United States v. Ricky Mabe ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4926
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICKY LEE MABE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:05-cr-00412-LCB-1)
Submitted: April 14, 2020 Decided: April 16, 2020
Before WILKINSON, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Albert Jamison Lang,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ricky Lee Mabe appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised
release and sentencing him to 11 months’ imprisonment. Mabe’s counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but questioning the reasonableness of Mabe’s revocation sentence.
Although advised of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief, Mabe has not done so.
We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). Only if the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable must we determine whether it is plainly so. United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007).
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable when the district court considers
the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the applicable 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) factors and adequately explains the sentence imposed. Slappy,
872 F.3d at 207; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2018) (listing relevant factors). A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the court states a proper basis for concluding that
the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Slappy,
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872 F.3d at 206. “A sentence within the policy statement range is presumed reasonable.”
United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In fashioning an appropriate sentence, “the court should sanction primarily the
defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness
of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.” U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2018). “A court need not be as detailed or specific
when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction
sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.”
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court “must address
the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence, and if the court rejects
those arguments, it must explain why in a detailed-enough manner that [we] can
meaningfully consider the procedural reasonableness of the revocation sentence imposed.”
Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208. An explanation is sufficient if we can determine “that the
sentencing court considered the applicable sentencing factors with regard to the particular
defendant before it and also considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised by
the parties with regard to sentencing.” United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir.
2018) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
We find no unreasonableness, plain or otherwise, in Mabe’s sentence. The district
court properly calculated Mabe’s policy statement range and sentenced him within that
range. While the court provided only a limited explanation for the sentence it imposed, its
statements evidence its reasoned basis for rejecting Mabe’s arguments for a sentence that
would include partial home confinement. Finally, we conclude that Mabe fails to rebut
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the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded his sentence. See Padgett, 788
F.3d at 373.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires that counsel inform Mabe, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Mabe requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may again move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Mabe. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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