United States v. Daniel Scott, Jr. ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4114
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL JAY SCOTT, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00151-TDS-1)
Submitted: August 20, 2020 Decided: August 25, 2020
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William S. Trivette, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Randall Stuart Galyon,
Eleanor T. Morales, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Jay Scott, Jr., appeals the 24-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his
supervised release. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether Scott’s revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable. Scott was advised of his right
to file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so. The Government has declined to file
a response brief. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release. We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640
(4th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e first consider
whether the sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. Only
when the sentence is unreasonable will we determine whether the sentence “is plainly so.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (footnote omitted); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (listing relevant factors). “[A] revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the court sufficiently states a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted). “A sentence within the policy statement range is presumed reasonable.”
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United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, “the court should sanction primarily the
defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness
of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.” U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2018); see Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. “A court need
not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court “must address the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in
favor of a particular sentence, and if the court rejects those arguments, it must explain why
in a detailed-enough manner that [we] can meaningfully consider the procedural
reasonableness of the revocation sentence.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208.
We conclude that Scott’s sentence, which was at the top of the accurately calculated
policy statement range, is not plainly unreasonable. The district court considered Scott’s
request for the revocation sentence to run concurrently with his state sentence but
ultimately concluded that his significant breach of trust and the applicable § 3553(a) factors
warranted a consecutive sentence. See USSG § 7B1.3(f), p.s. (recommending consecutive
sentences); cf. United States v. Coombs, 857 F.3d 439, 451 (1st Cir. 2017) (explaining that
consecutive sentences are appropriate and that, “[w]ere the rule otherwise, a defendant
would effectively escape meaningful punishment for violating his supervised release
conditions”). When explaining the sentence, the court acknowledged Scott’s drug
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addiction but emphasized his failure to complete a drug treatment program and his
continued association with people who use drugs and possess firearms.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Scott, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Scott requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on Scott.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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