    , 
    2012 WL 2891079
    ,
    at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. July 17, 2012) (unpublished table decision)
    (in light of a lack of evidence or authority to the contrary,
    2
    The majority attempts to discount Nelson by splitting the
    finest of hairs based on the facts, see ante at 18 n.4, but
    provides no case-to-case analyses of its own for its cited
    cases.   Rather, the majority opinion is long on statements of
    law and instances in which waiver was found, see 
    id. at 16,
    but
    devoid of application of that law and the facts of the cited
    cases to the facts here.        Absent guidance from the North
    Carolina Supreme Court as to what time period is “reasonable”
    for an insurer to respond under these circumstances, and absent
    a case with more similar facts and arriving at an alternative
    outcome, Nelson actually provides an excellent analogy from
    which much can be gleaned. Any other characterization of Nelson
    is, quite simply, disingenuous.
    25
    insurer’s delay of four months was not unreasonable); cf. N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(3)(a.) (“Suit may not be instituted
    against the insurer in less than 60 days from the posting of the
    first notice of the injury or accident to the insurer[.]”).
    As to the second waiver criterion, the majority asserts
    that    Colony’s    inaction      during    the    twenty-seven     days   after
    receiving the inspection report provides the requisite evidence
    of conduct that is “inconsistent with an intention to enforce
    the condition,” 
    Mabry, 422 S.E.2d at 334
    .              But this argument is
    built upon the false premise that Colony had “knowledge” of the
    condition    in    the   first   instance.        Neither    the   majority    nor
    Peterson    and    Evergreen     dispute    the   accuracy    or   execution    of
    Colony’s internal review procedure upon receipt of an inspection
    report.     Specifically, Colony describes, at pages 18–19 of its
    brief, its internal review procedure as follows:
    The initial review [by an assistant underwriter] is
    simply to determine if the inspector has made any
    recommendations, and to direct the underwriter’s
    attention to those recommendations.   It [is] not the
    underwriting assistant’s responsibility to compare the
    inspection results against the conditions of coverage,
    or to confirm that all conditions of coverage had been
    met. . . . [T]he underwriting assistant . . . reviewed
    the ‘recommendations’ portion of the Inspection report
    on April 21, 2010, and then passed them on to the
    underwriter . . . . The ‘Recommendations Section’ of
    the report . . . said nothing about the utilities in
    the 501 building.
    (Paragraph break omitted.)
    26
    In view of the above-described (and uncontested) practice
    at Colony, the majority’s argument that waiver must be found
    because       Colony’s   underwriter      testified       that   she    would    have
    “immediately” taken steps to cancel the policy had she reviewed
    the pertinent part of the inspection report is a red herring.
    In essence, the relevant portion of the inspection report had
    not    been    reviewed,   and    thus,    Colony     cannot     be    imputed   with
    knowledge of the information contained in the “recommendations”
    section of the report until the appropriate personnel—Colony’s
    underwriter—had reviewed that section.                    Moreover, neither the
    majority      nor   Peterson    and   Evergreen      argue   that      the    internal
    review procedures at Colony are unreasonable and/or out of the
    ordinary for the insurance business, and to hold that knowledge
    was imputed on April 21, 2010, simply because Colony’s assistant
    underwriter reviewed the inspection report would be to impute
    knowledge on any individual at Colony who handled the report.
    In sum, notwithstanding the majority’s statements of pure
    law, when North Carolina law—most pertinently Nelson—is applied
    to    the   facts   of   this    case,    it   is   unquestionable       that    North
    Carolina’s appellate decisions counsel in favor of providing to
    insurance      companies   a     grace    period    for    processing        documents
    during which waiver cannot be found as a matter of law.
    27
    B.   Practices of Other States
    When looking to the practices of other states, my principal
    reason   for     positing     that      Colony     could       not   have    waived   the
    endorsement provision is this Court’s ruling in United Capitol
    Insurance Co. v. Kapiloff, 
    155 F.3d 488
    (4th Cir. 1998).                               In
    Kapiloff, this Court held that an insurer was not considered to
    have waived a condition/requirement of building occupancy that
    the   insured    failed      to    meet   prior     to     a    fire   destroying     the
    subject property, even though the insurer had knowledge of the
    insured’s noncompliance via a property inspection and did not
    inform the insured about the inspection results.                             
    Id. at 497.
    Specifically, the building inspection took place in January and
    the losses occurred in February and March of the same year.                           The
    insurer, however, did not deny coverage to the insured until
    December    of   that    year.          
    Id. at 491.
            In    holding   that   the
    occupancy    requirement          was   not    waived,     this      Court   stated   the
    following:
    [T]he amount of time it took for [the insurer] to
    determine that the [insured’s] properties were not in
    compliance with the policy would not, as a matter of
    law, be long enough in any event to constitute a
    waiver of any right under the policy. . . . In making
    coverage decisions, an insurance company must be
    entitled to a sufficient time to collect the facts,
    evaluate them, and make legal determinations with
    respect to those facts.   These activities require not
    only field work but also an internal evaluation with a
    review by appropriate personnel. The one or two months
    urged by the [the insured] as supporting the finding
    of waiver or estoppel would hardly provide an
    28
    insurance company with adequate time to make this kind
    of a decision, particularly when its liability for a
    wrongful decision could expose it to the risk of bad
    faith.
    
