United States v. Marcus Blanks ( 2020 )


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  •                                      UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 19-4432
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    MARCUS ANTONIO BLANKS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
    Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (7:18-cr-00107-BO-2)
    Submitted: February 27, 2020                                      Decided: April 20, 2020
    Before AGEE, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jamie L. Vavonese, VAVONESE LAW FIRM, PC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Marcus Antonio Blanks pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
    conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine,
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1) (2018), possession with intent to distribute a
    quantity of cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), and
    possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(i) (2018). On appeal, Blanks’ counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
    v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting there are no meritorious grounds for appeal
    but questioning whether Blanks’ sentence is procedurally reasonable. Blanks was notified
    of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so, and the Government has
    elected not to respond to the Anders brief. For the following reasons, although we affirm
    Blanks’ convictions, we vacate Blanks’ sentence and remand for resentencing.
    This court reviews criminal sentences for both procedural and substantive
    reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Lynn,
    
    912 F.3d 212
    , 216 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 
    140 S. Ct. 86
    (2019). “In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider, among other things,
    whether the court . . . considered the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) [(2018)] factors, and sufficiently
    explained the selected sentence.” 
    Id.
     “The sentencing judge should set forth enough to
    satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
    basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007). This standard requires the district court to “address or consider all
    non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why he has
    2
    rejected those arguments.” United States v. Ross, 
    912 F.3d 740
    , 744 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    140 S. Ct. 206
     (2019). “[A] perfunctory recitation of the defendant’s arguments or the
    § 3553(a) factors without application to the defendant being sentenced does not
    demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking or provide an adequate basis for appellate review.”
    United States v. Blue, 
    877 F.3d 513
    , 518 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Rather, “the district court must provide some individualized assessment justifying the
    sentence imposed and rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on
    § 3553[a].” Ross, 912 F.3d at 744 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, if the
    district court “could have made precisely the same statements in support of a different
    sentence,” then the explanation is inadequate, and we will remand for resentencing. Blue,
    877 F.3d at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    After reviewing the record, we conclude that Blanks’ sentence is procedurally
    unreasonable. The district court did not indicate that it had considered the § 3553(a)
    factors, nor did it make any statements clearly “plac[ing] on the record an individualized
    assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.” See United States v. Lynn,
    
    592 F.3d 572
    , 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the
    district court failed to respond to any of Blanks’ non-frivolous arguments in mitigation—
    including that he had not previously spent time in custody, had a limited criminal history,
    and had immediately accepted responsibility for his conduct upon arrest—although our
    precedent required it to do so. See Ross, 912 F.3d at 744. Therefore, it is impossible for
    us to ascertain the rationale behind the imposed sentence without “impermissibly
    speculat[ing] as to the reason for the district court’s sentencing decision.” Id. at 745.
    3
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
    found no further meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the convictions but
    vacate Blanks’ sentence and remand for resentencing. We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART,
    VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-4432

Filed Date: 4/20/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/20/2020