Denise Shipman v. UPS , 581 F. App'x 185 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2501
DENISE SHIPMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:12-cv-00589-F)
Submitted: June 30, 2014 Decided: August 5, 2014
Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sandra J. Polin, LAW OFFICE OF SANDRA J. POLIN, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Charles A. Gartland, II, ALSTON &
BIRD, LLP, Washington, DC; Molly M. Jones, ALSTON & BIRD, LLP,
Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Denise Shipman appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to her former employer, the United
Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), on her claims of race, gender, and
age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2012), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (2012). The district
court also granted summary judgment to UPS on Shipman’s claims
that UPS retaliated against her and fostered a hostile work
environment. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir.
2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is
a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district
court should grant summary judgment unless a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence
presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice,
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nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the
nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
First, Shipman contests the district court’s
determination that she failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies with respect to her claims of retaliation and hostile
work environment. However, because Shipman’s charge filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) described
only a single act of age, race, and sex discrimination, we
conclude that the district court was correct. See Jones v.
Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2009);
Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2005).
Also without merit is Shipman’s suggestion that the
district court erred in finding her claims of discriminatory
treatment untimely to the extent they were based on disciplinary
terminations Shipman experienced in March and August 2011.
Shipman’s reliance on the continuing violation theory is
misplaced because her disparate treatment claims depended on
three discrete acts of allegedly discriminatory discipline.
Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219-20 (4th Cir.
2007); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 113-14 (2002).
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Finally, we reject Shipman’s contention that she was
entitled to proceed to trial on her claim that her final
discharge in January 2012 was discriminatory. Because Shipman
produced no direct evidence that discrimination of any type
motivated her final termination, the district court properly
considered her claims under the burden-shifting framework
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-05 (1973). Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc.,
354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (discussing
framework); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 142-49 (2000); Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330,
334 (4th Cir. 2004).
Assuming here, as the district court did, that Shipman
established a prima facie case, we agree that the evidence was
insufficient to suggest pretext in UPS’s stated reasons for
Shipman’s January 2012 discharge--namely dishonesty,
falsification of records, and overall performance. Shipman’s
vague recounting of her brief conversations with several co-
workers did not adequately indicate that UPS had cited them for
immediately terminable misconduct comparable to that
precipitating Shipman’s final discharge. See Hill v. Michelin
N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 307, 314-15 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2001).
Moreover, standing alone, the fact that a grievance panel later
concluded that dishonesty should not have been a basis for
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Shipman’s discharge does not suggest pretext. See DeJarnette v.
Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 298-99 (4th Cir. 1998). Similarly,
Shipman’s brief allusion to evidence that she, at times, had
disputes with or was mistreated by her various supervisors is
unavailing, as such incidents are not generally probative of
discrimination. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 788-89
(4th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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