Samuel Jackson v. Jennifer Holley , 666 F. App'x 242 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-6896
SAMUEL R. JACKSON,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JENNIFER HOLLEY, Psychologist,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
DAVID MAY, Captain; LEE FUTRELLE, Psychologist Program
Manager; VERDEEN B. BENJAMIN, Disciplinary Hearing Officer;
LEWIS ROWE, Unit Manager; DENNIS DANIELS, Superintendent,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:14-ct-03238-BO)
Submitted: November 10, 2016 Decided: November 18, 2016
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy
Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Samuel R. Jackson, Appellee Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Jennifer Holley, a staff psychologist at Maury Correctional
Institution, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying
her motion to dismiss North Carolina prisoner, Samuel R.
Jackson’s, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint alleging Holley
sexually harassed Jackson. The district court denied Holley’s
motion to dismiss because it found that Holley was not entitled
to qualified immunity. Jackson has moved to dismiss Holley’s
appeal, asserting that the appeal is interlocutory. Jackson has
also filed a self-styled “Motion to Invalidate[,]” summarily
asking that this court invalidate Holley’s appellate
submissions. We deny the pending motions and vacate and remand
to the district court.
First, we disagree with Jackson that we lack jurisdiction
over this appeal. Admittedly, this court may exercise
jurisdiction only over final decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012),
and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). A final decision is
one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). Because qualified immunity is
an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,
however, orders denying qualified immunity may be immediately
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appealable collateral orders. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 233-
34 (4th Cir. 2008).
An order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity
is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine
only “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law[.]”
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). However, a
district court’s determination that a genuine issue of material
fact exists to preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds is not immediately appealable. Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 313-20 (1995); Culosi v. Bullock, 596 F.3d 195, 201
(4th Cir. 2010).
Viewing the complaint’s allegations in the light most
favorable to Jackson, and noting that a video allegedly exists
to substantiate those allegations, the district court concluded
that “qualified immunity is inappropriate given that the
plaintiff’s complaint states sufficient factual allegations
that, if true, show a violation of clearly established
constitutional rights.” Thus, the district court found that
Jackson’s “Eighth Amendment claims are alleged and supported by
the facts[.]” Moreover, Holley asserts on appeal that even
assuming all facts as alleged by Jackson are taken as true,
Jackson’s allegations do not legally amount to an Eighth
Amendment violation. Holley therefore presents only legal
arguments on appeal. Because the district court’s disposition,
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and Holley’s arguments on appeal, present this court with purely
legal questions, we have jurisdiction over Holley’s appeal and
deny Jackson’s motion to dismiss.
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, we disagree with
the district court’s determination that Holley was not entitled
to qualified immunity. We review de novo a district court’s
decision on a motion to dismiss. See Coleman v. Md. Ct. of
App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). When ruling on such a
motion, “a judge must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). A complaint “need only
give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 93 (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted).
However, “plaintiffs may proceed into the litigation
process only when their complaints are justified by both law and
fact.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.
2009). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must
“state[] a plausible claim for relief” that “permit[s] the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” based
upon “its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
It is well-established that “the treatment a prisoner
receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined
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are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted). There can be little doubt that sexual abuse is
repugnant to contemporary standards of decency, and that
allegations of sexual abuse can amount to an Eighth Amendment
violation. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 118 (2006)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Accordingly, those inmates who are
sexually assaulted by guards, or whose sexual assaults by other
inmates are facilitated by guards, have suffered grave
deprivations of their Eighth Amendment rights.”); Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834 (“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not
part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Supreme Court has held, however, that “not every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause
of action.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[a]n inmate who complains of
a push or a shove that causes no discernible injury almost
certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.” Id. at
38 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[a]lthough
prisoners have a right to be free from sexual abuse, whether at
the hands of fellow inmates or prison guards, the Eighth
Amendment’s protections do not necessarily extend to mere verbal
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sexual harassment.” Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Jackson alleges only that Holley: (1) sent
him one “sexually explicit and lurid” letter; (2) “posed up
seductively before [Jackson] and whispered sexually explicit
words to [him;]” and (3) “plant[ed] her groin area in
[Jackson’s] face while [he] was seated for [his] haircut in the
barber’s chair.” We conclude that the conduct about which
Jackson complains does not amount to an Eighth Amendment
violation. * See Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38-39. Thus, Holley was
entitled to qualified immunity and her motion to dismiss should
have been granted by the district court. See Henry v. Purnell,
652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (reiterating that to determine
whether qualified immunity protects a prison official, this
court must ask “first whether a constitutional violation
occurred and second whether the right violated was clearly
established”).
*
Given the lack of circuit authority regarding whether
sexual harassment by prison officials amounts to a
constitutional violation, we also find that it was not
unreasonable for Holley to have “failed to appreciate that h[er]
conduct would violate [Jackson’s] rights.” Meyers v. Baltimore
Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, even if the conduct about which Jackson
complains is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation,
Holley is entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong
of the qualified immunity inquiry.
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Based on the foregoing, we deny Jackson’s motions to
invalidate and to dismiss this appeal, and we vacate the
district court’s order denying Holley’s motion to dismiss and
remand with instructions to enter judgment in Holley’s favor on
Jackson’s § 1983 claim. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
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