United States v. Michael Taylor , 644 F. App'x 227 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6971
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY TAYLOR,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:08-hc-02009-BR)
Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: April 8, 2016
Before WILKINSON and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Joseph Bart
Gilbert, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Jennifer D. Dannels, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Anthony Taylor appeals from the district court’s
order revoking his conditional release and remanding him to the
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246
(2012). On appeal, Taylor contends that the court erred in
finding that he violated the terms of his conditional release
due to an arrest for driving under the influence when he was not
adjudicated guilty of that offense. He also maintains that the
court should not have revoked his conditional release after he
mailed threatening letters. Finally, Taylor alleges that his
original civil commitment was improper because his due process
rights were violated during the original criminal investigation.
Finding no error, we affirm.
When, as here, a district court is asked to revoke an
individual’s conditional release granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246(e), it must hold a hearing to
determine whether the [individual in question] should
be remanded to a suitable facility on the ground that,
in light of his failure to comply with the prescribed
regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care
or treatment, his continued release would create a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or
serious damage to property of another.
18 U.S.C. § 4246(f). Accordingly, a district court may revoke
conditional release upon two findings: “that the individual
failed to comply with his treatment regimen and that his
continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily
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injury to another.” United States v. Mitchell, 709 F.3d 436,
443 (5th Cir. 2013).
Generally, a district court’s findings of fact under 18
U.S.C. § 4246(f), including an individual’s risk to other
persons or property, are reviewed for clear error. See United
States v. Woods, 995 F.2d 894, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992) (indicating
similar standard in review of denial of unconditional release).
Although the district court’s explanation of its reasoning was
brief, we conclude that Taylor’s admission that he wrote and
mailed threatening letters, in addition to the information
submitted with the Government’s revocation motion, adequately
supported the conclusion that Taylor’s continued release posed a
substantial risk to other persons or property. See Mitchell,
709 F.3d at 443 (considering probation officer’s report attached
to government’s motion for revocation of conditional release
when determining whether district court’s factual findings were
clearly erroneous). Taylor’s mental health records indicated
that he had a history of violence, and had a previous arrest for
being “under the influence of a controlled substance.”
Taylor’s significant threat to others was clearly exhibited
by his willingness to engage in noncompliant behavior, such as
consuming alcohol, and mailing threatening letters to various
individuals and law enforcement. See United States v. Sahhar,
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917 F.2d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A] finding of
‘substantial risk’ under section 4246 may be based on any
activity that evinces a genuine possibility of future harm to
persons or property.”); see also United States v. Williams, 299
F.3d 673, 677-78 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding of substantial risk
supported by evidence of delusions and refusal to participate in
mental health assessment); United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966,
970 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding actual violent conduct, threatening
letters, history of drug abuse, weapons possession, and failure
to take prescribed medication supported finding of probable
dangerousness).
Although Taylor claims on appeal for the first time that
there was insufficient evidence of his use of alcohol because he
was arrested, but not convicted, for driving under the
influence, this claim fails. There was sufficient evidence to
conclude that Taylor had used alcohol without a conviction for
driving under the influence. Thus, there is no clear error in
the court’s finding of a violation of a release condition.
Finally, Taylor contends that his original commitment order
was invalid because it resulted from an arrest and indictment
based on an affidavit containing false information and
misrepresentation of the law. Taylor did not raise these issues
at the revocation hearing. Further, he had an opportunity to
challenge the initial commitment on a direct appeal. Therefore,
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these issues are not before us on this appeal from revocation of
conditional release.
We therefore conclude that there was no reversible error in
the revocation of Taylor’s conditional release and affirm the
district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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