United States v. Daniel Laurey ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-7086
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL LAUREY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
James K. Bredar, Chief District Judge. (1:06-cr-00586-JKB-1)
Submitted: January 23, 2020 Decided: January 28, 2020
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Katherine Tang Newberger, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Shari Silver Derrow, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Ellen E. Nazmy,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, David I. Salem, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Laurey appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence
reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (“the Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404,
132 Stat. 5194. The court concluded that Laurey was not eligible for relief because his
Sentencing Guidelines range is driven by the career offender offense level, which was
unaffected by the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the court examined the quantity of
cocaine base attributed to Laurey by stipulation as relevant conduct rather than the quantity
of cocaine base charged in the indictment. We recently held, however, that it is the drug
quantity charged in the indictment that controls whether the defendant is eligible for relief
under the Act. United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 182, 185-86 (4th Cir. 2019). We
further clarified that a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the Act arises under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) (2018), rather than 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2018). Wirsing, 943
F.3d at 183-85.
Based on our review of the record in light of Wirsing, we conclude that Laurey is,
in fact, eligible for a sentence reduction under the Act. Accordingly, we vacate the district
court’s order and remand so that the court may consider whether to exercise its discretion
to grant Laurey’s motion. See id. at 180 (“Congress left the decision as to whether to grant
a sentence reduction to the district court’s discretion.”). We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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