United States v. Artist , 381 F. App'x 276 ( 2010 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4746
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    WILLIE LEE ARTIST,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Malcolm J. Howard,
    Senior District Judge. (5:03-cr-00106-H-2)
    Submitted:   May 18, 2010                     Decided:   June 4, 2010
    Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research
    and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    John Stuart Bruce, First Assistant United States Attorney,
    Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
    Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Willie Lee Artist appeals from his twenty-one month
    sentence imposed upon the revocation of his supervised release.
    On appeal, Artist asserts that his sentence is both procedurally
    and    substantively       plainly     unreasonable.          Specifically,           he
    contends    that    the     district     court   failed       to     consider        the
    statutory sentencing factors in choosing to impose a consecutive
    sentence, failed to provide reasoning for choosing the specific
    sentence, and essentially treated the Guidelines as mandatory.
    In addition, Artist asserts that his state sentence adequately
    addressed   the    relevant      sentencing    factors    and       was   sufficient
    punishment.      We affirm.
    We    review    a    sentence     imposed    as     a    result     of     a
    supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence
    is plainly unreasonable.          United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    ,
    437 (4th Cir. 2006).             The first step in this analysis is a
    determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable.                        
    Id. at 438
    .    In determining reasonableness, we follow generally the
    procedural and substantive considerations employed in reviewing
    original sentences.        
    Id.
        However, “[t]his initial inquiry takes
    a more ‘deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact
    and the exercise of discretion’ than reasonableness review for
    guidelines sentences.”           United States v. Moulden, 
    478 F.3d 652
    ,
    656 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 438
    ).
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    When imposing sentence, a district court must conduct
    an “individualized assessment” of the particular facts of every
    sentence, whether the court imposes a sentence above, below, or
    within the guidelines range.                 United States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    ,     330    (4th        Cir.    2009).       While    “[t]his     individualized
    assessment      need        not    be   elaborate   or   lengthy,     . . .   it   must
    provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and
    adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.”                       
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).                         In addition, “[w]here
    [the   parties]        present[]        nonfrivolous     reasons    for   imposing   a
    . . . sentence [outside the advisory guidelines range,] . . . a
    district judge should address the party’s arguments and explain
    why he has rejected those arguments.”                          
    Id. at 328
     (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).                     An appellate court may
    not guess at a district court’s sentencing rationale. 
    Id. at 329-30
    ; see also United States v. Thompson, 
    595 F.3d 544
    , 547
    (4th Cir. 2010) (applying Carter to revocation hearings, but
    noting that “[a] court need not be as detailed or specific when
    imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
    post-conviction sentence . . . .”).
    Here,        even    assuming     that     the      district   court’s
    consideration          of    Artist’s     arguments      and    explanation   of   the
    sentence imposed was insufficient, we review the issue for plain
    error.     Although Artist and his counsel spoke extensively about
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    his background and circumstances at sentencing, they failed to
    request a sentence different than the one imposed.                           Artist did
    not request a sentence lower than the Guidelines range or a
    sentence    concurrent           with   his   state     sentence.        Accordingly,
    Artist did not preserve his objection to the adequacy of the
    explanation      of    the       sentence     and,    therefore,       his    procedural
    claims are reviewed for plain error.                   See United States v. Lynn,
    
    592 F.3d 572
    , 580 (4th Cir. 2010).
    “To establish plain error, [Artist] must show that an
    error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
    affected his substantial rights.”                    United States v. Muhammad,
    
    478 F.3d 247
    , 249 (4th Cir. 2007).                      Moreover, even if Artist
    satisfies these requirements, “correction of the error remains
    within [the court’s] discretion, which [the court] should not
    exercise    .    .     .    unless      the   error     seriously      affect[s]     the
    fairness,       integrity          or    public        reputation       of      judicial
    proceedings.”          
    Id.
           (internal        quotation    marks    and     citation
    omitted).         In       the    sentencing        context,    an     error    affects
    substantial rights if the defendant can show that the sentence
    imposed “was longer than that to which he would otherwise be
    subject.”       United States v. Washington, 
    404 F.3d 834
    , 849 (4th
    Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
    also United States v. Miller, 
    557 F.3d 910
    , 916 (8th Cir. 2009)
    (“In the sentencing context, an error was prejudicial only if
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    there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have
    received a lighter sentence but for the error.”).
    Here, Artist fails to assert on appeal that he would
    have    received    a   lesser     sentence       had    the    court    addressed       his
    arguments in pronouncing the sentence.                    Artist was sentenced at
    the low end of the advisory Guidelines range, based on several
    supervised      release    violations        occurring         over     the    course    of
    several months.         Additionally, the motion for revocation noted
    that Artist had violated his supervised release as early as five
    days after he was released from prison and continued to do so
    throughout his supervision period.                     Therefore, we conclude that
    Artist    has     not    demonstrated           that    the    court’s        failure     to
    specifically address his arguments and articulate its reasoning
    affected his substantial rights.                  As such, there was no plain
    error arising from any procedural irregularities.
    As to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
    Artist    fails    to    rebut    the     presumption         that    his     sentence    is
    reasonable.       United States v. Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir.
    2007)    (holding       that     sentence       within     a    properly       calculated
    Guidelines range is reasonable).                   Artist was sentenced at the
    bottom of his correctly calculated Guidelines range, even though
    he had a history of repeated supervised release violations.                              The
    court had discretion to impose a consecutive or a concurrent
    sentence,    see    United       States    v.     Contreras-Martinez,           
    409 F.3d
                                           5
    1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2005); its decision was rendered after
    hearing   argument     from    both   parties;   and   the   record    does   not
    support Artist’s assertion that the district court applied the
    Guidelines in a mandatory manner.           Accordingly, we conclude that
    substantively Artist’s sentence was not plainly unreasonable.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm Artist’s sentence.
    We   dispense   with    oral    argument    because    the   facts    and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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