United States v. Isaac Jones , 674 F. App'x 318 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ISAAC EZELL JONES, a/k/a Ike,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:14-cr-00667-JFA-4)
Submitted: December 20, 2016 Decided: January 9, 2017
Before THACKER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Leslie T. Sarji, SARJI LAW FIRM, LLC, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellant. John David Rowell, Assistant United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Isaac Ezell Jones pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more
of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). The
district court imposed a variant sentence of 95 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Jones’ counsel filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the
district court made several errors in calculating Jones’
Sentencing Guidelines range.
Following our review of the record, we ordered merits
briefing, directing the parties to address whether the district
court committed plain error in imposing a Guidelines enhancement
for possession of a dangerous weapon, pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1). The Government now
moves to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the appellate waiver
provision in Jones’ plea agreement. Jones opposes the motion.
For the reasons that follow, we grant the Government’s motion
and dismiss the appeal.
We review de novo the issue of whether a defendant validly
waived his right to appeal. United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d
522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013). Where, as here, the Government seeks
to enforce the appeal waiver and has not breached the plea
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agreement, we will enforce the waiver if it is valid and the
issue being appealed falls within the waiver’s scope. United
States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
A defendant’s waiver of appellate rights is valid if he
entered it “knowingly and intelligently.” United States v.
Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010). Generally, if the
district court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver
provision during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is
valid and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137,
151 (4th Cir. 2005).
In his plea agreement, Jones waived his right to appeal
both his conviction and sentence, reserving only his right to
raise certain postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The language of the
waiver is clear and unambiguous, and our review of the record
reveals that Jones understood its full significance. We
therefore conclude that Jones’ waiver is valid and enforceable.
Even “a defendant who waives his right to appeal does not
subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the
district court.” United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th
Cir. 1992). Thus, we will refuse to enforce a valid waiver to
preclude review of “a few narrowly-construed errors” that fall
automatically outside the scope of the waiver. Johnson, 410
F.3d at 151. This “narrow class of claims” includes “errors
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that the defendant could not have reasonably contemplated when
the plea agreement was executed.” United States v. Poindexter,
492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[T]he type of ‘illegal’ sentence which a defendant
can successfully challenge despite an appeal waiver involves
fundamental issues, including claims that a district court
exceeded its authority, premised its sentence on a
constitutionally impermissible factor such as race, or violated
the post-plea right to counsel.” Copeland, 707 F.3d at 530
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United
States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537-40 (4th Cir. 2012)
(discussing narrow class of unwaivable sentencing claims).
Jones attempts to characterize his appellate argument as a
due process challenge that falls within the narrow class of
unwaivable sentencing claims. However, his merits brief readily
belies this argument. Our review of Jones’ submissions leads us
to conclude that Jones’ challenge to the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)
enhancement amounts to a garden-variety claim of procedural
sentencing error falling squarely within the waiver’s broad
compass.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no potentially meritorious
issues that fall outside the scope of the appeal waiver. We
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therefore grant the Government’s motion and dismiss Jones’
appeal.
This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing,
of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jones.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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