    Id. at 497.
    As noted above, the fire at the 501 building occurred just
    twenty-seven days after Colony received the inspection report.
    That amount of time is shorter than the lower end of the at
    least “one or two months” contemplated in Kapiloff, during which
    an insurer is permitted to timely process information regarding
    the conditions of an insured property.         Nonetheless, Peterson,
    Evergreen, and the majority assert that such a grace period does
    not apply to Colony merely because Kapiloff is a Maryland case.
    In the absence of more on-point case law from North Carolina,
    however, Kapiloff provides strong and logical guidance, given
    its factual similarity to this case.
    Kapiloff was indeed a case arising out of the District of
    Maryland   and   applying   Maryland   law   based    upon   jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), but the relevant portion of the
    opinion is in no way Maryland-specific.              In the entirety of
    Part V of the Kapiloff opinion, which discusses the grace period
    before waiver occurs, this Court cited to Maryland law in three
    different instances.    First, this Court cited A/C Electric Co.
    v. Aetna Insurance Co., 
    247 A.2d 708
    , 713 (Md. Ct. App. 1968),
    and McFarland v. Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 93
    
    29 A.2d 551
    , 554 (Md. 1953), for the proposition that “an insurance
    company may waive a condition of its policy by its conduct when
    it induces an honest belief that the condition is not required,
    when    the    insured       is   duly     misled,       and    when   no      extension        of
    coverage results from the waiver.”                       
    Kapiloff, 155 F.3d at 497
    .
    North    Carolina       follows      a     similar       scheme.         See     Brendle        v.
    Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 
    332 S.E.2d 515
    , 518 (N.C. Ct. App.
    1985) (“An insurer may be found to have waived a provision or
    condition in an insurance policy which is for its own benefit.
    Implied       waiver    occurs       when       the    insurer     acts     in       a    manner
    inconsistent with an intention to enforce strict compliance of
    the contested provision, and the insured is naturally led to
    believe       that     the   right        has    been    intentionally           given      up.”
    (citations       omitted)).          Second,          this     Court   cited        Prudential
    Insurance Co. v. Brookman, 
    175 A. 838
    , 840 (Md. Ct. App. 1934),
    for the proposition that “waiver or estoppel may occur only when
    it does not create new coverage; an extension of coverage may
    only be created by a new contract.”                      
    Kapiloff, 155 F.3d at 497
    .
    Again,    North       Carolina      follows      the     same    rule.         See       Gore   v.
    Assurance Co. of Am., 
    704 S.E.2d 6
    , 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (“In
    North Carolina, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel are not
    available to broaden the coverage of a policy so as to protect
    the    insured       against      risks    not       included    therein       or    expressly
    30
    excluded from coverage.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    Finally—and most relevant here, as it immediately precedes
    the above block quote from Kapiloff—this Court cited Monumental
    Life Insurance Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 
    617 A.2d 1163
    , 1181 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993), for the proposition that
    “an   insurance    company        that   denies       coverage       or   rescinds    the
    policy in bad faith risks liability for that action.”                          
    Kapiloff, 155 F.3d at 497
    .         Once again, North Carolina adheres to a nearly
    identical rule.      See Robinson v. N.C. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 
    356 S.E.2d 392
    , 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (vacating summary judgment
    for the defendant insurer and stating, “An insurance company is
    expected     to    deal     fairly       and     in      good        faith     with   its
    policyholders. . . . Th[e] evidence is sufficient to establish a
    tortious    bad    faith    refusal      to     settle      in   a    timely    manner.”
    (paragraph break omitted)); see also Thomas v. Ray, 
    317 S.E.2d 53
    ,   57   (N.C.   Ct.     App.    1984)      (“We    are    aware     that    insurance
    companies have wrongfully denied coverage in some cases in which
    bad faith or careless business practices might reasonably be
    imputed to them.”).         In sum, nothing about the relevant portion
    of our decision in Kapiloff is unique to Maryland law; quite the
    opposite, North Carolina has the same guidelines to resolve the
    same types of issues, and thus this Court should ipso facto
    reach the same result.
    31
    Kapiloff, rather than announcing a Maryland-specific rule,
    provides a much-needed yardstick for assessing reasonableness in
    a factual scenario identical to the one at play here.                         It is
    curious, given their rejection of Kapiloff’s at least “one or
    two   months”   time    period,    that     Peterson      and   Evergreen   do    not
    advocate for any standard of their own regarding what amount of
    time would have been reasonable for Colony to respond; on the
    contrary, they simply contend that North Carolina does not have
    a hard-and-fast sixty-day rule.                Similarly, while not disputing
    that reasonableness is the sine qua non of whether Colony waived
    the endorsement provision, the majority does not put forth any
    amount of time that it believes would be reasonable for Colony
    to    process   the    information    and      send    notice   to   Peterson    and
    Evergreen, nor does the majority cite any authority for the idea
    that twenty-seven days is, as a matter of law, unreasonable and
    that an insurer should necessarily process information in a more
    timely fashion.
    By casting aside the rule from Kapiloff—and thus ignoring
    one of the two criteria that we should consider when trying to
    predict how the North Carolina Supreme court would rule in this
    case—the    majority     appears     to   think       that   insurance   companies
    operate    drastically      differently          across      state   lines,      thus
    ignoring the day-to-day realities of the business and the fact
    that North Carolina, like Maryland, also holds insurers liable
    32
    for wrongfully denying coverage or rescinding a policy in bad
    faith.     Compare Monumental Life Ins. 
    Co., 617 A.2d at 1181
    , with
    
