United States v. Eric Byers ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-7362
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC MARIO BYERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Senior District Judge. (2:02-cr-00077-RBS-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2020 Decided: April 15, 2020
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER, Circuit Judge, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eric Mario Byers, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Mario Byers appeals the district court’s order granting his motion to reduce his
sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. In 2003,
Byers was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5
kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base (Count 1), possession
with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine (Count 2), possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 3), possession of 5 grams or more of crack
cocaine with intent to distribute (Count 4), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
(Count 5), possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 6), and possession of
an unregistered machine gun (Count 8). Byers received concurrent sentences of 360
months’ imprisonment for Counts 1, 2, and 4, and lesser concurrent sentences for the
remaining counts. In 2015, the district court reduced Byers’ sentences for Counts 1, 2, and
4 from 360 months’ imprisonment to 290 months’ imprisonment, pursuant to Amendment
782 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced the applicable Guidelines range for
certain crack cocaine offenses. In 2019, Byers moved for a reduction of sentence pursuant
to the First Step Act (“FSA”), claiming that Counts 1, 2, and 4 were eligible for reduced
sentences. We vacate and remand.
After reviewing the Government’s opposition to Byers’ motion and the Probation
Office’s FSA Worksheet, the district court granted the motion as to Count 3 and reduced
the sentence from 290 months’ imprisonment to 240 months’ imprisonment, the revised
statutory maximum for that offense. The court concluded that Byers’ conviction for Count
1 was not a covered offense because Byers was convicted of conspiring to distribute 50
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grams of crack cocaine and 5 kilograms of cocaine, and the statutory penalties for cocaine
offenses were unchanged.
Section 404(b) of the FSA provides that “[a] court that imposed a sentence for a
covered offense may, on motion of the defendant . . . impose a reduced sentence as if
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-220; 124 Stat. 2372)
were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” § 404(b). “Section 404(a)
defines a ‘covered offense’ as a violation of a federal criminal statute, the statutory
penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
that was committed before August 3, 2010.” United States v. Gravatt, __ F.3d __, __, 2020
WL 1327200, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 2020). Section 404(c) contains limitations on the
application of § 404(b) and “provides that ‘nothing in the section is to be construed to
require a court to reduce any sentence.’” Id. (quoting § 404(c)).
When the district court considered Byers’ FSA motion, it did not have the benefit
of our recent decision in Gravatt. In Gravatt, we held that a defendant convicted of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine and powder cocaine was
convicted of a covered offense under the FSA. Id., 2020 WL 1327200, at *4-5. Thus,
Byers was eligible for a reduced sentence on Count 1. Accordingly, we must vacate the
district court’s order and remand. This “decision . . . only requires that [Byers]’ sentence
receive a substantive review. It should not be construed as expressing any view on how
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the district court should rule.” * Id. 2020 WL 1327200, at *5. We deny Byers’ motion to
consolidate. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
*
The district court recognized that it had the authority to reduce Byers’ sentence for
Count 2, but chose not to do so as a matter of discretion. We take no position on the court’s
decision at this juncture. The court may, however, choose to revisit that decision.
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