United States v. Braderick Isom ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4940
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRADERICK ISOM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (5:19-cr-00202-BO-1)
Submitted: July 21, 2020 Decided: August 7, 2020
Before KING, THACKER, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Braderick Isom appeals the 84-month upward variant sentence imposed after he pled
guilty without a plea agreement to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018). Isom argues only that the district
court abused its discretion when it imposed an upward variant sentence because, since the
Sentencing Guidelines accounted for his criminal history, the district court abused its
discretion by upwardly varying on the basis that the criminal history was understated.
Finding no error, we affirm.
“We review a sentence for reasonableness ‘under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.’” United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we
must consider both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We have confirmed that Isom’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 215, 217-19 (4th Cir. 2019).
To be substantively reasonable, then, the imposed sentence must be “sufficient, but
not greater than necessary” to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2018). In assessing substantive reasonableness, we consider “the totality of the
circumstances[.]” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. And when the district court imposes a departure
or variant sentence, we consider “whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with
respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the
divergence from the sentencing range.” United States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d
118, 123 (4th Cir. 2007). In reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines range, this court
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“may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court’s
decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 51.
Contrary to Isom’s argument that the district court erroneously relied only on his
understated criminal history to impose the upward variance, the court considered what it
believed to be Isom’s underpunished criminal history, as well as his bold probation
violations, admitted gang association, and repeated firearms possession to arrive at the
upward variant sentence. We conclude that the court’s decision that a 13-month upward
variance was warranted by the circumstances of Isom’s crimes was reasonable under the
§ 3553(a) factors and, thus, we will not disturb the sentence. See Hernandez-Villanueva,
473 F.3d at 123.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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