    Robinson, 356 S.E.2d at 395
    ,   and   
    Thomas, 317 S.E.2d at 57
    .
    Given that Kapiloff is directly on point and is a published
    decision of this Court, and that there is not any North Carolina
    authority to the contrary to even suggest that twenty-seven days
    is an unreasonable time to respond (but there is authority to
    suggest that twenty-seven days is not unreasonable, see 
    Nelson, 630 S.E.2d at 233
    ), I would follow Kapiloff’s guidance and logic
    in this case.         Accordingly, I do not think that Colony was
    required     to    have   notified     Peterson    and     Evergreen    that     the
    utilities were off at the time that the 501 building burned.
    C.
    Peterson and Evergreen also contend that Colony should not
    be permitted to avail itself to a grace period because, at other
    times, Colony acted more quickly—at times on the same day—to
    contact     policyholders          after    receiving      inspection      reports.
    Specifically, Peterson and Evergreen included in their brief a
    table showing that Colony had, at other times, responded in a
    more timely fashion following receipt of an inspection report.
    Among these examples is an instance from 2009 in which Colony’s
    underwriter       reviewed    an     inspection    report     and   took     action
    twenty-two    days    after    the    assistant    underwriter      received     the
    33
    report.      Based on Peterson and Evergreen’s implication that this
    time    period      was    reasonable,       Peterson         and     Evergreen          would
    apparently draw the reasonableness line somewhere between day
    twenty-two and day twenty-seven.                      Perhaps at day twenty-four.
    Or   maybe    day   twenty-six,       thus   leaving         Colony      on   the    outside
    looking in by just twenty-four hours.
    The problem with this approach is readily evident: if we
    were   to    use    a     company’s    own       prior      response      times      as    the
    benchmark for what is reasonable, companies might begin dragging
    their feet in responding to reports to establish a record of
    slower response times, thus creating an environment in which
    prolonged     delays      become    the     new       business    norm—and         are    even
    encouraged—due to the fear of future litigation.                               This would
    have the opposite effect of ensuring that insurance companies
    provide timely notice to policyholders of defects or breaches.
    II.
    The majority did not reach the issue of whether Randolph
    Bank   can    recover      from    Colony    because        it    held    that      Colony’s
    purported     waiver      trumps    any   alleged        knowledge       of    a    material
    misrepresentation.           But    because       I    do   not     think     that    Colony
    waived its rights, as explained above, I would reach the merits
    of Colony’s defenses to Randolph Bank’s counterclaims.
    34
    There are two possible ways for Randolph Bank to recover
    payments/benefits under the policy: as Peterson and Evergreen’s
    loss payee or as mortgagee of the 501 building.                             As a loss
    payee,    however,    Randolph       Bank     stands   in    the     same    shoes   as
    Peterson and Evergreen and its rights are coterminous with those
    of Peterson and Evergreen; thus any successful defense by Colony
    against Peterson and Evergreen also works as against Randolph
    Bank.     See Wells Fargo Equip. & Fin., Inc. v. State Farm Fire &
    Cas. Co., 
    805 F. Supp. 2d 213
    , 218–19 (E.D. Va. 2011) (citing
    Sydincate Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 
    65 F. 165
    , 173 (8th Cir. 1894)),
    aff’d, 494 F. App’x 394 (4th Cir. 2012).                    Because Colony has a
    successful defense against Peterson and Evergreen pursuant to
    Kapiloff, Randolph Bank is precluded from recovery under the
    loss-payee theory.
    Colony further argues that Randolph Bank cannot recover as
    an innocent mortgagee of the 501 building because Randolph Bank
    is   responsible      for,    and/or    had     knowledge      of,    Peterson       and
