United States v. Rodney Hines ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4897
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RODNEY DEMARIUS HINES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:19-cr-00276-TDS-1)
Submitted: July 14, 2020 Decided: August 27, 2020
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Ames Chamberlin, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew G.T. Martin, United States Attorney, Veronica L.
Edmisten, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rodney Demarius Hines pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018). The district court calculated
Hines’ advisory sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2018) at
27 to 33 months’ imprisonment and, after imposing an upward variance, sentenced Hines
to 72 months’ imprisonment. Hines challenges the substantive reasonableness of this
sentence on appeal. We affirm. *
We review the reasonableness of a criminal sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard” and assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under “the
totality of the circumstances.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). This
standard applies whether the sentence is “inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
Guidelines range.” United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 100-01 (4th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although an above-Guidelines-range sentence carries
no presumption of reasonableness on appeal, “a sentence outside the Guidelines carries no
presumption of unreasonableness.” Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008).
In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of an above-Guidelines variant
sentence, “we consider whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to
its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from
the sentencing range.” United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014)
*
We have confirmed after review of the record that the sentence is procedurally
reasonable. See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2019).
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(internal quotation marks omitted). When a district court imposes a sentence outside of
the Guidelines’ advisory range, “it must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure
that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”
United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Extraordinary circumstances, however, are not necessary to justify a deviation from the
Guidelines range. United States v. Spencer, 848 F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 2017). “[E]ven
though we might reasonably conclude that a different sentence is appropriate, that
conclusion, standing alone, is an insufficient basis to vacate the district court’s chosen
sentence.” Zuk, 874 F.3d at 409 (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted).
Rather, “we give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors,
on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hines argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater
than necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) in view of the
fact that his offense conduct—shooting his firearm at the residence in a neighborhood
where he believed the boyfriend of the mother of some of his children resided and
threatening to shoot her—did not result in any person being hurt and in light of his
incarceration history and personal history and circumstances. Although the district court
sentenced Hines to a prison term over three years above the top of the advisory Guidelines
range, we conclude that this term does not amount to an abuse of discretion under the
totality of the circumstances. The district court properly considered and explained its
decision pursuant to relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. As the district court noted,
although Hines had experienced some mental health issues and did not shoot a person, his
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offense conduct was egregious and serious, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The conduct went
beyond mere possession of a firearm Hines knew he was not supposed to possess and
included his violent behavior of indiscriminately shooting in a residential area—evincing
his disregard for the safety of those in the neighborhood despite his capacity to understand
his conduct was inappropriate—and threatening to shoot the mother to some of his
children. The court also recognized the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of
Hines’ conduct, to protect the public, to promote respect for the law, and to afford adequate
deterrence, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C), given that Hines engaged in his offense conduct
while on probation for prior offenses and after having received a lenient prior incarceration
term but was not deterred by those experiences and given his capacity to understand his
conduct was inappropriate and irresponsible but willingness to engage in it anyway.
Giving these aggravating circumstances, the district court acted within its discretion in
imposing the 72-month upward variance sentence in this case. We thus afford due
deference to the district court’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors,
on the whole, justify the 72-month prison term. See United States v. Diosdado-Star,
630 F.3d 359, 362, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming variance sentence six years greater
than Guidelines range because sentence was based on district court’s examination of
relevant § 3553(a) factors).
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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