Clarke Veneers and Plywood v. Mentakab Veneer & Plywood ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-2428
CLARKE VENEERS AND PLYWOOD, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MENTAKAB VENEER & PLYWOOD, SDN BHD,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:19-cv-01738-GLR)
Submitted: July 13, 2020 Decided: August 25, 2020
Before WYNN, HARRIS, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua W. Stover, Cheri T. Gatlin, BURR & FORMAN, LLP, Jackson, Mississippi;
Richard L. Costella, TYDINGS & ROSENBERG, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Michael B. MacWilliams, Emily J. Wilson, VENABLE LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Clarke Veneers and Plywood, Inc. (“Clarke”) appeals the district court’s order
dismissing its complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm the district court’s
order.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
Perdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A., 814 F.3d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 2016). In evaluating a Rule
12(b)(2) motion, if “the court addresses the personal jurisdiction question by reviewing
only the parties’ motion papers, affidavits attached to the motion, supporting legal
memoranda, and the allegations in the complaint, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction to survive the jurisdictional challenge.” Grayson v.
Anderson, 816 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasis omitted). When deciding whether
the “plaintiff has made the requisite prima facie showing, the court must take the
allegations and available evidence relating to personal jurisdiction in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
[A] federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant
in the manner provided by state law. Thus, for a district court to assert
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two conditions must be
satisfied: (1) the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized under the state’s
long-arm statute; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with the
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396-97 (4th Cir.
2003) (internal citations omitted). Assuming that Maryland’s long-arm statue authorized
the exercise of jurisdiction over Mentakab Veneer & Plywood, SDN BHD (“MVP”), we
conclude that the district court cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over MVP.
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In order for a court to constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction, “a defendant
must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Consulting
Eng’rs. Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In analyzing a defendant’s minimum contacts, we consider three factors:
“(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those
activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
be constitutionally reasonable.” Id. at 278 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the second factor is dispositive in this case. This factor “requires
that the defendant’s contacts with the forum state form the basis of the suit.” Id. at 278-
79. As the Supreme Court has held, “there must be an affiliation between the forum and
the underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the
forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Bristol-Myers Squib Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). “[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or
connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Clarke’s claims all relate to the plywood allegedly being of poor quality, and related
fraud claims concerning misrepresentations concerning the quality. The contracts were not
negotiated in Maryland, nor did MVP make any misrepresentations in Maryland. Although
Clarke is currently storing the plywood in Maryland, the breach occurred before the
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plywood ever reached Maryland. See ESAB Grp., Inc v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626
(4th Cir. 1997) (“Although the place that the plaintiff feels the alleged injury is plainly
relevant to the inquiry, it must ultimately be accompanied by the defendant’s own contacts
with the state if jurisdiction over the defendant is to be upheld.”). Moreover, although
Clarke asks us to consider post-breach conduct concerning MVP’s attempts to find a buyer
for the plywood, Clarke’s complaint did not raise a claim arising out of this issue. The
only allegation in the complaint is that Clarke continues to incur storage costs and that its
storage facility is in Maryland; however, this is voluntary conduct on the part of Clarke.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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