United States v. Gary Lyles , 675 F. App'x 303 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4276
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
GARY WAYNE LYLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:14-cr-00377-NCT-24)
Submitted: December 21, 2016 Decided: January 18, 2017
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Elisa C. Salmon, SALMON LAW FIRM, LLP, Lillington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Wayne Lyles pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine with intent
to manufacture methamphetamine. He received an 82-month
sentence. On appeal, he argues that his sentence is
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a defendant’s sentence for an abuse of
discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In
reviewing a district court’s decision to apply a sentencing
enhancement, “[w]e accord due deference to a district court’s
application of the sentencing guidelines.” United States v.
Steffen, 741 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 2013). We review the
district court’s factual determinations for clear error. Id.
However, “if the issue turns primarily on the legal
interpretation of a guideline term, the standard moves closer to
de novo review.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The district court imposed a two-level enhancement for the
unlawful transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of a
hazardous waste, under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2D1.11(b)(3)(B) (2014). For the enhancement to apply, the
defendant’s conduct must violate one of several environmental
statutes, including the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2012). USSG § 2D1.11 cmt. n.4. Lyles
2
asserts that the district court erred in applying this
enhancement.
We assume, without deciding, that the court erred in its
determination. Even if the court erred in assessing the
enhancement, “harmless error review applies to a district
court’s procedural sentencing errors made during its Guidelines
calculation.” United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382
(4th Cir. 2014). Thus, “we commonly assume, without deciding,
an error in performing harmless error inquiry.” United States
v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2011). A
“Guidelines error is harmless if we believe (1) the district
court would have reached the same result even if it had decided
the guidelines issue the other way, and (2) the sentence would
be [substantively] reasonable even if the guidelines issue had
been decided in the defendant’s favor.” United States v.
Parral-Dominguez, 794 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2015) (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming
that the application of the USSG § 2D1.11(b)(3)(B) enhancement
was in error, that error was harmless.
Although the district court applied the enhancement, it
“backed out” the increased two offense levels because other
defendants involved in the same conspiracy did not receive the
same enhancement. The court sentenced Lyles based on the
Guidelines range without consideration of the enhancement.
3
Thus, any potential error from applying the enhancement is moot
and harmless. See Parral-Dominguez, 794 F.3d at 447.
Lyles also argues that his 82-month sentence is
substantively reasonable because it is higher than necessary to
meet the considerations of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors under the totality of the circumstances. Lyles argues
that he had a limited criminal history consisting of relatively
minor offenses, that prior to his methamphetamine addiction he
had a solid and stable lifestyle, and that after receiving drug
rehabilitation, he would be an unlikely recidivist.
If a sentence is free of “significant procedural error,” as
is the case here, we review it for substantive reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “Any sentence that is within or below a
properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir. 2014). “Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing
that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
Lyles has not rebutted the presumption that his
below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. The
district court considered that Lyles did not “offend[] greatly,”
and that Lyles sincerely took responsibility for his offense.
The court stated that it felt “optimistic” about Lyles’
4
potential when listening to him allocute. The court also noted
Lyles’ employment history and limited criminal history and
considered the need for correctional drug treatment. The court
also stated that the methamphetamine offense involved a serious
drug and a serious problem. Viewing the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that Lyles has failed to overcome the
presumption of reasonableness accorded his below-Guidelines
sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5