    Evergreen’s      noncompliance         with     the    endorsement          provision.
    Colony     advances    two    theories.          First,      Colony    claims       that
    Clayton—whom     Randolph     Bank     engaged    to    procure      the    policy—was
    Randolph    Bank’s    agent.        Colony     reasons      that   because    Clayton
    filled    out   the   insurance      application       containing      the    material
    misrepresentations regarding the status of the utilities, those
    misrepresentations      can    be    imputed     to    Randolph       Bank    and    the
    35
    policy is void as to Randolph Bank.                     See In re McCrary, 
    435 S.E.2d 359
    , 364 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (“Under [the relevant state
    statute], an insurer may avoid the policy if the insured makes a
    representation which is both (1) false and (2) material; the
    misrepresentation need not be fraudulent.” (emphasis deleted)).
    Although sound in principle, this argument by Colony fails in
    light   of   the       jury’s      finding     that    Randolph      Bank    was    not
    responsible for the representations made in the application for
    insurance.    Insofar as Colony failed to file a Rule 50(b) motion
    after   trial,    it      cannot   now   challenge      the    sufficiency     of    the
    evidence and the jury’s findings; thus, the agency theory fails.
    Second, Colony argues that Randolph Bank itself had actual
    knowledge    of     the    misrepresentations          in    the   application      for
    insurance    that      substantially     increased       the    risk    of   loss    but
    never informed Colony of that knowledge.                    The jury passed on the
    question of whether Randolph had actual knowledge based on its
    conclusion    that      Colony     had   waived       and/or   was     estopped     from
    rescinding the endorsement provision.                       The policy states, in
    relevant part, as follows:
    If we [Colony] deny your [Peterson and Evergreen]
    claim because of your acts or because you have failed
    to comply with the terms of this Coverage Part, the
    mortgageholder [Randolph Bank] will still have the
    right to receive loss payment if the mortgageholder:
    . . . (3) has notified us of any change in ownership,
    occupancy or substantial change in risk known to the
    mortgageholder.
    36
    Randolph         Bank    and      Colony   have     a    material       factual       dispute
    regarding communications between Peterson and representatives of
    Randolph Bank as to whether Randolph Bank had knowledge that the
    utilities at the 501 building were off. 3                       In particular, Colony
    claims      that       Randolph    Bank    was   told,    via       telephone,     that     the
    utilities were off at the 501 building; Randolph Bank, on the
    other hand, claims that it specifically required that a letter
    be sent to it confirming the state of the utilities at the 501
    building and that it never received such letter.                               Because the
    jury       did    not    reach     this    issue,   and    because          this   issue     is
    determinative of whether Colony must pay benefits to Randolph
    Bank, I would remand the case for trial on the sole issue of
    whether Randolph Bank had knowledge that the utilities were off
    and failed to notify Colony pursuant to the policy.
    III.
    For       the    reasons     set    forth    above,      I    would    reverse       the
    district         court’s    denial    of    Colony’s     Rule       50(a)    motion    as    to
    waiver      of    the    endorsement       provision     and    remand       the   case     for
    trial as to whether Randolph Bank had knowledge that utilities
    3
    Randolph Bank does not appear to contend that the
    utilities being off constitutes a “substantial change in risk”
    for purposes of the policy, but argues only that it did not have
    any such knowledge.
    37
    at the 501 building were off.        Therefore, I very respectfully
    dissent.
    38
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-1033

