United States v. Darrell Harris , 593 F. App'x 189 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4295
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARRELL LAMONT HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00116-REP-1)
Submitted: November 25, 2014 Decided: December 2, 2014
Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L.
Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Valencia D. Roberts, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Olivia L. Norman,
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Darrell Lamont Harris of interference
with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(2012) (Hobbs Act robbery). On appeal, Harris contends that the
district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of
acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, because the Government
presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.
Finding no error, we affirm.
We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of
evidence and a district court’s denial of a motion for a
judgment of acquittal under Rule 29. United States v. Alerre,
430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005). “The jury’s verdict must be
upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record
to support it, where substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 175
(4th Cir. 2014) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating whether substantial evidence supports a
conviction, we must “view[] the evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the Government.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
To obtain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, the
Government must prove “(1) the underlying robbery or extortion
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crime, and (2) an effect on interstate commerce.” United States
v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917, 922 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2689 (2014). The Hobbs
Act defines robbery as “the unlawful taking or obtaining of
personal property from the person . . . by means of actual or
threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, . . . to his
person or property . . . at the time of the taking or
obtaining.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). Harris concedes that the
Government presented sufficient evidence that a robbery occurred
and that the perpetrator violated the Hobbs Act. He argues,
however, that the Government presented insufficient evidence to
permit the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he
committed the robbery. Specifically, Harris contends that (1)
the eyewitness identifications were unreliable; (2) the evidence
of a BB gun recovered from his girlfriend’s residence did not
clearly link him to the crime; and (3) blue latex gloves
recovered from his girlfriend’s residence, allegedly matching
gloves worn by the robber, are so commonplace that they do not
support the conviction.
It is well settled that “the identification of a
criminal actor by one person is itself evidence sufficient to go
to the jury and support a guilty verdict.” United States v.
Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 274 (4th Cir. 1974). Here, two
eyewitnesses selected Harris from a photographic lineup and
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positively identified Harris during their in-court testimony.
Although not contesting the admissibility of testimony regarding
the identifications, Harris contends that the circumstances
surrounding the photographic lineup identifications were so
suggestive that the eyewitness identifications were insufficient
to establish his identity as the robber. “In the absence of a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,
[eyewitness identification] evidence is for the jury to weigh.”
Fowler v. Joyner, 753 F.3d 446, 454 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). In determining the
likelihood of misidentification, the factors a court should
consider include:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at
the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of
attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior
description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and
the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
Here, both eyewitnesses had ample opportunity to view
the robber. Although the robber wore a mask during the robbery,
one of the eyewitnesses observed the robber before he pulled the
mask over his face and the other eyewitness observed
distinguishing facial features through cutouts in the mask.
Further, both eyewitnesses provided an accurate description of
the robber, in line with the descriptions provided by other
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eyewitnesses and generally matching a description of Harris.
Additionally, both eyewitnesses testified that they were certain
Harris was the robber. The testimony of Harris’s alleged
coconspirator placed Harris at the scene of the robbery.
Finally, although Harris’s federal trial occurred two years
after the robbery, both eyewitnesses picked Harris out of a
lineup within two days of the robbery and confronted Harris in
state court proceedings within months of the robbery. Thus,
under the Biggers factors, the eyewitness identification did not
produce a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.”
Any weakness in the eyewitness identifications were
ones for the jury to weigh when determining whether Harris was
the robber. The contentions Harris advances regarding the BB
gun and the latex gloves do not undermine the overall
sufficiency of the Government’s evidence. See United States v.
Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir. 2010) (observing where some
evidence provided jury with sufficient basis to conclude
defendant was perpetrator, alleged weaknesses in other evidence
tying defendant to offense cannot sustain insufficiency of
evidence claim). Thus, the district court did not err in
denying Harris’s Rule 29 motion.
Accordingly, we affirm Harris’s conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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