Citation Numbers: 582 F. App'x 156

Filed Date: 8/25/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023

Authorities (27)

lisa-l-ocheltree-v-scollon-productions-incorporated-lawyers-committee , 335 F.3d 325 ( 2003 )

united-capitol-insurance-company-v-bernard-kapiloff-lynn-kapiloff-v , 155 F.3d 488 ( 1998 )

twin-city-fire-insurance-company-hartford-casualty-insurance-company-v-ben , 433 F.3d 365 ( 2005 )

william-douglas-auer-v-kawasaki-motors-corp-usa-and-kawasaki-heavy , 830 F.2d 535 ( 1987 )

A/C Electric Co. v. Aetna Insurance , 251 Md. 410 ( 1968 )

christopher-lack-and-susan-willis-v-wal-mart-stores-incorporated-a , 240 F.3d 255 ( 2001 )

Monumental Life Insurance v. United States Fidelity & ... , 94 Md. App. 505 ( 1993 )

Faircloth v. OHIO FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY , 253 N.C. 522 ( 1960 )

Gouldin Ex Rel. Wiley v. Inter-Ocean Insurance , 248 N.C. 161 ( 1958 )

Brandon v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance , 301 N.C. 366 ( 1980 )

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Brookman , 167 Md. 616 ( 1934 )

Cab Co. v. . Casualty Co. , 219 N.C. 788 ( 1941 )

Claus v. . Lee , 140 N.C. 552 ( 1906 )

Horton v. . Insurance Co. , 122 N.C. 498 ( 1898 )

Dailey v. Integon General Ins. Corp. , 75 N.C. App. 387 ( 1985 )

Robinson v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Insurance Co. , 86 N.C. App. 44 ( 1987 )

Matter of McCrary , 112 N.C. App. 161 ( 1993 )

Cullen v. Valley Forge Life Insurance , 161 N.C. App. 570 ( 2003 )

Brendle v. Shenandoah Life Insurance , 76 N.C. App. 271 ( 1985 )

Hicks v. . Insurance Co. , 226 N.C. 614 ( 1946 )

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